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LES TYPES DE RÉPRÉSENTATION DE L'ACTIVITÉ SOCIALE: RÉFLEXION SUR DEUX MODÈLES

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«Dans le champ anglophone de la théorie du social,...), le problème n'est plus celui du retour du sujet, puisque ce retour s'est accompli (...). Aujourd'hui le principal objectif théorique est plutôt de parvenir à reconnaître le bien-fondé du virage en direction de la subjectivité tout en évitant de basculer à nouveau dans un subjectivisme à tout crin.» A. Giddens

Depuis un certain nombre d'années, une vingtaine si l'on suit le mouvement des idées aux Etats-Unis, en Angleterre et en Allemagne, plus récemment en France on constate que les approches compréhensives et phénoménologiques restées souterraines pendant le structuralo-marxisme reprennent de l'importance, en même temps que les interrogations portant sur la production de la société plutôt que sur sa reproduction. De telles approches insistent sur le concours nécessaire des individus à la production de la société. Les analyses d'A. Giddens me paraissent illustrer ce mouvement et c'est à partir d'elles, que je développerai un certain nombre de remarques. Dans la constitution de la société, Giddens faisait remarquer que les perspectives théoriques actuelles - mis à part, le structuralisme et le post-structuralisme-, partagent un certain nombre de traits communs. Elles insistent sur trois points: 1) une réévaluation de l'acteur et de sa capacité auto-réflexive, une insistance sur le fait que l'acteur peut mettre sa situation en perspective. Mettre sa situation en perspective signifie deux choses: lorsque j'agis mon action dépend des comptes rendus et des raisons que je peux en donner, d'une part, de l'autre lorsque je donne des raisons il est possible que je mette à distance mon

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expérience et que j'y découvre des éléments auxquels je n'avais pas pensé en agissant. L'action ne dépend pas seulement des intentions, il faut analyser les capacités et les compétences qui la caractérisent. L'important est situé dans la reconnaissance que l'acteur peut se distancier de sa conduite, et en quelque sorte l'accompagner de commentaires, dont on ne voit pas pourquoi le caractère illusoire serait la caractéristique centrale. Cela, Max Weber le soulignait déjà, dans ses travaux de logique des sciences de la culture, lorsqu'il indiquait qu'à travers le dialogue conjugal, à propos d'une gifle donnée à un enfant, l'expérience vécue était mise à distance et s'enrichissait toujours de perspectives et de relations dont on n'a justement pas conscience au moment où on la vit. Le premier point insiste sur la possibilité de la réflexivité, et donc manifeste le rejet d'une «conception de la conduite humaine (...) selon laquelle une telle conduite résulte de forces que les acteurs ne peuvent ni contrôler, ni même comprendre»⁽¹⁾ On trouvera dans l'espace sociologique français la même idée chez A. Touraine, qui le mène à prôner l'étude des mouvements sociaux et à reconnaître que les sciences sociales sont de plus en plus conduites à abandonner leur langage déterministe pour utiliser celui d'acteurs sociaux. Ce qui veut aussi dire que «l'acteur n'est pas celui qui agit conformément à la place qu'il occupe dans l'organisation sociale, mais celui qui modifie l'environnement matériel et surtout social dans lequel il est placé en transformant la division du travail, les modes de décision, les modes de domination ou les orientations culturelles.»⁽²⁾ Une telle approche n'est pas sans conséquence on s'en doute, sur la manière d'analyser les conflits. M. Wieworka précise en s'inscrivant dans cette démarche qu'il s'agit «de contribuer à une recomposition de la sociologie qui puisse intégrer, tout à la fois, une prise en compte du sujet et une perspective historique.»⁽³⁾ Bref, les acteurs, le vécu ne sont plus perçus comme le mal absolu, ce qu'aperçoit avec beaucoup de retard un des auteurs qui aura le plus combattu ces références: P. Bourdieu 1991. N'affirme-t-il pas maintenant: «il m'a fallu beaucoup de temps pour comprendre que le refus de l'existence était un piège.»

2) Le langage et les capacités cognitives dans leurs relations aux activités courantes ou quotidiennes, sont envisagés à nouveaux frais, ici

(1) A. Giddens, *La constitution de la société*, Paris, Puf, 1986, p. 26.

(2) A. Touraine, *Critique de la modernité*, Paris, Fayard, 1992, p. 243.

(3) M. Wieworka, *La démocratie à l'épreuve*, La découverte/Essais, Paris, 1993, p. 19.

structuralisme et post-structuralisme sont aussi concernés. Le langage et les descriptions de la vie courante qu'il rend possible sont à la fois ce qui permet aux individus de réaliser leurs activités et d'en rendre compte. Comme le disent les ethnométhodologues, les activités à travers lesquelles les membres d'un groupe produisent et organisent leurs affaires quotidiennes émergent des mêmes procédures que celles qui leur servent à rendre compte de ces activités. C'est parce que je peux dire ce que je fais que je suis capable de faire ce que je dis. L'accent mis sur les compétences des acteurs à rendre compte de leurs activités implique que soit refusée une conception sociologique qui fait des acteurs des «idiots culturels» (*cultural dopes*) tenant pour épiphénomène leurs interprétations et les considérant uniquement déterminées par le système social ou culturel. Il est clair que la défense d'une perspective comme celle de J. Habermas qui tient l'activité communicationnelle pour centrale et désirable ne peut que s'appuyer sur de telles transformations de la perception des acteurs. Une telle conceptualisation, même idéalisée, sert de toile de fond à son entreprise.

3) Les épistémologies dites conventionnelles ont mis en évidence que le langage et l'interprétation des significations concernent également les sciences exactes. Ces épistémologies font remarquer que l'expérience est «theory laden». Il nous faut alors reconnaître, d'une part, que depuis la moindre crédibilité des épistémologies empiristes en théorie des sciences, la fracture et la distance, qui séparent les sciences de la nature et les sciences humaines, sont plus importantes que ne le pensaient ces théories et que, d'autre part, si les sciences de la nature sont également confrontées aux questions d'interprétation elles seront obligées de s'intéresser aux questions que traitaient et que traitent ce que Giddens nomme les nouvelles théories du social. La dernière remarque qui peut être faite à propos des transformations théoriques épistémologiques concerne la notion d'objectivité et sa conception. I. Prigogine et I. Stengers ont rappelé que «longtemps un idéal d'objectivité issu des sciences physiques a dominé et divisé les sciences. Une science, pour être digne de ce titre devait «définir son objet», déterminer les variables en fonction desquelles les comportements observés pourraient être expliqués, voire prévus. Aujourd'hui une nouvelle conception de l'«objectivité scientifique» est en train de naître, qui met en lumière le caractère complémentaire et non contradictoire des sciences expérimentales qui créent et manipulent leurs

objets, et des sciences narratives, qui ont pour problème les histoires qui se construisent en créant leur propre sens.»⁽⁴⁾ Pour qui est habitué à pratiquer une épistémologie de type wébérienne et à penser l'objectivité propre aux sciences de la culture, il n'y a là rien de neuf, si ce n'est qu'est levée l'hypothèque scientiste sur la connaissance.

C'est en fonction des trois tournants que j'ai abordés qu'il faut selon Giddens réenvisager la théorie du social, c'est-à-dire tenir compte des «enjeux qui ont trait à la nature de l'action humaine et à celle du soi agissant, à la conceptualisation de l'interaction et de ses relations avec les institutions, à la compréhension des connotations et des implications de l'«analyse» sociale sur le plan pratique.»⁽⁵⁾ Autrement dit, il est fondamental de se mettre au clair sur les conceptions de l'agent humain et sur ce que l'on entend par activités sociales. Ma réflexion s'inscrit dans le cadre général des théories qui font de l'action et de l'activité sociale le point central de la démarche sociologique. Dire que la sociologie dépend du modèle d'acteur qu'elle construit, c'est aussi souligner que, quoi qu'elles en aient et quoique qu'elles en pensent les sciences sociales sont redevables de conceptions philosophiques concernant tant la conception de la nature de l'action humaine que la mise en jeu de théories de la conscience. Comme l'indique R. Boudon, ces théories de la conscience peuvent être plus ou moins acceptables et pour ce qui concerne la sociologie individualiste celle-ci «reprend en totalité ou par morceaux la théorie de la conscience qui s'est développée notamment dans la philosophie et la sociologie allemandes (*Simmel, Weber, Husserl*), mais aussi dans la philosophie anglaise (*Ryle, MacIntyre*). Elle admet bien l'existence d'un inconscient, mais elle ne se donne le droit ni de le transformer en boîte de Pandore, ni de lui prêter une efficience causale. Dans ce courant de pensée, on admet par exemple l'existence des habitudes, mais on s'interdit de conclure qu'elles puissent transformer l'acteur social en somnambule.»⁽⁶⁾ La remarque vaut à mon sens sans que

(4) I. Prigogine, I. Stengers, *Entre le temps et l'éternité*, Flammarion, Paris, 1992, p. 179.

(5) A. Giddens, *La constitution de la société*, Paris, Puf, 1986, p. 27. J'ai développé les relations entre savoir profane et savoir sociologique dans *La sociologie et les représentations de l'activité sociale*. Paris. Méridiens Klincksieck/Masson, 1996. Sur ce thème cf. aussi M. Maffesoli, *La connaissance ordinaire*, Paris, Méridiens Klincksieck, 1985.

(6) R. Boudon, *L'idéologie*, Fayard, Paris, 1986, note 10, p. 304.

l'on adopte nécessairement une démarche du type que prône l'individualisme méthodologique; on notera avec R. Aron la présence implicite «dans toutes les théories sociologiques élaborées (...) d'une certaine image de l'homme et de la société qui équivaut à une philosophie de l'homme et de la société.»⁽⁷⁾ Le poids respectif accordé à la responsabilité, aux contraintes, à l'action ou aux structures, l'idée qu'il existe des lois, tous ces éléments peuvent être différemment composés dans une théorie du social. Le retour vers l'action indique une insatisfaction vis-à-vis des théories qui supposaient qu'il n'y a de sciences humaines comme le soutenait par exemple Foucault dans «Les mots et les choses», que dans le registre de l'inconscient, des normes, des règles sans position réflexive à leur égard.

Remarquons que ces conceptions de l'action, de la conscience ou de la non conscience avec la part de déterminisme qu'elles intègrent ou non, ne sont pas l'apanage du sociologue, les agents en formulent à leur propos, au sujet des autres, ils connaissent aussi des théories savantes et ils peuvent les actualiser dans l'accomplissement de leurs actes. Si les acteurs ont des conceptions de ce qu'un individu peut faire ou réaliser, il en résulte que le sociologue ne découvre pas ces conceptions mais qu'il peut les formuler différemment ou replacer ces conceptions et les activités des agents dans des circonstances que ceux-ci ignorent; mais de fait les conceptions du sociologue ne sont pas séparables de ce que les agents savent à propos des activités. M. Hollis résume une des caractéristiques centrales des idées des acteurs en soulignant: «Parmi les idées qui agitent les gens, il y a celles à propos de ce qui les fait bouger»⁽⁸⁾. La séparation d'avec les conceptions qui font du leurre ou de l'illusion la caractéristique centrale de la pratique est donc nette. Dans un tel cadre, il est de la plus haute importance de pouvoir se doter de «moyens conceptuels qui permettent d'analyser ce que savent les acteurs à propos de ce pourquoi ils font ce qu'ils font, en particulier lorsque ces acteurs ne sont pas conscients (de façon discursive) qu'ils le savent, ou lorsque des acteurs dans d'autres contextes n'ont pas une telle conscience discursive.»⁽⁹⁾ Il est donc nécessaire d'être au clair sur ce que les agents peuvent savoir, et sur ce qu'ils peuvent faire, ce qui va en effet à

(7) Leçons sur l'histoire n31 p. 587.

(8) *The Cunning of Reason* 1987, Cambridge University Press.

(9) Ibid. p. 30.

l'encontre du présupposé des théories structurales et objectivistes pour qui ce sont des forces qui poussent, sans que la capacité de l'agent ne soit réellement prise en compte. Disons qu'il peut accompagner la tendance. Si on ne veut pas attribuer à des forces ce qui peut relever de la capacité de l'agent, il faut savoir ce qu'un agent quelconque peut faire arriver, et si nous sommes dans le cadre d'une interaction comme le souligne Goffman «nul observateur n'est mieux placé pour percer à jour le jeu d'un acteur que cet acteur lui-même»⁽¹⁰⁾. Cela dit, il serait bien sûr restrictif de limiter son jugement sur la situation à sa propre présentation et prestation, car l'acteur met en œuvre des rationalités de sens commun pour définir et agir la situation. La relation au rôle social démontre que l'acteur connaît les modes de présentation de soi, qu'il est capable de faire une distinction entre une présentation qu'il pense authentique et une autre qui serait simplement une prise de rôle social. A travers la maîtrise des capacités expressives, les individus managent les impressions que les autres reçoivent et créent des définitions de la réalité sociale. Ce techniques expressives supposent un sens aiguisé des conditions et des situations sociales. En ce sens: «Il n'existe aucun mécanisme d'organisation et de reproduction sociale déjà repéré par des analystes du social que des acteurs «ordinaires» ne peuvent parvenir à connaître et à incorporer de façon active dans ce qu'ils font. Dans un très grand nombre de cas les «trouvailles» des sociologues ne sont telles que pour ceux et celles qui ne se trouvent pas dans les contextes d'activité des acteurs étudiés. Puisque les acteurs ont des raisons de faire ce qu'ils font, il est facile de comprendre qu'ils seront probablement déconcertés d'apprendre de la bouche d'un sociologue que leurs actions dérivent de facteurs qui en quelque sorte agissent sur eux de l'extérieur. Ainsi, les «objections ordinaires» qu'ils dirigent contre de telles trouvailles peuvent reposer sur une base très solide. La réification est loin de caractériser uniquement la pensée ordinaire.»⁽¹¹⁾

De plus, on peut avancer que ce qui arrive aux agents varie en fonction de ce que ces derniers peuvent apprendre à faire arriver, mais cette question est distincte de celle de la connaissance discursive ou

(10) E. Goffman, *La mise en scène de la vie quotidienne, La présentation de soi*, Paris, Minuit, 1973, p. 25.

(11) A. Giddens, *La constitution de la société*, Paris, P.U.F. 1988, p. 346. Cf aussi P. Watier, *réflexivité institutionnelle et modes de vie*, *Sociétés* no 48, 1995, p. 133-147.

pratique qu'ils peuvent avoir de ce savoir. Disons dans les mots de Giddens ce que nous avons déjà affirmé à savoir que «Les agents humains sont capables de comprendre ce qu'ils font pendant qu'ils le font, cette capacité est inhérente à ce qu'ils font.» Ils ne pourraient faire ce qu'ils font s'ils n'étaient dotés d'une capacité réflexive, mais cette capacité ne se transforme pas automatiquement en connaissance discursive, elle est, surtout si elle n'est pas trop sollicitée, essentiellement pratique et cette connaissance pratique consiste en savoir faire, qui ne sont pas forcément thématiques en tant que tels.

Ils ne pourraient faire ce qu'ils font s'ils n'étaient dotés d'une capacité réflexive, mais cette capacité ne se transforme pas automatiquement en connaissance discursive, elle est, surtout si elle n'est pas trop sollicitée, essentiellement pratique et cette connaissance pratique est tout ce que «les agents connaissent de façon tacite, tout ce qu'ils peuvent faire dans la vie sociale sans pour autant pouvoir l'exprimer de manière discursive.»⁽¹²⁾ Il s'agit surtout pour Giddens de sortir des représentations de la société comme structures qui contraignent, et des théories qui ont pour conséquence de ne pas percevoir les structures comme intégrantes à l'action humaine. Mais il faut ici souligner qu'elles ne sont pas simplement situées dans les individus sous forme de dispositions ou de dispositifs intériorisés qui semblent mécaniquement assurer un ajustement par delà la multiplicité des situations. Dans une telle conception, quels que soient les domaines d'activité c'est toujours un seul principe générateur de conduites qui est appelé à la rescousse pour rendre compte des activités, et ce principe générateur a pour caractéristique centrale d'échapper à la conscience des agents. Bien entendu, l'inconscient n'est ici que le terme générique, l'*habitus* étant sa traduction en sociologie, le biais par lequel la structure serait faite homme. Prendre en compte des habitudes, envisager la socialisation ne disparaît pas de la perspective sociologique, mais, il faut les concevoir autrement que sous la seule forme de contraintes pour l'action.

C'est donc le modèle classique de conception de l'action qui est remis en cause et surtout l'ensemble d'hypothèses implicites qui sous-tendent la représentation de l'action. A. Cicourel en donne la description suivante: «la méthode traditionnelle du sociologue est de doter son modèle

(12) Giddens, *ibid.*, p. 33.

d'acteur de la possibilité d'attribuer des significations, mais seulement après avoir présupposé que ces attitudes et ces normes intériorisées constituent des guides automatiques pour la prise d'un rôle. L'intériorisation des normes est supposée conduire à l'application automatique de certaines règles dans les situations appropriées.»⁽¹³⁾ Mais lorsque le sociologue fait l'hypothèse que ce qu'il observe est le résultat de normes intériorisées, il oublie que son accès à ce qu'il voit, entend, saisit, passe par des procédés interprétatifs qui sont ceux-là mêmes qui ont cours dans la vie ordinaire, et que c'est grâce à eux qu'il est dans une situation de communication avec son «objet d'études.» Le sociologue utilise une connaissance tacite pour rendre compte du groupe ou des individus qu'il étudie, et cette connaissance, cette utilisation de procédés interprétatifs proviennent de «sa propre appartenance à la société et non pas de sa formation professionnelle ou des connaissances acquises dans sa recherche.» Dès lors, la reconnaissance de l'existence des procédés interprétatifs conduit à admettre que le chercheur doit s'appuyer sur «ce que tout le monde sait» ou sur sa capacité à jouer le rôle de membre compétent de la culture ou de la société qu'il étudie.⁽¹⁴⁾ La question sur les buts de la recherche se transforme et la quête des seules fausses raisons ou des perspectives incongrues de l'action n'apparaît pas comme le seul objectif que la sociologie puisse se fixer. Il nous faut penser dans son ensemble, sa globalité mais aussi ses spécificités, ce que nous nommons activité sociale, et, de fait, reposer dans toute son ampleur la question des relations entre action, environnement et sujet. Pour résumer par un terme, on dira que la conception de l'ordre social s'est déplacée d'une conception normative vers une conception cognitive, qui a pour corollaire le rejet de l'individualisme méthodologique et du holisme au profit d'un «situationisme méthodologique».⁽¹⁵⁾

La modification concernant l'action touche également la conception des structures sociales: comprises comme conditions limitant les possibilités elles ne contraignent pas à agir de telle ou telle manière, pas plus que des lois du système n'interdiraient à des agents de savoir ce qu'ils font, ni n'empêcheraient qu'ils puissent prendre une connaissance

(13) A. Cicourel, *La Sociologie Cognitive*, Paris, P.U.F., p. 57.

(14) Ibid, p. 70 et 88.

(15) Knorr-cetina, K. Cicourel A. V (eds.), *Advances in social theory and methodology*, Boston 1981, p. 2.

réflexive des conditions de leurs actions. Prendre conscience des conditions de l'action ne veut pas dire connaître toutes les conditions de l'action. S'engageant dans la voie qui reconnaît «le retour du sujet» dans la théorie du social, il est nécessaire de «revoir les conceptions du développement social des êtres humains».⁽¹⁶⁾ Cela nécessite aussi à mon sens un retour sur les théories de la socialisation, et une nouvelle évaluation des théories qui font de l'intériorisation un processus unilatéral, de l'extérieur vers l'intérieur. S'interroger sur les conceptions à propos des acteurs, c'est se rendre compte que toute théorie du social repose sur une image des capacités virtuelles de l'acteur, que savent-ils à propos de leur propre histoire? par exemple, que savent-ils faire arriver? les justifications qu'ils donnent, la réflexivité qu'ils mettent en œuvre, la perspicacité dont ils peuvent faire preuve, comment sont-elles mises à contribution? Bien entendu, le rôle des orientations morales de l'action peut également entrer en ligne de compte. Disons que trop souvent les sciences sociales considèrent que certaines valeurs telle l'authenticité revendiquée, ne sont que des voiles posés sur des pratiques douteuses et que ces valeurs de toute façon ont leur origine ou leur fondement dans des causes sociales. Charles Taylor remarque que les sciences sociales ont le plus souvent écarté le rôle des idéaux moraux et évitent de se demander si certaines transformations de la culture et dans les façons de penser ne sont pas redevables aux idéaux moraux en tant que tels. Il ajoute judicieusement que les facteurs structurels invoqués devraient eux-mêmes être expliqués et, sauf à penser qu'ils se sont mis en place dans un accès de distraction, nous devons prendre en compte des motivations humaines qui ont participé à leur création. Ch. Taylor résume une position devenue un sens commun de l'époque, qui évacue le recours à la formation d'idéaux moraux susceptibles d'orienter l'action, car «les sciences sociales semblent nous dire que pour comprendre les phénomènes de la culture contemporaine de l'authenticité, nous ne devrions pas faire appel à des idéaux moraux, mais que nous devrions la considérer, disons, comme une transformation récente dans les modes de production, ou en fonction de nouveaux modèles de consommation chez les jeunes...».⁽¹⁷⁾

(16) A. Giddens, la constitution de la société, op. cit., p. 19.

(17) Ch. Taylor, le malaise de la modernité, Cerf, Humanités, Paris, 1994, p. 30.

A côté de cette question classique sur le rôle des idéaux puisqu'on trouve chez Weber une problématique qui s'est déjà confrontée à ce thème, il faut se demander comment les individus par le biais d'ethnométhodes à la fois agissent et rendent compte de leurs actions.

L'ethnométhodologie, on le sait, s'est intéressée aux aptitudes qui permettent aux sujets de produire, grâce à des moyens adaptés, l'ordre social. H. Garfinkel l'exprime dans les termes suivants: «... notre familiarité avec la société est un miracle sans cesse renouvelé. Cette familiarité... recouvre l'ensemble des accomplissements de la vie quotidienne comme pratiques qui sont à la base de toute forme de collaboration ou d'interaction. Il nous faut parler des aptitudes qui en tant que compétence vulgaire, sont nécessaires aux productions constitutives du phénomène quotidien de l'ordre social.»⁽¹⁸⁾ Dans la plupart des situations courantes de l'existence, les individus mettent en œuvre un savoir quotidien, actualisent des compétences, justifient leurs actes en donnant des raisons. Pour Garfinkel, l'ordre social ou celui des interactions repose sur la mise en œuvre de ce qu'il appelle des méthodologies profanes, des rationalités ordinaires, et Goffman étudiera les cadres qui servent à fixer ce qui se passe ici, ainsi que la connaissance des techniques de la mise en scène. H. Garfinkel, pour que nous ne traitons pas les individus comme des idiots culturels (*cultural dopes*), ou des crétins sociaux dans le vocabulaire d'E. Morin, nous propose d'analyser le savoir quotidien à disposition des membres de la société, leurs compétences courantes lorsqu'ils agissent. Je signalerai que le rôle des compétences en relation à des raisons fait actuellement l'objet de recherches notamment de R. Boudon, L. Boltanski, et L. Thévenot. Pour ces derniers, il s'agit notamment de tirer «toutes les conséquences du fait que les personnes sont confrontées à la nécessité d'avoir à justifier leurs actions, c'est-à-dire non pas à inventer, après coup, de fausses raisons pour maquiller des motifs secrets, comme on se trouve un alibi, mais à les accomplir de façon à ce qu'elles puissent se soumettre à une épreuve de justification.» Poursuivant, les auteurs font une remarque de bon sens, qui était au fondement de la sociologie compréhensive: «Comment une science de la société peut-elle espérer aboutir en ignorant délibérément une propriété fondamentale de son objet, et en négligeant que les gens sont confrontés à l'exigence d'avoir à répondre de leurs conduites,

(18) H. Garfinkel, *Sociétés* no 5, 1985, p. 36.

preuves à l'appui, auprès d'autres personnes avec qui elles agissent?» Reprenant des observations nombreuses qui avaient pu déjà être faites par A. Schütz, sans apparemment les connaître, les deux auteurs précités remarquent encore «que le cours de la vie ordinaire réclame un travail presque incessant pour faire se tenir ou rattraper des situations qui échappent... Les gens, dans la vie quotidienne, ne font jamais complètement taire leurs inquiétudes et, comme des savants, ne cessent de suspecter, de s'interroger, de soumettre le monde à des épreuves.»⁽¹⁹⁾ Autrement dit, la capacité d'interroger n'est pas l'apanage du sociologue et celle de se leurrer celle des gens ordinaires.

Il faut aussi remarquer que ce que nous appelons objectivité plus exactement conditions objectives, est souvent le résultat d'activité des agents mais ne prenant en compte que le résultat nous oublions les diverses conduites qui ont produit un tel ordre, et il est certes plus simple de considérer que tout cela s'est fait dans le dos des agents. R. Boudon a fait remarquer que les explications de type holiste supposent toujours des structures à qui sont accordées des capacités actives, alors que les individus sont dépeints comme passifs et il souligne que ces théories décrivent «l'individu comme étant exclusivement le siège ou le point de passage de forces ou d'idées collectives. Ses attentes, ses desseins seraient entièrement déterminés par son environnement social. Ici les croyances des autres, et, de manière générale, les caractéristiques de l'environnement de l'acteur ne sont pas traitées comme des données que l'acteur prendrait en compte, mais comme des forces quasi-mécaniques qui viendraient déterminer à la fois les objectifs qu'il se donne et les moyens auxquels il recourt pour y parvenir.»⁽²⁰⁾ Il faut rappeler ici une description de Dilthey concernant les activités juridiques et l'art de produire un jugement, on verra plus loin en quoi elle s'oppose décisivement à certaines formulations de Durkheim. Dilthey avait montré la liaison entre ce qu'il nommait ensembles interactifs et fonction, ensembles interactifs et propriétés de tels systèmes. Chaque ensemble réalise une union, une liaison des individus, le droit, l'éducation, le commerce, etc. Bien entendu chaque ensemble a des

(19) L. Boltanski, L. Thévenot, *De la justification*, Gallimard, Paris, 1991, p. 54.

(20) R. Boudon, *Individualisme et holisme dans les sciences sociales*, in, *Sur l'Individualisme*, sous la direction de P. Birnbaum et J. Leca, Presses de la Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1991, p. 54.

règles léguées par le passé, mais ces ensembles n'ont pas d'existence en dehors de la mise en œuvre permanente de raisons pratiques par les individus qui participent à leur fonctionnement. Si l'on prend comme exemple d'ensemble interactif le droit, il faut aussi étudier les divers processus par lesquels passe sa mise en œuvre. Nommément «les règles du Code, le procès au cours duquel, devant un tribunal, des parties discutent sur un héritage conformément aux règles de ce Code, la décision du tribunal et son exécution - quelle longue série de processus psychiques divers se manifeste ici; que de personnes y participent; combien nombreuses sont les manières dont ils s'articulent les uns aux autres pour finalement résoudre le problème juridique posé par le surgissement d'une situation vitale précise!» Voir le jugement comme le produit de l'activité des individus et non comme l'application de règles, c'est le voir comme une construction sociale donc comme le résultat de nombreuses activités et non comme conséquence de lois ou de forces qui poussant à agir de telle ou telle manière ne pouvaient que produire le résultat. Les explications déterministes tirent une partie de leur faveur de leur caractère rassurant, les choses ne pouvaient que se passer ainsi parce que les causes suivantes ne pouvaient que produire ce qui s'est passé. Bien entendu, les causes n'apparaissent que *post festum*, jamais *ante*. La première propriété d'un ensemble interactif est de donner un cadre à des processus qui se rapportent à lui, il est le lieu d'opérations qui le prennent comme donné. Et dans une perspective systémique on peut alors considérer le code ou le médium de communication généralisé qui régit les opérations, le code argent pour l'économie, le code pouvoir pour la politique, le code amour pour les relations d'interpénétration humaine. Des individus participent à ces opérations, mais il faut alors souligner, selon Dilthey, une seconde caractéristique de ces ensembles qui est la suivante: «Indépendamment de la fonction qu'il occupe dans l'espace juridique, le juge, appartient à divers autres ensembles interactifs; il agit dans l'intérêt de sa famille, il doit accomplir une activité économique, il exerce ses fonctions politiques, et peut être compose-t-il de surcroît des vers.»⁽²¹⁾ A l'intérieur du système il agit sans doute selon les règles générales de ce système, mais le fait qu'il appartienne aussi à d'autres ensembles n'est pas sans influencer son action, et vice versa,

(21) W. Dilthey, *L'édification du monde historique dans les sciences de l'esprit*, Cerf, Paris, 1988, p. 118.

l'appartenance principale à un ensemble interactif n'est pas sans conséquences sur les autres ensembles.

Pour illustrer de nouveau ce processus de construction sociale, il est possible de faire appel à d'autres types de jugements, ceux qui relèvent de la compétence de jurys scolaires ou universitaires. Les discussions autour de cas font appel à un tout un ensemble de jugements, de critères, d'évaluations qui sont discutés, où les uns exhibent des raisons morales, d'autres des raisons particulières, c'est-à-dire du type il faut tenir compte de la situation de l'étudiant par rapport à d'autres épreuves, d'autres encore des justifications concernant la crédibilité de la formation. Cette discussion conduit à racheter tel étudiant selon tel critère, tel autre selon d'autres critères, à accorder ou non une mention lorsque manquent quelques dixièmes de points. En ce sens les résultats définitifs sont aussi le résultat d'une construction sociale, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des critères utilisés, leur acceptation ou leur rejet par la majorité des membres du jury. Le jury comme activité interactive est un endroit et un moment où des arguments s'échangent, ces arguments donnent lieu à des discussions, et leur observation permet de saisir quels arguments sont susceptibles dans un tel contexte, qui peut varier du fait de présences ou d'absences, d'être entendus et éventuellement pris en compte. On peut y traiter d'objets, au sens où toute note supérieure à 9.5 est relevée, ou bien y prendre en compte des sujets, alors c'est au cas par cas. Le président du jury peut avoir un rôle central ou non, certains ne s'intéressent qu'à leurs épreuves, d'autres participer activement à toutes les opérations. Pour ne pas être accusé de dévoiler des secrets, j'arrête là ma description. Ces résultats traités ultérieurement par des moyens statistiques et des corrélations ne peuvent connaître les négociations qui ont eu lieu et ont tendance à traiter ces résultats comme des faits objectifs comme s'ils n'avaient pas été produits par des activités interactionnelles ou des réflexions individuelles dans un premier temps de chaque enseignant. Le résultat est donc au sens de Garfinkel la conséquence de l'activité sociale de nombreux individus qui chacun à sa manière et en maintenant par son activité l'interaction, s'orientant en fonction des autres interactants, a contribué à sa production. La situation de jury est le cadre qui fixe les conditions générales de l'interaction, on y discute des notes, et non pas de l'avancement des professeurs, mais ce cadre ou cette forme sociale ne peuvent exister que de par l'activité des individus réunis, et les arguments,

justifications qu'ils apportent à propos des notes données sans compter les anticipations sur l'avenir des étudiants en situation délicate. Sur cet exemple on peut voir comment pendant une action les individus sont amenés à justifier leurs manières de faire et que pour ce faire ils ne sont en général pas limités par un seul registre et sauf à participer à l'intercacion, il me semble difficile de pouvoir prévoir à l'avance le résultat, ne serait-ce que dans la mesure où les prises de position ne sont pas prédictibles et ne sont pas réductibles à des positions construites ou constatées par avance. C'est sans doute la mise en évidence de toutes les activités sociales constitutives qui caractérise le mieux la perspective ethnométhodologique dans la mesure où elle analyse les activités comme le résultat d'un faire compétent. Envisager les actions sous cet angle, c'est faire l'hypothèse que l'objectivité est constituée de manière intersubjective à travers la mise en œuvre par les individus de savoir-faire qui relèvent plus souvent d'une connaissance tacite que discursive, qu'en ce sens il n'y a pas quelque chose d'objectif qu'il suffirait de décrire, l'objectivité étant le résultat du faire social de membres compétents. Dans sa conférence intitulée «L'étrange sérieux de la sociologie, en donne un mode d'emploi qui déplace radicalement le sens de l'injonction. Pour Garfinkel il faut l'entendre comme suit: «La réalité objective des faits sociaux, en tant que toute société est produite localement, est naturellement organisée, est réflexivement descriptible, est un accomplissement continu et pratique, en tant que cette réalité objective est partout, toujours, seulement, exactement, et entièrement le travail des membres, elle est le phénomène central de la sociologie (...)», en ce sens l'ordre social est «... localement et interactionnellement produit, naturellement organisé et réflexivement descriptible.» On peut donc soutenir que ce que certains appellent structures sociales objectives est le résultat d'activités sociales structurantes qui se situent dans la continuité d'activités sociales et fournissent le cadre pour la poursuite des activités. Ces activités s'inscrivent dans des cadres déjà là, qui forment les conditions générales de l'action, mais on ne peut dire qu'elles contraignent, ou alors le simple fait de respirer est une contrainte due à notre constitution.

Si les sciences sociales acceptent de sortir des méthodologies scientistes qui ne voulaient rien connaître des savoirs familiers, elles

(22) J. Habermas, Explications du concept d'activité communicationnelle, in: *Logique des sciences sociales*, Paris, P.U.F., 1988, p. 429.

seront amenées à reconnaître ce que je nommais la connaissance tacite, et aussi que «les sujets décrits utilisent eux-mêmes ces propositions au moyen desquelles le sociologue pouvait, jusqu'à présent, dans ses descriptions, s'expliquer le statut des faits, des normes et des expériences vécues, c'est-à-dire des référents de l'activité téléologique régulée par des normes ou de l'activité dramaturgique.»⁽²²⁾ Admettre la réflexivité invite à considérer toutes les sociologies spontanées sur le modèle de la compréhension ordinaire par rapport à la compréhension historique ou sociologique, elles sont des briques à partir desquelles des édifices scientifiques, logiques, rationnels seront construits, mais l'édifice ne se construit ni sans les briques, ni contre elles.

Si l'on reconnaît une compétence aux acteurs, cela ne signifie pas que les sciences sociales ne sont pas susceptibles de fournir des connaissances nouvelles que les acteurs ne possèdent pas, ou pour le moins qu'elles n'informent pas ceux qui ne pratiquent pas certaines activités sur les contenus de ces activités pratiquées par d'autres. On sait, en effet, que le type de connaissance produit par les sciences sociales peut donner un sens à des pratiques pour nous de prime abord étrangères, ce qui n'implique pas qu'elles «révèlent» ce qu'ils font à ceux qui les font. De plus, elles peuvent faire jouer un aspect critique, ou un potentiel subversif par rapport aux pratiques telles qu'elles existent, les inscrivant dans un monde de possibles plus vaste. Comme nous l'avons vu précédemment, le statut accordé au sens commun départage dans les termes d'A. Giddens les partisans de l'objectivisme de ceux des positions interprétatives: «Nous ne pouvons considérer que les croyances de sens commun, qui font partie intégrante de l'action et du langage de tous les jours, sont de simples obstacles à une caractérisation valide ou véridique de la vie sociale puisqu'il est impossible de décrire une activité sociale sans connaître ce que les acteurs en savent de façon tacite aussi bien que discursive.»⁽²³⁾ L'approche objectiviste supprime la question du statut du savoir commun par la dépréciation fondamentale qu'elle en opère, ne le définissant que comme une forme de méconnaissance; mais alors comment la vie sociale est-elle possible dans un monde où, le sociologue mis à part, tout le monde est dupe? Ne faut-il pas considérer qu'en deçà des préjugés et des notions toutes faites, il y a aussi des principes d'organisation et de construction de la vie sociale commune qui relèvent

(23) A. Giddens, op. cit., p. 401.

d'autres registres que ceux du leurre ou de la fausse conscience?

La manière dont les individus se racontent leur parcours, leurs réussites ou leurs échecs, la façon dont ils parlent aussi des contraintes qu'ils repèrent tout cela ne me semble pas vain et c'est seulement sur la présence de tels éléments et leur reconnaissance qu'il est possible de fonder la possibilité d'une éventuelle appropriation plus générale ou globale de ce que les individus font arriver et de ce qui leur arrive. Bien entendu, il faut alors supposer que cette unité narrative n'est ni simplement un leurre, ni seulement atteignable par le biais de «la sommation des pratiques dans une forme englobante, mais est régi à titre égal par un projet de vie, aussi incertain et mobile soit-il et par des pratiques fragmentaires qui ont leur propre unité, les plans de vie constituant la zone médiane entre l'indétermination des idéaux recteurs et la détermination des pratiques.»⁽²⁴⁾ Cette notion de projet de vie me paraît en effet centrale et elle apparaît souvent dans les réponses à des questionnaires, il ne convient pas de la réduire à la contrainte structurale et peut être que Ricoeur accorde trop à la structure en en parlant en terme de détermination. Un projet de vie n'est pas à concevoir comme un programme, mais comme des orientations très générales, qui sont relativement indéterminées et qui peuvent donner lieu à modifications, interprétations, rajouts, etc. Mais laissons de côté ce point et retenons le projet de vie comme élément moteur des actions situées dans des circonstances, bien entendu, ni voulues ni choisies par les individus, ce qui n'implique pas de considérer que ces conditions agissent comme des forces physiques qui contraignent à faire ceci ou cela. Comme par avance, Alexis de Tocqueville, comparant les mérites et défauts des historiens des siècles aristocratiques et des siècles démocratiques, avait mis le doigt sur les valorisations implicites des historiens des temps de l'égalité. Bien entendu, cela vaut tout autant, sinon plus, pour les sociologues modernes français qui ont souvent donné leurs modèles aux historiens et surtout à ceux de l'École dite des Annales. Les historiens de ces temps sont entraînés non seulement «à donner à chaque fait une grande cause, mais ils sont encore portés à lier les faits entre eux et à en faire sortir un système... Lorsque la trace de l'action des individus sur les nations se perd, il arrive souvent qu'on voit le monde se remuer sans que le moteur

(24) Paul Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre*, Seuil, Paris, 199, p. 187.

se découvre. Comme il devient très difficile d'apercevoir et d'analyser les raisons qui, agissant séparément sur la volonté de chaque citoyen, finissent par produire le mouvement du peuple, on est tenté de croire que ce mouvement n'est pas volontaire et que les sociétés obéissent sans le savoir à une force supérieure qui les domine (...). Les historiens qui vivent dans les temps démocratiques ne refusent donc pas seulement à quelques citoyens la puissance d'agir sur la destinée du peuple, ils ôtent encore aux peuples eux-mêmes la faculté de modifier leur propre sort, et ils les soumettent soit à une providence inflexible, soit à une sorte de fatalité aveugle... Il ne leur suffit pas de monter comment les faits sont arrivés; ils se plaisent encore à faire voir qu'ils ne pouvaient arriver autrement.»⁽²⁵⁾ Les théories de l'action et de l'activité sociale, en réhabilitant le faire compétent, en envisageant la possibilité d'une réflexivité des actes, nous disent aussi qu'il n'y a pas de destin, de loi de l'histoire et que le futur est entre nos mains.

(25) A. de Tocqueville, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, Tome I, Paris, Gallimard, 1961, p. 91-92. Réfléchissant sur la défaite française de 1940, M. Bloch nous donne sans doute une piste pour comprendre la prééminence accordée aux causes apparemment inéluctables:

«Adeptes des sciences de l'homme ou savants de laboratoire, peut-être fûmes nous aussi détourné de l'action individuelle par une sorte de fatalisme, inhérent à la pratique de nos disciplines. Elles nous ont habitué à considérer sur toutes choses, dans la société comme dans la nature, le jeu de forces massives. Devant ces lames de fond d'une irrésistibilité presque cosmique, que pouvaient les pauvres gestes d'un naufragé? c'était mal interpréter l'histoire. Parmi tous les traits qui caractérisent nos civilisations, elle n'en connaît pas de plus significatif qu'un immense progrès dans la prise de conscience collective. «M. Bloch, *L'étrange défaite*, (1946), Paris, Folio, Essais, 1990.

THE IMPACT OF TELEVISION ON BEHAVIOUR

Aoun AZAR^(*)

I - Introduction

Psychologists differ in the extent to which they believe the research on screen violence has delivered any results on which action should, or can be taken. Some consider that enough evidence has been produced to indicate that screen violence should be restrained (and that, in this country, it is): others have brooded on the evidence and bring in a verdict of "not proven". Some believe, mostly in America, that screen violence probably is harmful, but do not advocate any centralised means of control, leaving those whom the research has shown are least likely to be able or inclined to exercise self control, but who are at the same time the most vulnerable to effects, to be responsible for their own viewing. A fourth group leads from simplistic though sincere observation and surveys, and calls for stringent controls tending to overlook other protests about censorship that this would entail, and the curtailment of what may be a market in modest but largely harmless viewing pleasure⁽¹⁾.

However, the magic box is, in the words of Robert Putman, professor of politics at Harvard University, "the fastest diffusing technological invention ever recorded". He believes that the ill-effects of TV are increasing all the time as the average American, with hundreds of channels to choose from, watches for four hours a day, spending more than half his spare time in front of the box.

Just 50 years ago, after the Second World War and with the

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(1) The Psychologist: Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, April 1989, No 4, pp. 162.

foundations of modern, post-Empire Britain firmly in place, nobody had a TV set. Social patterns, while modernised, had basically remained unchanged for centuries.

Now, we each spend an average of three-and-a-half hours each day watching TV. Nothing else has changed our lives so much so quickly.

That question is being raised by powerful academic and social groups in the United States, and, in the guise of a small, privately-produced magazine and up-to-date research, has just been aired in Britain. The issue is whether TV is responsible not just for the family fights and nasty screen images we normally associate it with, but for a gradual rotting of our own minds and the community bonds that hold society together. The latter theory has recently been given momentum by Professor Putnam, one of America's most respected social academics. "It's as though the postwar generations were exposed to some kind of mysterious X-ray which permanently and increasingly rendered them less likely to connect with the community", he says⁽²⁾.

II - The effect of the media user interface on interactivity and content

The effect of media technology on the use behaviour is a little explored area of media research. Some research have been done on structural factors affecting viewing behaviour. The effects of the introduction of remote control has also caused some curiosity among researchers. The concept of audience activity is developed to deal with how the user select, attend to, and use a medium. In addition, a few researchers have attempted to build theory on how the user choose in media content.

1 - Structural Factors

Structural factors that affect viewing behaviour and its outcomes have been the subject of a number of studies (Weibull, 1985)⁽³⁾. Webster and

(2) Darius SANAI: Magic box that is sending society down the tubes, SUNDAY EXPRESS, 1 Dec. 1996.

(3) L. Weibull, Structural factors in gratification research, 1985, pp. 123-124.

Wakshlag (1982)⁽⁴⁾ found that group viewing affected patterns of program choice. Becker and Schoenbach (1989)⁽⁵⁾ suggested that adaptation and integration of new media by users caused changes in their resource allocation, behaviours, and content reactions.

Weibull (1985) proposed that the general structure of mass media affect program availability and accessibility, thus changing the viewer's behaviour. However, earlier research seems to ignore the effects of the individual's choice of media technology. These choices increase in importance with more flexible and tailorable media technology, because this will produce a diversity of individual configurations of media.

On the other hand, Ferguson (1992)⁽⁶⁾ suggested that the cumulative effect of choice facilitators and more channels will make viewers more selective.

2 - Audience Activity

Audience activity relates to how intentionally a user selects, attends to, and uses a medium. The concept is important because audience activity causes variations in the gratifications viewers get from television exposure. Levy and Windahl (1985)⁽⁷⁾ developed a full typology of audience activity, constructed from a qualitative dimension of audience orientation and a temporal dimension in the communication sequence. Levy and Windahl (1984)⁽⁸⁾ discussed three types of activity in detail. Two of these are of relevance for this study: selectivity before exposure (choice behaviour), and involvement during exposure (mental processes like decoding and interpreting). According to Perse (1990)⁽⁹⁾, selectivity has two related meanings in the research literature: (a) content

(4) J.G. Webster & J.J. Wakshlag, The impact of group viewing on patterns of television program choice, *Journal of Broadcasting*, 1982, pp. 445-446.

(5) L.B. Becker & K. Schoenbach, When media content diversifies: Anticipating audience behaviors, 1989, pp. 1.

(6) D.A. Ferguson, Channel repertoire in the presence of remote control devices, 1992, pp. 83.

(7) M. R. Levy & Windahl, The concept of audience activity, *Media gratifications research: current perspectives*, 1985, pp. 109-110.

(8) M.R. Levy & S. Windahl, Audience activity and gratifications: A conceptual clarification and exploration, 1984, pp. 51-52.

(9) E.M. Perse, Audience Selectivity and involvement in the newer media environment. *Communication research*, 1990, pp. 675-677.

preferences that exclude exposure to other content, and (b) the behaviours that lead to program selection.

Webster and Wakshlag (1983)⁽¹⁰⁾ define an active audience as *one whose viewing is motivated by a desire to access specific television content*. Their criteria for a passive audience is that their viewing is a function of the individual's availability to watch television. Hawkins (1991)⁽¹¹⁾ suggested other types of activity, like seeking for diversity, variety, and stimulation. This might be a more useful perspective in today's media environment where many viewers seem to use the selection devices for interactivity rather than only program selection.

3 - The Choice Process

The decision-making process is crucial to understand how media affect audience behaviour. Heeter and Greenberg (1985)⁽¹²⁾ defined the choice process as *the alternative behaviours used by viewers to choose something to watch on television and how they watch it*. Their choice process has three stages;

- 1 - The planning stage, followed by
- 2 - An orienting search, in which the viewers orient themselves about what is available, and
3. Reevaluation of the program watched.

Heeter (1988)⁽¹³⁾ proposed an information-processing model of program choice, which does not deal with situations where viewers know what they will watch before they approach the viewing situation. According to this model, viewers first program an orienting search for program alternatives, involving the use of a TV program guide and/or browsing through channels. After selecting the initial program, the viewer may engage in a reevaluation of the choice, and start the selection process over again.

(10) J.G. Webster & J.J. Wakshlag, A theory of television program choice. *Communication research*, 1983, pp. 437.

(11) P.R. HAWKINS, In search of television viewing styles. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media*, 1991, pp. 375-378.

(12) C. Heeter & B.S. Greenberg, Profiling the Zapper. *Journal of advertising research*, 1985, pp. 15.

(13) C. Heeter, The choice process model, 1988, pp. 11-13.

Orienting search is the browsing of program options that occurs before viewing the program. It leads to awareness of program alternatives. Heeter and Greenberg (1985; 1988)⁽¹⁴⁾ examined different methods of channel scanning and suggested impacts on awareness and channel repertoire. Heeter (1988) proposed that three dimensions of an orienting search have implications for viewer awareness of program alternatives: Processing mode, search repertoire, and evaluation.

a- Schneider and Shiffrin (1977)⁽¹⁵⁾ defined the automatic processing mode as a *temporary activation of a learned sequence of elements in longterm memory that is initiated by appropriate inputs and then proceeds automatically - without subject control, without stressing the capacity limitations of the system, and without necessarily demanding attention.* They defined controlled processing as a *temporary activation of a sequence of elements that can be set up quickly and easily but requires attention, is capacity-limited (usually serial in nature, and is controlled by the subject.*

b- A search repertoire is the programs options that a viewer is browsing during a search for something to view. Heeter (1988)⁽¹⁶⁾ proposed that search repertoire is an important attribute of an orienting search. A search repertoire can be elaborated, including all or most available programs, or restricted to a limited number. Heeter and Greenberg (1988)⁽¹⁷⁾ defined a terminating search as a “search in which the viewer abandons the search when the first option that meet some minimal standard is located.”

c- Webster and Wakshlag (1983)⁽¹⁸⁾ integrated different perspectives into a model of program choice. They included viewer awareness of available options in their model, but focused more on viewer availability as a predictor of choice.

(14) C. Heeter & B.S. Greenberg, A theoretical overview of the program choice process, 1988, 32-35.

(15) W. Schneider & R. Shiffrin, Controlled and automatic human information processing: Detection, search and attention. Psychological Review, 1977, pp. 1.


(16) C. Heeter, The choice process model, 1988, pp. 20.

(17) C. Heeter & B.S. Greenberg, A theoretical overview of the program choice process, 1988, pp. 40.

(18) J.G. Webster & J.J. Wakshlag, A theory of television program choice, 1983, pp. 440.

4 - A Comprehensive Model

This model attempts to describe some of the more important relationships that links design of media, individual factors, and behaviour:



The comprehensive model suggests that the media user's mental model of a medium is affected by the medium's system image and its programming, and by the user's personality and gratifications sought by the media user, in addition to earlier interactive behaviour and content resulting from this.

The interactive behaviour results from an intersection between the system image, programming, personality of the user, gratifications sought, and the mental model. The interactivity causes certain content features. Some gratifications are obtained directly from the interactive behaviour, while others results from features of the manifest content. The different concepts in the comprehensive mode are defined and explicated.

a. Media Factors

The media factors are the features of media that the user perceive. Some of these factors are quite stable, and are grouped together as the system image. Others are more or less fluctuating. Programming is the concept that contains these fluctuating media factors. Note that the separation between system image and program is somewhat artificial, and that the different media factors lie on a continuum between the two concepts.

*** System Image**

The term “system image” is used in the design literature for the visible structure of a device. Since media is a group of devices, the system image of a medium is its visible structure. For example, the channel-changing controls of television is a central part of its system image.

The system image is affecting the viewer’s mental model, as well as constraining the viewer’s use of the medium.

*** Programming**

Programming includes the situation-dependent and fluctuating possibilities that a medium makes available. Traditional television presents programs that are available only in specific periods of time. Video programs may be available all the time, but certain possibilities, like viewing specific parts of the content, is only available during viewing of the video.

b. Human Factors

In the same way that stable and fluctuating factors in the media interface can be separated, it is also possible to separate between stable and fluctuating human factors. Users have a stable personality, but gratifications sought tend to fluxuate.

*** Personality**

The personality may affect the style of how media is used. People seem to have different viewing styles, although this is not totally stable. Hawkins (1991)⁽¹⁹⁾ located five different styles of viewing, based on

(19) R.P. HAWKINS, In search of television viewing styles. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 1991, pp. 380.

cluster analysis of viewing diaries focusing on the transitions between programs. Some viewers seem to be selective about watching television as an activity in itself, without caring about the type of content.

*** Gratifications Sought**

Walker and Bellamy (1991)⁽²⁰⁾ found that viewers have a variety of reasons for using remote controls. Some of the more important was to get an overview of available program options, as well as to selectively avoid unpleasant content. Heeter and Greenberg (1985)⁽²¹⁾ found that the primary reasons for channel changing were to avoid commercials. Ferguson (1992)⁽²²⁾ showed that avoiding advertisements and specific television personalities, as well as seeing two or more shows at the same time, were more related to high flipping frequency than the motive of seeing better shows.

Perse (1990)⁽²³⁾ divided viewing motives into instrumental (watching for informational reasons) and ritualistic (watching for other reasons). Ferguson and Perse (1993)⁽²⁴⁾ found that frequent channel changing correlated significantly with ritual motives for viewing, but only to a limited degree with instrumental motives.

c. The Mental Model

Norman (1990)⁽²⁵⁾ defines the mental (or conceptual) model as the model people have of themselves, of others, of the way objects work, and of the things with which they interact. Television is located in our mental maps with a distinctive profile and a set of associations and expectations about its functionality and utility. The mental model is formed by interpreting the system image.

(20) J.R. WALKER & R.V. Jr. BELLAMY, *Gratifications of grazing: An exploratory study of remote control use*, 1991, pp. 422.

(21) C. Heeter & B.S. Greenberg, *Profiling the Zapper*, *Journal of advertising research*, 1985, pp. 10.

(22) D.A. Ferguson, *Channel repertoire in the presence of remote control devices*, 1992, pp. 85.

(23) E.M. Perse, *Audience selectivity and involvement in the newer media environment*, *Communication research*, 1990, pp. 681.

(24) D.A. Ferguson & M.P. Perse, *Media and audience influences of channel repertoire*, 1993, pp. 31-32.

(25) D. Norman, *The design of everyday things*, New York: Doubleday, 1990.

The medium cannot be separated from its myth, and this works together with the user's perception of the medium to form a mental model of what it can be used for and how to use it.

The mental model includes perceptions of both stable and fluctuating possible actions. Stable options are those that are built into the medium interface, like the possibility to choose channels in today's television. Fluctuating options include programs that are available just for a short period of time.

The mental model is not necessarily totally stable, but can change during viewing, depending on the available options and learning of new possibilities. Program awareness is a fluctuating part of a mental model.

Different configurations and variations of a medium changes the mental image of the medium, as well as the range of functionality available. The intersection between these will affect how the viewer uses the medium.

Today's television is probably perceived as having channels by most viewers. Most research has concentrated on viewership of channels rather than on programs.

d. Interactive Behavior

Television viewers can browse through a number of channels to become aware of available options. This is a part of the choice process.

Reevaluation is an important part of the choice process. More critical viewers may reevalutate choices during a selected program, and some media technology may give better support for such behaviour. For example does the presence of a remote control facilitate reevaluation, because the device makes it easy to change an earlier selection. The system image and the viewer's mental model of its possibilites can affect how quickly and frequently selections are reevaluated and changed.

The behaviour attempting to satisfy sought gratifications is constrained by what the individual believes can be done (the mental mode) and which actions can be performed with the medium (the system image). Thus the interactive behaviour has to be in the intersection between gratifications sought, the mental model, and the system image.

e. Content Features

The interactive behaviour of the viewer may affect the manifest content some of the features of the received content that can be relevant includes content fragmentation and content diversity.

Heeter and Greenberg (1985)⁽²⁶⁾ suggested that program awareness is the key link between viewer needs and selection of the best available program. Awareness of many programs before selection should make it easier to choose programs that fulfill the viewer's needs, causing higher satisfaction of the viewed programs.

However, rapid change in content does not only create fragmented programming. The viewer will get a sequence of perceptions that can be considered a story in itself. Features of the manifest media content give gratifications for the user. Thus one general gratification obtained is the content satisfaction: how satisfied the user is with the content received.

A conversation can give gratifications independent of the quality of the content. In the same way, interactivity in itself may be a source of satisfaction, at least with more advanced forms for interactivity than provided by today's media.

III - Video violence and the protection of children

1 - Evidence of professional concern

Over the past few years, considerable anxiety has been expressed by those professionally concerned with children about the effects of "horror", "sex and violence", "soft porn" and similar scenes experienced by children via videos seen in their own or their friends' homes. Mr. Justice Brown identified children's access to sadistic videos as cause for concern following the Rochdale case of suspected ritual abuse, where the children's familiarity with horror images from videos such as Nightmare on Elm Street misled social workers into assuming that they must have experienced such things in reality. At an early stage the British Pediatric Association had invited comments from its members on damaging effects of "video nasties": at that time, concern was mainly centred upon

(26) C. Heeter & B.S. Greenberg, Cable and program choice, 1985, pp. 203-205.

children who were presenting with nightmares and traumatisations by images that they could not erase from their minds; and one might suggest healthy reaction, denoting the child's continuing sensitivity to such images. In 1985, too, opinions of child and adolescent psychiatrists on the viewing of violent "videos" by children were reviewed in the Bulletin of the Royal College of Psychiatrists (UK).

More recently, however, concern has grown greater and has addressed more serious and long-lasting effects. It now seems that professionals in child health and psychology underestimated the degree of brutality and sustained sadism that film-makers were capable of inventing and willing to portray, let alone the "special-effects" technologies which would support such images; and we certainly underestimated how easy would be children's access to them. Where formerly children were said to see them "by accident" or in defiance of parental edict, it is now clear that many children watch adult-only videos on a regular basis, with or without their parents' knowledge, and that many parents make less than strenuous efforts to restrict their children's viewing.

There must be special concern when children (or adults, for that matter) are repeatedly exposed to images of vicious cruelty in the context of entertainment and amusement.

In the context of entertainment:

- 1 - The viewer receives the implicit message that this is all good fun something with which to while away one's leisure time.
- 2 - The child viewer receives distorted images of emotions that he has not yet experienced so must accept - especially dangerous where love, sex and violence are equated.
- 3 - The ingenuity with which brutality is portrayed is likely to escalate over time, since the entertainment industry must try to be more and more "entertaining" and must allow for jaded palates.
- 4 - So that viewers will not be too disturbed to experience "entertainment", the victims must be portrayed as being somewhat sub-human, so that they need not be pitied.
- 5 - An alternative is that they should be portrayed as deserving violent treatment. A parallel in a recently released film is where we witness in lit silhouette the multiple rape of a woman by a queue of men, and

hear her agonised screams, all in the context of an intent to punish her.

2 - The connection between viewing violence and change in attitudes or behaviour

The principle that what is experienced vicariously will have some effect on some people is an established one, and is the reason why industry finds it worth while to spend millions of pounds on advertising. The derisive question which film makers have put to their critics, “have you been tempted to become a serial killer by watching our films?” is disingenuous: it ignores differing stability, susceptibility to influence and levels of immaturity among the audience as a whole. We know that children can be traumatised, not only by the images they see, but also by additional images that are suggested by their imagination in response to the originals; but far more dangerous, because more lastingly damaging, would be that eventually they should no longer be troubled at all by seeing violent images, as a result of desensitisation by systematic repetition. The processes of “desensitisation” and “flooding” are well-known methods for modification of behaviour by reducing the impact of the original accompanying emotion.

Because of this knowledge, it has been difficult for psychologists to demonstrate experimentally the effect of images of extreme violence on young children’s behaviour. Experiments involving live subjects, and especially young children, would usually be submitted to an ethical committee, who would consider any likely effects. The processes of traumatising and desensitisation are well enough known for any ethical committee to refuse to sanction if it were suggested that parents should watch alongside, child psychologists would be more alarmed still at such a proposal, on the basis that any identification by the child with the violent perpetrator could be additionally enhanced through identification with his parents, were they apparently to accept the film’s attitudes.

Thus most research on the results of watching violence either has to follow up long-term effects on individual cases, or has to extrapolate from experimental situations that do not in fact involve witnessing extreme violence. Since children’s exposure to the kind of sadistic images with which we are now concerned is relatively recent, there has not yet been time to carry out the longitudinal studies that this would involve, while

ethical experimental studies are necessarily rather artificial. Nevertheless, Professors Sims and Gray⁽²⁷⁾ (Professors of Psychiatry and Paediatrics respectively) were able to point to “a vast world literature, more than 1,000 papers, linking heavy exposure to media violence with subsequent aggressive behaviour” in their document presented to the Broadcasting Group of the House of Lords in September 1993. They made two particularly important points themselves: that in current video material “unlike traditional gruesome stories, the viewer is made to identify with the perpetrator of the act, and not with the victim”, and that “watching specific acts of violence on the media has resulted in mimicry by children and adolescents of behaviour that they would otherwise, literally, have found unimaginable”. There is, of course, a connection between identification and mimicry, which decides what is mimicked.

George Comstock⁽²⁸⁾, Professor of Communications at Syracuse University, New York, reviewed 190 research projects over 30 years on the impact of television violence; he found “a very solid relationship between viewing anti-social portrayals or violent episodes and behaving anti-socially” in both boys and girls. Huesman and Eron⁽²⁹⁾ at Illinois found that heavy exposure to television violence at age 8 years was associated with violent crime and spouse or child abuse at age 30 - “at all levels of intelligence... It cannot be denied or explained away”. A British review of 40 adolescent murderers and 200 young sex offenders showed “repeated viewing of violent and pornographic videos” as “a significant causal factor”; this was particularly significant in adolescents abusing in baby-sitting contexts. Including mimicry of the violent images witnessed.

3 - Implications

There continues to be a need for systematic research in order to keep pace with both the growth of violence in children and the growth of violent visual material available to them. (Indeed, the Professor of Psychological Criminology at Cambridge identifies “a pressing need for a

(27) ACP SIMS & Peter Gray, The media, violence and vulnerable viewers, document presented to Broadcasting Group, House of Lords, 1993.

(28) Georges Comstock, TV and the American Child, Academic press, 1991.

(29) LR HUESMANN & L. ERON, Aggression and its correlates over 22 years, University of Illinois, Chicago, 1984.

new long-term program of high-quality Government-funded research on (all) causes of offending” in young people, the cost of which would be “infinitesimal compared with the costs of almost everything connected with crime” So far as research on the effects of violent images is concerned, and given the ethical considerations already elaborated, the careful collection of case history material is likely to be the most fruitful. This would, of course, need to be both prospective and retrospective; that is, children’s viewing habits could be monitored, while child and adolescent violent offenders could be studied retrospectively in terms of background experience.

Meanwhile, it seems impossible to allow the situation to continue, and indeed escalate, as it now is. Michael Medved⁽³⁰⁾ stops short at advocating censorship, and makes a plea for film-makers to set their own standards and limits. Although some individuals have begun to have doubts about their own contributions, it seems unlikely that these we feel responsibility for protecting children will be able to wait for such corporate self-denial.

Parents should be discrete and responsible both in controlling their children’s viewing and in giving children clear models of their own distress in witnessing sadistic brutality: however, it is unhappily evident that many children cannot rely on their parents in this respect. By restricting such material from home viewing, society must take on a necessary responsibility in protecting children from this as from other forms of child abuse.

IV - A scientific evidence

1 - Effects of screen violence

The widespread use of TV for children’s education and the willingness of companies to spend large amounts of money on advertising shows that many expect TV to exert considerable influence on viewers. However the degree of influence of screen violence has remained a contentious area for some time.

Ways in which screen violence could affect behaviour include:

1 - Imitation of the general role of violence (e.g. as a means of

(30) Michael MEDVED, *Hollywood VS. America*, Harpercollins, Zondervan, 1992.

resolving arguments), of specific techniques, or by providing role models;

2 - triggering of generalised aggression or activation of latent “pathological” aggressive impulses;

3 - Desensitisation by dulling feelings of sympathy towards “victims” and creating indifference to the visual impact of violence;

4 - Creating a frame of mind that regards violence as a normal and socially acceptable response.

Psychologists have measured the effects of violent films on physical reactions, behaviour, and attitude⁽³¹⁾.

Studies show that the threshold of tolerated violence is raised in groups who have watched violent films. Other studies also suggest similar effects - e.g. students who watched violent pornography were less likely to sympathise with rape victims.

These “experimental” findings are supported by a limited number of field studies on the effects of screen violence in more realistic settings. Nevertheless, links between screen violence and behaviour are questioned by some; for example, sociologists studying links between juvenile deviance and social or cultural disadvantage may dismiss psychology experiments because they are acquired outside of a social context.

Of the many “expert” bodies to have reviewed this subject, the US Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence concluded in 1969 that, while not a principal cause of violence in Society, TV was a contributory factor. Since it was only one of many influences, effects depended on what other influence operated; children from low-income areas and from back-grounds where unstable or violent lifestyles were common were more vulnerable than those with more positive parental and other influences.

However, recent work in the USA and elsewhere continues to find that screen violence can desensitise viewers, raise aggression levels, reduce empathy for victims and enhance the role of violence in conflict resolution.

Many psychologists now conclude that the effects of screen violence

(31) Elisabeth Newson, Subject effects of TV, office of science and technology, june 1993, pp. 44.

are real, and may be best seen as an “overlay” on existing predispositions. Effects on most young people are generally minor. Moreover, psychiatrists working with the small minority of delinquent and violent children and adolescents conclude that with some individuals, the impact of screen violence can be seriously harmful.

There is thus a convergence of the psychology and psychiatry results which suggest that “vulnerable” individuals may be particularly affected by images of violence⁽³²⁾.

However with a minority of young people where there are no such influences, there may be a danger that video, film or TV can become the dominant source of external guidance on what levels of violence are and are not “acceptable” and related to individual success.

For adolescents with little prospect of success in their own lives, the capability for repetitive viewing, of a violent video may allow such images to dominate, creating a trigger for later violence.

The power of a particular image may depend on many factors - its context, its graphic detail, the degree of empathy engendered for the victim. However, recent research indicates that many younger children display a lack of understanding of what they see. While this may indicate that the influence of the TV screen (good or bad) may be less than other social activities, it also means that children may place actions in distorted scenarios embodying quite different values and attitudes to those intended by the program.

Other psychological research may be relevant in view of the considerable emphasis placed on chronological age in determining what is legal or suitable for viewing. Child psychologists recognise specific phases of moral development, (see T. 1) which may well be important in determining the impact of a given violent film or scene. Yet there is no automatic link between chronological age and moral “age”, so that the former may be a somewhat imperfect measure of susceptibility.

T.1 - Steps in the moral development of children

Child psychologists and educationalists see children passing through

(32) Ibid, pp. 44.

the following stages in their moral development:

Stage

- | | | |
|---|------------------|---|
| 1 | Age - 4 | Self-centred morality where the greatest good is in getting what one wants. |
| 2 | Age - 5 | Accepts adult's right to make rules without question. |
| 3 | Age 5.5-7 | Preoccupied with fairness. |
| 4 | Age 8-14 | Increasing self-consciousness and concern that people should think well of them. Need to have approval of others which, depending on who they wish to impress may lead to positive and healthy social values, or to negative and antisocial ones. |
| 5 | Age 15+ | More disinterested approach, becoming more aware of the wider society and community interests. |
| 6 | Adulthood | Developed a fully principled conscience and a concern for general human rights. |

Note: Individuals may not progress through all stages and many never reach stage 4 let alone stage 5).

2 - Science and Current Controls

What implications does the "science" have for current policies? To a large extent, the current system has already implicitly accepted that screen violence may have an important effect on viewers. The BBFC⁽³³⁾ and broadcasters state that they take the issue of violence's effects on younger viewers very seriously. The BBFC is concerned, for instance over the danger of copy-cat violence, learning techniques of wounding or killing, personalised violence, glamourising violence or weaponry and sadistic acts, and will require cuts in such areas even under the more restrictive classification; it is particularly concerned over screen violence against women.

While many see current controls as having struck an appropriate balance with the rights of people in a free society to watch what they wish,

(33) British Board of film classification.

some Ministers have expressed concern over the amount of realistic screen violence and look to the existing structures to apply appropriate standards. Ministers at the Department of National Heritage (DNH) recently stated that research had not produced any conclusive evidence of a link between screen violence and violent behaviour; yet many psychologists and psychiatrists now conclude that the evidence for such a link is strong to overwhelming. Since the last major UK Government review of this issue was in 1979, one option would be for DNH to support an authoritative update by the relevant professional and learned societies, rather than relying on individual reviewers as in the past.

Attitudes on the need for additional measures depend to some extent on how far current age-based viewing restrictions are seen as effective. The ability to record and replay allows some children to evade the TV “watershed”; moreover complying with the video classification scheme depends very much on parental control which may be lacking. The inherent “leakiness” of restrictions on under-age viewing thus leads some to conclude that it is unwise to rely on these controls alone. There is also the work on children’s perception and moral development mentioned earlier which undermines reliance on chronological age as the basis for restrictions, and casts doubt on the relevance to children of adult perceptions of context, motive and impact of violence, such considerations can be seen as arguing for caution in the portrayal of violence as a whole, rather than relying on age-based restrictions. Indeed, some see the level of screen violence as setting Society’s standards for what is an acceptable level of violence, it would then follow that a society keen to encourage a less violent society would lower the threshold of aggression that is viewed for entertainment.

V - A psychologist view about screen violence **(The Empiricist achievement)**

1 - Laboratory studies

When psychologists are asked what our science has achieved this century, we might justifiably include the claim that it has been shown that screen violence plays a part in increasing the level of interpersonal violence in society.

More recently Hearold (1986)⁽³⁴⁾ found 230 studies which still, in general, revealed a relationship between violence viewing and anti-social

attitudes and behaviour. Hearold was able to generalise that boys and girls may be open to similar effects up to the age of 10 after which the reinforcing role of watching screen violence increases for boys but decreases Among girls. Further, realistic and justified violence probably has more of a promotional effect than seeing violence that is undeserved or which leads to the downfall of the aggressor.

It is possible, however, that all these conclusions are simultaneously mistaken. One whole argument concerns the utility of laboratory experiments, which it is feared do not generalise to real life. To answer this there are three main points to bear in mind. One is simply that experiments do identify one element of a structure whose operation is then easier to assess in real life; the contribution of laboratory-based abstractions to a careful exercise in real life social architecture is not to be gainsaid.

The second point of view takes the laboratory-based literature as one component among an array of methods; if laboratory studies had tended to conclude differently from correlational one-wave or longitudinal developmental studies, or from real life "experiments, then there would be more need for caution about their role. However, laboratory studies in the field of social learning (one might better say anti-social learning) have generally shown that effects are there to be found by those who seek them.

The third defence of, or indeed support for laboratory studies is the most powerful and far reaching one. This takes two forms. One is a weaker version based more on considerations of rhetoric.

The strong form of this third defence is that critics, and sometimes the same ones who dismiss the claim that aggressive behaviour is learned from the screen accept a very related proposition, that the depiction of sex-role related behaviour teaches viewers how to think of the world and to behave accordingly. In other words, men are shown by television in America to exercise power and make decisions, women to function under the rule of that power and to accept the social structure that has been determined (it is said) generally by men.

The next link to be made is that there is a conceptual similarity in the

(34) S. Hearold, *A Synthesis of 1043 studies of effects of television on Social behaviour*, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 65-68.

content of the ideas and feelings that are involved in portrayals of male power (over women) and of male aggression. Van der Post (1986) has attributed the bridging of these two conceptual and behavioural realms to Jung.

None of these evaluations of laboratory work are acknowledged by those who partition violence effects research into three of four sectors, and propose to knock each one down with arguments that are truly insufficient for the task they are assigned.

2 - Correlational studies

Cook *et al*⁽³⁵⁾ are on stronger ground when they deal with correlational studies. People are asked to say what they view; their viewing is then rated for violence content and finally measures of aggression are applied and correlated with the viewing evidence while various other characteristics are statistically controlled. Several shortcomings in the measures have been pointed out, and refinements have been introduced; but the general and continuing finding is of an association between viewing violence and behaving aggressively.

One possibility is that the link is entirely a result of selective processes, with the more aggressive people seeking out violence containing programs; no reinforcement of an aggressive personality results from such viewing, indeed, some release from aggression may thereby be found.

A second view of positive correlational studies is to suppose that all the process flows from viewer experience towards subsequent aggressive behaviour. This unilateralism is as unwarranted as is the previous sort, and, adopting an interactionist view, Cook *et al*⁽³⁶⁾ refer to age, race, sex and other attributes as “proxies for the true psychological and social factors that cause differences in exposure to violence” (and, they should add, for parallel differences in behaviour).

A third aspect of correlational results concerns the size of relationships that are found. Many psychologists would agree that, 60 per cent of an individual's personality structure is given genetically; if this leaves 40

(35) T.D. Cook, *The implicit assumptions of television*, 1983, pp. 161.

(36) *Ibid*, pp. 179.

per cent to be accounted for, then there need only be twenty environmental sources of influence, each responsible for two per cent, to account for the whole.

Pure environmentalists would not accept that heredity provides 60 per cent of the personality structure - but they would be hard pressed to deny at the same time that television viewing which may average about three hours per day or nearly one fifth of one's wakeful life can have such a tiny effect on personality.

In short, the pure environmentalist seems likely to have to accept a much larger role for the effects of television (simply its presence, as well as active viewing); but the more orthodox "middle of the road" evaluator of the genetic contribution is left with a role indicated for television that is in the same direction as laboratory results but which is not as tiny as it first seems.

3 - Field Studies

Cook *et al*'s third category of investigation is "field studies". In most of these studies the authors have reported results in parallel with the outcome of other methods. Arguments about technique involve such issues as whether the non-violent "control" films seen in parallel with the violent ones being viewed by experimental groups are sufficiently exciting or enjoyable (or boring, when, by inducing frustration they could provoke aggressive behaviour).

Another approach was reported by Loye *et al*⁽³⁷⁾ (1977) in Los Angeles; use was made of a six month free offer of a cable channel; husbands watched programs from whatever was provided and their wives reported on behaviour. One group has only "prosocial" material supplied while other subgroups could only receive mixed prosocial and violent content, neutral (light entertainment) or "natural" (i.e. considerably violence-containing) content. The different groups showed no significant differences with regard to helpful behaviour; but hurtful behaviour was more common in the groups that saw aggressive material than in the other groups. Cook *et al* appear to deny this reported fact which may be

(37) D. Loye, effects of Television: an experimental field study, journal of communication, 27, 1977, pp. 206-209.

one reason why they are less impressed with field studies that with longitudinal ones, which will be dealt with presently.

4 - Longitudinal Studies

Cook *et al*'s paper was commissioned by the journal to scrutinise a study, by Milavsky *et al* (1982)⁽³⁸⁾ which had been set up by the American broadcasting industry which had been disconcerted by signs from long-term studies that showed a cumulative effect of viewing violent television. Milavsky's study therefore involved over 3,000 children in six waves of data collection over a three year period. These authors conclude that there is little or no demonstrable effect of viewing television violence upon young people's behaviour. Cook *et al*, however, observe that the results "are predominantly positive, suggesting that viewing television violence may have a small effect on aggression"; further "the lagged coefficients... appear to increase with time, suggesting a larger effect the longer the delay between watching television and aggression".

Like other longitudinal studies Milavsky's shows that personality provides the main common core of predictive power, in other words, it is the children who are aggressive at an early age who continue to be so later on.

Now it falls to strong environmentalists, if they distrust personality theory, to show how it may be that in the very early years of childhood the family will have established an aggressive character in some children, a character which then remains relatively unmodifiable⁽³⁹⁾.

At present, efforts are being made to fund and carry out analysis of all this information in ways that may shed light on the role of British television viewing (it has been estimated that British viewing is very different from American viewing) in its possible contribution to behaviour.

Elsewhere, in countries like Finland where there is little violence to be found on the screen, it tends to provide a measurable influence on behaviour. Von Feilitzen⁽⁴⁰⁾ (1987) in her extensive review of the Finnish study reported "positive, often statistically significant relationships were

(38) J. MILAVSKY, *Television and Aggression: The results of a panel study*. New York: Academic Press.

(39) *The Psychologist: Bulletin of the British Psychological Society*, 4, 1989, pp. 162-165.

noted between viewing of violence and aggression... most of these long term analysis support the hypothesis that viewing of violent television content leads to later aggression. None of the longitudinal analysis, however, supported the alternative hypothesis of an opposite causal relation, viz., that aggressive children choose to watch violent television content”.

Another recent report on a longitudinal study comes from Conradie, Heyneke and Botha (1987)⁽⁴¹⁾. This study took place in south Africa from two years before the introduction of television, until three years after its arrival. Nearly 10,000 (white) children were involved, in several samples including a core of 2,200 who were followed for five years from standard 6 (aged 11) onwards.

The method of analysis was a conservative one of using regression equations to see if viewing experience added to the ability of early aggression scores to predict later ones, with all the other indicators of aggression into account.

The results were that viewing, whether of physical and verbal amounts of aggression portrayed, or of television overall was a significant, even if small additional predictor of aggressive behaviour in older children. Children with low self esteem, or a higher degree of “personal freedom”, who were less sociable, more unyielding, with “lower moral character” and with high initial aggression scores were more likely to increase their aggressiveness the more they viewed television.

The authors concluded that “the long term influencing of aggressiveness through television is a cumulative process that is not sensitive to small fluctuations in aggressive content”.

This whole study points up some important problems on which members of the Society might wish to reflect. One is that without any contact with South African psychologists we would not know that a process is reportedly underway in which the next generation of white

(40) C. Von Feilitzen, Violent films, anxiety and aggression. *Nordicom Review*, 1, 1987, pp. 27-39.

(41) D.P. Conradie, M. Heineke & M. P. Botha, The effect of Television Violence on Television - Naïve pupils: A follow up study over five years: Human sciences research council.

South African adults is likely to be, to a small but measureable amount more aggressive to others than were their forebears. This evidently comes about through out watching television, much of which is imported from Western sources. Some might accept the research validity and try to press Western program experts (noting another important piece of evidence that the peacefully educative Cosby Show has been the most popular imported program in south Africa, among whites) to refrain from exporting programs which contain gratuitous violence, to that country. If such a step is considered worthwhile in the case of South Africa it would be hard to deny its more general value as well.

VI - A psychiatrist opinion of films violence

A HEAD DOCTOR WRITES

Dr. Raj Persaud, a psychiatrist and lecturer at the University of London, specialises in the study of the effects that violent films have on people. Here he gives his considered opinion on the subject...

THERE HAVE BEEN ABOUT 3000 research studies done on whether violent films lead to violence, and there is a general consensus by academic psychologists and psychiatrists that there is a link between films and violence, though it's a very small effect - less than five per cent of *all* violence is thought to be directly linked to the watching of films.

Research in America has found that a few days after a big heavyweight fight the homicide rate goes up. If a black man gets beaten, the number of black homicide victims goes up; if a white man gets beaten the number of white victims goes up. No one knows why.

Films cause violence in many ways, and the idea of a link is a summary of a lot of different experiments which range from showing people films that aren't violent and then comparing their responses with a group of people shown violent films, and measuring their aggression with questionnaires or interviews.

By using a gamut of measures, people have determined that watching an aggressive or violent film does appear to be linked to increased levels of aggression or violence. That's controversial, however, because those

experiments tend to be done over a short period of time - they show people a film and then interview them later that day, or the next. There's controversy over whether that effect lasts over a long period of time.

So people then go to do further experiments where they ask people how many violent films they tend to watch over a number of years and again look at various aggression measures. The summary of all that is that there is *some* link – there is a consistent finding that people who watch violent films *do* appear to be violent in some way.

Another theory is that violence in films is portrayed as a solution to people's problems so when you think about a solution to your own problems, you're more likely to consider violence. In a conflict situation you could consider several mechanisms to get yourself out of that, such as negotiation or using the law. But in films, heroes tend to go for the violent mechanism. Therefore, in terms of considering possible strategies when you're in a problem or conflict situation, you're more likely to consider violence.

Another good example is revenge. People talk about revenge quite openly. And why is that? Because it's part of our culture.

Another theory is to do with identification. People like to identify with heroes like Clint Eastwood or Arnold Schwarzenegger. Now if those characters who people are trying to identify with use violence, then it may well be that another way in which people try to identify with their heroes is through using violence.

But while there *is* a link between films and violence, there are many more things that are linked to violence that people don't want to talk about. They tend to talk about films and blame films or television rather than the things which are more potent, and if one is going to enter a rational debate about dealing with violence it would appear more rational to deal with the things that cause a higher percentage – poverty, desperation, availability of weapons. etc.

VII -Questions

What do the British public really think about violence in the movies?

EMPIRE⁽⁴²⁾ commissioned an exclusive survey to find out...

Are films TOO VIOLENT? HAVE YOU EVER felt violent after watching a movie? should violent videos be banned to protect children? We asked these questions and more in an attempt to gauge public feeling towards the currently sensitive issue of Violence In The Movies.

Naturally, some of the responses were unsurprising (90 per cent of the over 65s think there is too much violence in movies, for instance), but others were not so obvious: nearly half 25 to 34 - years - old feel there was about the right amount of violence and – get this – two per cent of 25 to 44 - year - olds feel there is not *enough* violence on our screens.

Tellingly, 94 per cent of men and 99 per cent of women say they personally have never felt violent after watching a film, though 46 per cent of respondents feel violent films make “people more tolerant towards violence” – the “it would never affect me, but what about lesser mortals?” argument that dogs the entire debate and is grist to the anti-censorship lobby’s mill.

When it comes to who should take responsibility for protecting the young from the adverse effects of violent films, the feeling was clear: 67 per cent felt that the buck stops with the parents but 36 per cent of those questioned felt that the Government should carry some of the responsibility, while 37 per cent felt the filmmaker should be accountable as well. Perhaps the most encouraging reponse for David Alton is the fact that more than half of the survey feel that violent films should be banned to protect children, rising to 64 per cent of women – and since only governments can ban videos, perhaps parental responsibility is not capable of doing the job alone.

1 - Thinking generally about the level of violence shown in films do you think there is....

Too much violence shown?	66%
About the right level of violence shown?.....	30%

(42) EMPIRE magazine, 1994, pp. 90-91.

Not enough violence shown?..... 0%
 Don't know..... 4%

- * While 66% of people think there is too much violence in films, 2% of 25-44 years-old think there is not enough.
- * 59% of 15-24 years-old think there is just the right amount of violence.
- * 90% of 65 years old think there is too much violence in movies.
- * 76% of women think there is too much violence in films while 23% think there is the right amount.

2 - Have you ever felt in any way violent after seeing a film that contained scenes of violence?

Yes..... 3%
 No..... 96%
 Don't know..... 1%

- * While 96% of people said they had never felt in any way violent after seeing a movie, 11% of 15-24 years old said they had.

3 - Do you think that watching films with scenes of violence in makes people generally more tolerant towards violence of not?

Yes, makes people more tolerant..... 46%
 No, does not make people more tolerant..... 46%
 Don't know..... 8%

4 - Do you think that films with scenes of violence should be banned to protect children or not?

Yes..... 56%
 No..... 42%
 Don't know..... 2%

- * 64% of women as opposed to 48% of men thought that films should be banned, while 38% of 15-24 supported a ban.

5 - In your opinion, who should take the responsibility for policing the levels of violence shown in films. Should it be? (People were given the opportunity to give more than one answer)

The filmmaker..... 37%
 The Government..... 36%

The parents.....	67%
Someone else.....	2%

* 67% feel that parents should take responsibility for policing the levels of violence in films, rising to 74% in the 25-34 category. And only 28% of 25-34 years old feel that responsibility should lie with the filmmaker.

The EMPIRE Violence In The Movies Survey was conducted between March 18 and March 20, 1994 and based on a sample of 967 adults representative of the population of Great Britain, and was prepared by Marketing Direction, a marketing research consultancy specialising in media and entertainment.

VIII - Conclusion

"VIOLENCE IS AN ELUSIVE CONCEPT when applied to representations on the screen." Says James Ferman, head of the British Board classification (BBFC) who explains the BBFC's role and gives his own opinion of the violence in the movies.

He adds: "During the past year, public concern about media violence has surfaced repeatedly, much of it focused on the possible effects of such violence on the young. "The BBFC share that concern, since our policy is based on an awareness that people are, to some extent, what they consume."

The BBFC (British Board of film classification) policy on violence is twofold. It wants to protect children from fear, and potential delinquents from anti-social influence.

Unfortunately, even if we disregard press hysteria, there is no reason to be complacent about the role that violent screen images may play in the lives of some viewers. The problem, as ever, is to evaluate the extent to which such material is being seen by those who might be influenced in adverse ways.

The chief worry, as far as video is concerned, must always be that children below the age of 18 are gaining access to tapes they are too immature to handle.

Access to a film once it is in the home is a matter for adult supervision. Yet too few parents grasp the need for comparable controls on video, and as their children grow into teenagers, many give up the struggle.

Society cannot provide a fail-safe system for all its unsupervised children without laying down a regime that would be unacceptable on civil liberties grounds. Only one household in four now includes a child under 16. Are all those households to be denied the right to enjoy legitimate adult entertainment in the privacy of their homes, merely because a small percentage of parents shirk their parental duties? The answer seems obvious until we are asked. "But what if it could actually save the life of one small child?"

While there is convincing evidence that sexual violence onscreen can influence the attitudes and behaviour of some viewers, the evidence about simple aggression is less clear, though recent American studies have shown that, particularly over time, some sort of relationship exists, possibly causal, more likely contributory.

Human nature is far too complex to lend itself to simple explanations, and crucial experiences may have their origin in infancy or adolescence, home or school, family or peer group, or some unique combination of them all. It would be surprising if none of those experiences had their origin in the thousands of hours of TV or video consumed by the average child.

Needless to say, it is easier to see the problems than to identify the solutions and a new approach is almost certainly needed.

Britain remains one of the most regulated societies in the world as far as the media is concerned, and the public seem to want more rather than less. But, increasingly, this regulation is going to have to be self-imposed.

In the end, it is up to adults to police their own viewing and the viewing of their children.

Contrary of widespread belief, there is legislation already in place to cover violent videos. The need now is for a serious effort to educate the public about their own responsibilities. Too many of those who inveigh against media violence have no idea what their own children are watching.

One of the new areas to be developed is that of consumer advice, and

the Board is about to launch a pilot scheme that will help parents to make an informed choice on behalf of their children. But if children are to survive in a media-saturated world, they will need to make informed choices, too, and media education may be a necessary constituent of that survival...

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**FRONTIERES MARITIMES DE L'ETAT A L'AUNE
DU NOUVEAU DROIT DE LA MER
(approche juridico-politique)**

Laurice RIZKALLAH^(*)

Introduction

1- L'horizon marin est resté, pendant des siècles dans la vie quotidienne des navigateurs et des pêcheurs, et aussi dans l'optique des Etats, borné à quelques mers étroites, à quelques passages resserrés, sur lesquels s'appliquaient et s'enchevêtraient de multiples us et *coutumes*, des règles fractionnées dans le temps et l'espace, intermittentes et partielles dans leur application effective. Ces règles diverses, contradictoires même difficiles à recenser et à connaître formaient tout au plus des droits sur des mers et sur des activités particulières. Des droits dans lesquels il est malaisé de faire le départ entre les affirmations unilatérales plus ou moins tacitement admises, et les dispositions conventionnelles, les privilèges consentis aux marchands et les véritables accords entre Etats. C'est l'apparition de systèmes douaniers cohérents, de frontières maritimes, œuvre du XVIème siècle, qui va donner à la diplomatie et au droit de la mer un aliment essentiel: la négociation des traités de commerce et de navigation, les deux activités étant étroitement liées.

Ce n'est que vers la fin du XVIIIème siècle et même le début du XIXème siècle que le principe de la liberté des mers, sous son aspect global, se trouve consacré en fait et en droit, non pas de par la volonté délibérée de la société internationale, mais sous l'effet d'un concours de circonstances: nécessité du libre négoce au grand cours, révolution que le bateau à vapeur provoque dans le transport maritime, possibilité d'une maîtrise potentielle plus discrète. C'est à la même époque que fut admise,

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de façon quasi universelle, l'existence d'eaux adjacentes aux côtes des Etats: une mer territoriale aux limites étroites fixées à 3 milles marins, selon la large acceptation du critère de la portée du canon⁽¹⁾ c'est donc le "modèle juridique classique" du droit de la mer dont le principe de liberté en constitue la pierre de touche qui fut internationalement accepté durant plus d'un siècle.

2- Or, depuis les années soixante-dix avec la découverte des richesses de la mer et de ses fonds, les appétits ne se limitent plus à l'aventure de traverser les espaces marins pour rejoindre d'autres terres plus riches encore, mais il s'agit de projection sur la mer, sur ses eaux et ses fonds. C'est, en effet, à une formidable explosion de l'emprise maritime que nous assistons depuis la découverte des ressources minérales des fonds marins (l'eldorado du siècle) et leur proclamation en 1970 patrimoine commun de l'humanité relevant d'un mécanisme institutionnel: "**l'Autorité internationale des fonds marins**" chargée de l'exploitation et de la gestion de ces fonds considérés, d'ores et déjà, propriété commune de toute l'humanité⁽²⁾.

Ainsi face à l'institutionnalisation de ces nouveaux espaces, autrefois *res nullius*⁽³⁾, et au moment où, à quelques exceptions près, les "Etats ont stabilisé les contours de leurs souverainetés terrestres, c'est la fixation des limites de leurs juridictions et droits maritimes, qui est devenue l'une des grandes affaires des relations internationales, et partant, du droit international de cette fin de siècle"⁽⁴⁾.

Or, les frontières maritimes d'un Etat – dans un univers maritime profondément bouleversé depuis les années soixante-dix – se fixent soit,

- (1) cf. G. Gidel, *La mer territoriale*, R.C.A.D.I. 1934, II, p. 137 (Notons qu'à l'époque la portée du canon n'atteignait pas 3 milles).
- (2) Depuis les années soixante-dix, les fonds marins, à partir des limites des juridictions nationales, sont proclamés par les Nations Unies, patrimoine commun de l'humanité avec un organe international dénommé **l'Autorité internationale des fonds marins** - destiné à leur gestion et à leur exploitation (cf. Résolution 2750 c(XXV) du 17 déc. 1970).
- (3) La notion *res nullius* aurait permis au premier venu l'appropriation des espaces marins vacants et sans maître.
- (4) Nous n'aborderons pas ici les délimitations entre Etats se faisant face. Voir sur la question de la délimitation maritime, L. Lucchini, *Droit de la Mer*, T2. Vol. 1, Paris Pedone 1996.

par rapport aux frontières d'autres Etats soit, par rapport à la zone internationale des fonds marins. Nous écarterons le premier cas (qui fera l'objet d'une étude ultérieure). Nous nous arrêterons à l'étude du second cas relatif à la fixation des frontières des Etats par rapport à la zone internationale des fonds marins. (La délimitation de cette dernière consiste en une opération négative: la fixation de son périmètre équivaut à la détermination des limites extérieures des nouveaux "dégradés"⁽⁵⁾ d'espaces marins jusqu'à 12 milles marins ou 200 milles de surface avec 350 milles de fond ou de sous-sol marin). Ce qui revient à analyser dans une approche socio-politique, la mer territoriale⁽⁶⁾ de 12 milles marins (Section I) et les nouvelles appropriations maritimes à connotation économique, politique et technologique. Il s'agit de la zone économique de 200 milles marins de surface, doublée d'un plateau continental de 350 milles marins de fond (Section II).

I - Mer territoriale de 12 milles marins

La mer territoriale – institution longtemps consacrée à 3 milles marins se trouve projetée, depuis quelques décennies, à 12 milles vers le large. Vu les liens qu'entretiennent ses eaux et le domaine terrestre de l'Etat, cette «vieille dame» (selon une formule ancestrale), conserve une importance essentielle en droit international. Sa limite extérieure fixe, en effet, les frontières de l'Etat en mer⁽⁷⁾. La nouvelle largeur de 12 milles marins affirmée par le nouveau droit de la mer constitue, à n'en pas douter, une nouvelle emprise à la fois juridique et politique de l'Etat sur le milieu marin⁽⁸⁾.

- Nouvelle emprise Juridico-politique de l'Etat sur la mer

Il s'agit, en fait, d'une assimilation au territoire terrestre sous réserve, toutefois, de la règle du passage inoffensif.

(5) cf. R.J. Dupuy, *L'océan partagé*, p. 5, Paris, Pedone 1979; L.Lucchini & M. Voelckel, *Droit de la Mer*, Tome I, p. 78, Paris Pedone 1990.

(6) cf. P.M. Dupuy, *Droit international public* p. 530, Paris, Dalloz 1995.

(7) Voir dans ce sens les propos du représentant de la R.D.A. à la 3ème Conférence: «*La question de la largeur et du régime juridique de la mer territoriale, qui est un des problèmes fondamentaux que la conférence doit traiter, revient à déterminer des frontières d'Etats*».

(8) cf. P. Weil, «Perspectives du droit de la délimitation maritime», p. 98, Pedone, 1988; voir également, L.Lucchini, *Délimitation*, 1996, op.cit; pp. 131-135.

A - Assimilation au territoire terrestre

Si, à première vue, les questions de juridiction maritime ne sont pas aussi étroitement liées à la philosophie territorialiste que les problèmes traditionnels des limites terrestres, pour la mer territoriale, il est certain que «l'assimilation au territoire terrestre est complète»⁽⁹⁾, comme le rappelle l'article 2 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. En effet, l'Etat riverain, aux termes dudit article exerce «sa souveraineté sur la mer territoriale». La Convention de 1982 ne fait que consolider une première consécration conventionnelle en 1958. L'article 1er de la Convention de Genève, commence ainsi: 1) «La souveraineté de l'Etat s'étend au-delà de son territoire et de ses eaux intérieures, à une zone de mer adjacente à ses côtes désignée sous le nom de mer territoriale». 2) «La souveraineté de l'Etat riverain s'étend à l'espace aérien au-dessus de la mer territoriale, ainsi qu'au lit et au sous-sol de cette mer»⁽¹⁰⁾.

Les différents projets soumis par les Etats à la 3ème Conférence à ce sujet, se réfèrent tous à la souveraineté⁽¹¹⁾. Les transformations subies dans sa composition par la société internationale, depuis 1930 et 1958, n'ont pas entraîné le déclin du principe de souveraineté. Les positions

(9) Sur les aspects historiques, voir, A. Raestad: *La mer territoriale; études historiques et juridiques*, Paris, Pedone 1913; F. de Pauw: *Grotius and the law of the sea*, éd. de l'Institut de sociologie de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1965; D.P. O'Connell: «the international Law of the sea», vol. I p. 59. op. cit., J. Imbart-Latour: *La mer territoriale au point de vue théorique et pratique*, Paris 1889; A. de Geouffre de La Pradelle: «*Le droit de l'Etat sur la mer territoriale*», R.G.D.I.P., 1898, p. 264 et p. 309; H. Merveilleux-Duvigneaux: *Du droit de l'Etat sur la mer territoriale* - Aix-Marseille, 1900; P. Fauchille: *Traité de Droit International Public*, Paris 1921/26, Tome 1, p. 147; à l'époque contemporaine voir aussi D.P. O'Connell: «*The juridical nature of the territorial sea*» BYBIL, 1971, p. 303. La conférence de codification de La Haye de 1930 va donner une consécration de portée solennelle à la thèse de la souveraineté. La formule sur laquelle l'entente se réalise est ainsi rédigée: «*Le territoire de l'Etat comprend sur une zone de mer désignée... sous le nom de mer territoriale. La souveraineté sur cette zone s'exerce....*». Certes, ce ne sont pas là les termes d'une Convention de droit positif.

(10) Article 19 de la Convention de Montego Bay sur le droit de la mer:

(11) Le passage est inoffensif aussi longtemps qu'il ne porte pas atteinte à la paix, au bon ordre, à la sécurité de l'Etat côtier. Il doit s'effectuer en conformité avec les dispositions de la Convention et les autres règles du droit international. mais le consensus qui s'est dégagé à cette occasion montre la très large acceptation par la communauté internationale de l'époque de cette conception. La doctrine dans son ensemble s'y est ralliée (cf. notamment l'International Law Association, session de Stockholm, 1924; l'Institut de Droit International, session de Stockholm, 1928; P.C. =

soutenues par les Etats «territorialistes» montrent, plutôt le contraire. Néanmoins, la condition majeure imposée à l'exercice de la souveraineté, a trait au respect de la navigation internationale dans cet espace adjacent à la haute mer. (C'est une condition enracinée depuis longue date dans le droit international coutumier).

B - Principe du passage inoffensif

Le principe du passage inoffensif dans la mer territoriale traduit cette concession faite par l'Etat territorial aux droits et intérêts des tiers. Il impose à l'Etat côtier l'obligation de ne pas entraver le passage inoffensif des navires étrangers dans ses eaux territoriales, ce qui ne l'empêche pas de prendre les mesures nécessaires à sa protection et sa sécurité. Le passage inoffensif est, en effet, strictement défini par la Convention. Il s'agit en premier lieu d'un passage au sens où le navire battant pavillon étranger peut traverser la mer territoriale sans faire escale, se rendre dans les eaux intérieures (ports en particulier) ou bien encore les quitter. Ensuite, le caractère innocent est entendu restrictivement, en particulier à l'article 19 de la Convention de 1982 qui reprend en les affinant les critères traditionnels⁽¹²⁾. Le passage doit être continu et rapide et ne pas porter atteinte à la paix de l'Etat côtier, entendue au sens large.

= Jessup: The Law of territorial waters and maritime jurisdiction, New-York; G. Gidel affirme, selon l'expression célèbre, que «la mer territoriale n'est que du territoire submergé». (cf. G. Gidel, le droit international public de la mer, T.III, op. cit., p. 169); voir également sur ce point, R.J. Dupuy «La mer sous compétence nationale» in Traité du droit de la mer, op. cit.; p. 224-236. L.Lucchini & Voelckel, 1990, op. cit., pp. 162-194; et Doc. A/conf. 62/L. 4, 3ème Los; Doc off. vol. III, p. 94; Doc. A/conf. 62/C. 2/L. 13, 3ème Los; Doc. off. vol. III, p. 221.

(12) Le passage d'un navire étranger est considéré comme, portant atteinte à la paix, au bon ordre ou à la sécurité de l'Etat côtier si, dans la mer territoriale, ce navire se livre à l'une quelconque des activités suivantes:

- a) menace ou emploi de la force contre la souveraineté, l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de l'Etat côtier ou de toute autre manière contraire aux principes du droit international énoncés dans la Charte des Nations;
- b) exercice ou manœuvre avec armes de tout type;
- c) collecte des renseignements au détriment de la sécurité de l'Etat côtier;
- g) embarquement ou débarquement de marchandises ou de personnes en contravention aux lois et règlements douaniers, fiscaux, sanitaires ou d'immigration de l'Etat côtier;
- h) pollution délibérée et grave, en violation de la convention.
- l) toute autre activité sans rapport direct avec le passage.

A la condition de respecter ces règles, les Etats dont le navire possède le pavillon, conservent sur celui-ci, alors même qu'il est en transit à l'intérieur de la mer territoriale d'un autre Etat, l'usage de leur compétence personnelle. Ceci explique, notamment, que l'Etat côtier ne puisse exercer sa juridiction civile et pénale sur le navire étranger en passage, sauf si ce dernier a commis des actes attentatoires à sa sécurité (y compris, en particulier, des faits de pollution). On est bien en présence d'une situation où l'intérêt de maintenir les communications maritimes internationales limite en droit l'exercice par l'Etat territorial de la plénitude de ses compétences.

Aussi peut-on discerner facilement, derrière les débats théoriques et juridiques, *les enjeux pratiques et concrets d'une notion à la charnière du droit et de la politique: celle de la souveraineté*. Le régime des eaux territoriales qui est, de surcroît, lié à celui de l'espace aérien surjacent, repose sur un équilibre entre cette notion et des aménagements venus de Conventions, de coutumes ou d'usages. La transformation de la communauté internationale, l'apparition d'Etats nouveaux et partant, d'autant de souverainetés neuves et aussi de nouvelles extensions en mer, devait, bien sûr, remettre en question les termes de cet équilibre, ouvrant un nouveau regard sur l'univers maritime.

- Nouveau regard sur la planète bleue

Si à Genève la question de la largeur de la mer territoriale n'a pu être réglée, un consensus s'est réalisé, à la 3ème Conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, autour d'une «*mer territoriale de 12 milles marins*» à partir des lignes de base. Donc, passage de la règle mytique de 3 milles à un mouvement collectif expansionniste et début d'une ère maritime nouvelle.

A - Dépassement du mythe de la «portée du canon».

Une mer territoriale aux limites étroites fixées à 3 milles nautiques - selon la large acception au 18e siècle, la règle de la «portée de canon»⁽¹³⁾ est le corollaire du principe ancestral de liberté des mers. C'est, en effet, par souci de garantir une liberté totale de la navigation dans les espaces les plus larges que la souveraineté de l'Etat était pendant

(13) C'est Galiani qui apporta la précision mathématique de 3 milles marins en 1782.

des siècles cantonnée à la zone littorale placée à la portée du canon qu'il pouvait disposer sur la côte. Cette zone maritime étroite était destinée à la protection de la sécurité de l'Etat. De là découle, d'ailleurs, la largeur de la mer territoriale déterminée par la *portée du canon*. Ce n'est qu'au début du XVII^e siècle que cette largeur de trois milles marins, fut introduite dans la pratique internationale. A partir du 18^e siècle on a pu affirmer que la souveraineté de l'Etat s'étend à une portion de mer adjacente aux côtes, large de trois milles marins, mais qu'elle se trouve limitée par un droit de passage inoffensif reconnu aux navires étrangers. Jusqu'à la première moitié du XX^e siècle, la notion coutumière ainsi définie et délimitée grâce à une *opinio juris* cohérente, fut maintenue par les grands Etats maritimes dont le Royaume-Uni. Les intérêts de ces Etats trouvent leur compte car ils possèdent des puissantes flottes capables d'aller pêcher dans des eaux très éloignées de leurs côtes.

Ainsi, cette règle de 3 milles resta d'application stable pendant presque deux siècles, au point de devenir mythique. Cependant, elle subit peu à peu un phénomène d'usure dû à l'influence de nouveaux facteurs qui affectèrent la société internationale (apparition d'Etats nouveaux, émergence d'intérêts autres que ceux de la navigation, philosophie du développement etc...) poussant, par conséquent, à de nouvelles extensions en mer affirmant le mouvement territorialiste⁽¹⁴⁾.

On assiste, en fait depuis 1945, à un mouvement d'extension de la mer territoriale par voie d'actes unilatéraux émanant dans leur ensemble des mêmes pays pauvres qui expriment, à l'époque, des prétentions sur le plateau continental. Ce processus qui rencontre de nombreuses oppositions et suscite de multiples incidents, coïncide avec le renforcement des flottes de pêche industrielle. Les pays pauvres commencent ainsi à briser le droit coutumier de la mer territoriale, à l'élaboration duquel ils n'ont, du reste pas participé. Les principaux instigateurs de ce mouvement revendicatif multilatéral sont les Etats latino-américains dans les années qui suivent la Proclamation TRUMAN sur le plateau continental. Ils ont le souci d'empêcher l'épuisement des ressources halieutiques des zones extérieures aux eaux territoriales proches des côtes

(14) cf. L.Lucchini, 1990, op.cit.; p. 170; P. Weil, 1988, op.cit.; p. 63 et 1989, R.G.D.I.P., pp. 501-511; G. Gidel: «La mer territoriale et la zone contiguë», R.C.A.D.I. 1934, II, p. 137 et suiv.

et vitales pour leurs économies.

On constate, donc, dès avant la conférence de Genève 1958, que la notion de mer territoriale n'est plus tributaire des seules exigences de sécurité comme par le passé; viennent s'y ajouter, désormais, des intérêts économiques contradictoires. De surcroît, tout au long de cette longue évolution de la notion de mer territoriale, l'objectif de protection de protection a cessé d'être exclusivement militaire et est devenu également sanitaire, policier et douanier. Dans le domaine militaire les exigences des Etats sont désormais plus fortes; elles se sont surtout renforcées avec l'apparition des armes nucléaires porteuses de dangers nouveaux tels que la pénétration de sous-marins ou la pose d'installations nucléaires dans les eaux proches d'Etats côtiers. Aux conférences diplomatiques de Genève, la notion de 3 milles a fait l'objet de divergences économiques et politiques, entre les pays en développement et les pays industrialisés. La règle de 3 milles ne satisfait donc plus aux exigences de la majorité des Etats qui ne l'acceptent et ne l'appliquent plus. Désuète, si on la justifie exclusivement par le critère de sécurité nationale, cette règle coutumière est imparfaite et insuffisante si l'on invoque celui de la nécessité économique. C'est donc vers l'affirmation d'un «mouvement collectif» expansionniste que s'est orientée la pratique internationale.

En effet, d'abord isolée, cette pratique s'élargit et s'épanouit à travers des déclarations communes chargées de définir à la fois les raisons d'être du mouvement et l'extension réalisée. Ainsi, la Déclaration de Santiago du 18 août 1952 (Chili, équateur, Pérou et plus tard Costa-Rica) qui indique la volonté de préserver les ressources naturelles des océans jusqu'à 200 milles, une zone d'application des compétences nationales et progressivement une grande partie des pays latino-américains dont les déclarations affirment le caractère collectif du mouvement.⁽¹⁵⁾

La question s'est alors posée, de savoir si la 3ème Conférence sur le droit de la mer serait à même de réussir - à une époque marquée par la diversité des limites nationales - une *unité de mesure* de la largeur de la mer territoriale, comme celle des *3 milles marins* qui s'est affirmée et devenue *mythique* durant plus de deux siècles?

(15) cf. Déclaration de Montevideo du 8 mai 1970 (A/AC. 138/34; Déclaration de Lima du 8 août 1970 (A/AC. 138/128).

B - Affirmation de la nouvelle frontière maritime de 12 milles marins

Si l'on assiste après les conférences de Genève (1958-1960) à une multiplication de prétentions unilatérales de la plupart d'Etats qui viennent de naître, ce n'est qu'au sein de la 3ème Conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer qu'un *consensus* autour d'une largeur de 12 milles marins a pu se réaliser, permettant ainsi le retour à une «*règle unitaire*»⁽¹⁶⁾. Il s'agit d'un nouveau chapitre qui s'ouvre après deux siècles gouvernés par la *portée du canon*. C'est, en fait, un premier grignotage sur la Zone internationale, cet espace maritime autrefois régi par le principe *mare liberum*, aujourd'hui, *patrimoine, commun de l'humanité* et domaine nouveau du droit international public, dont la limite intérieure devait commencer dans les années 70 à la limite extérieure d'une mer territoriale de 3 milles marins.

C'est cette limite qui fut consacrée dans la Convention du 10 décembre 1982 entrée en vigueur le 16 novembre 1994. Ainsi, en vertu de l'article 3, paragraphe 1, «tout Etat a le droit de fixer la largeur de sa mer territoriale; cette largeur ne peut dépasser 12 milles marins...»⁽¹⁷⁾ La disposition est habile, par l'équilibre qu'elle réalise; elle donne, en effet, consécration au droit de l'Etat de procéder unilatéralement à la fixation de la largeur des eaux territoriales à la condition pour lui, de ne pas outrepasser la limite prescrite. Liberté lui est, d'ailleurs, laissée d'opter pour une mer territoriale de moindre étendue⁽¹⁸⁾. Certes, avant même que la 3ème Conférence soit parvenue à cet accord, de nombreux Etats avaient adopté une législation nationale fixant à 12 milles la limite de leurs eaux territoriales. (Ce fut, notamment, le cas de la France qui, par sa loi du 24 décembre 1971, a porté à 12 milles la largeur de sa mer territoriale rompant ainsi avec une longue tradition et un attachement ferme à la vieille règle de 3 milles).

Le mouvement annexionniste de l'espace marin internationalisé s'est, depuis lors, amplement confirmé. La règle de 12 milles est, d'ores et déjà, une règle de droit positif⁽¹⁹⁾. C'est le nouveau droit de la mer qui

(16) Sur la diversité de ces positions, voir Castaneda: «*Les positions des Etats latino-américains*», in. *Actualités du droit de la mer*, Pedone, 1973, p. 158. Voir également *Doc. off. vol II*, p. 119; et *Doc A/AC/138/Se/SR6*, p. 6-27.

(17) cf. Article 3, paragraphe 1, de la Convention, de Montego Bay sur le droit de la mer.

(18)

(19) Elle est consacrée par la nouvelle Convention sur le droit de la mer entrée en vigueur le 16 nov. 1994. Voir également la doctrine notamment, L. Lucchini «1996: où en est le droit de la mer?», *Annuaire du droit de la mer*, 1996, Monaco; Pedone 1996;

s'affirme rompant ainsi avec la notion mythique de la *portée de canon*. Il s'agit d'une pratique décidée, par les Etats et confirmée par la Convention du 10 décembre 1982 sur le droit de la mer, entrée en vigueur le 16 novembre 1994. Par conséquent, la question longtemps controversée sur la largeur de la mer territoriale se trouve réglée avec la nouveau droit de la mer.

II - Extensions maritimes des Etats jusqu'à 200 milles marins

Les Etats ne disposent pas à première vue sur leur plateau continental et zone économique exclusive de 200 milles marins de la souveraineté territoriale au plein sens du terme, mais seulement de «droits souverains» de caractère fonctionnel, surtout, économique. «Ni le plateau continental ni la Z.E.E. ne sont des zones de souveraineté» a rappelé la sentence arbitrale sur la délimitation de la frontière maritime Guinée/Guinée-Bissau⁽²⁰⁾.

Cette conception non territoriale du plateau et de la zone ne doit pas, toutefois, faire illusion⁽²¹⁾; car, sous le couvert des droits d'exploration et d'exploitation des ressources naturelles de la mer et du sol marin, c'est plus d'une fois l'extension de l'espace étatique qui a été recherchée; ce n'est pas un hasard si la nouvelle Convention sur le droit de la mer désigne les fonds marins au-delà du plateau continental et de la zone économique exclusive comme ceux situés «*au-delà des limites de la juridiction nationale*». La territorialisation pure et simple de la zone de 200 milles, demeure la revendication avouée ou l'ambition secrète de certains Etats. C'est, en tout cas, dans cette perspective économico-politique que des Etats cherchent à s'assurer des espaces maritimes aussi vastes que possible en s'accrochant au moindre îlot, au moindre rocher émergé, susceptible de leur procurer une zone maritime.

C'est ainsi qu'une distance de 200 milles marins qui n'était, au départ, qu'une particularité géographique qui n'intéressait que quelques Etats riverains a, vite, conquis la majorité écrasante des Etats de la communauté internationale pour devenir une «*idée-force, une règle de portée universelle donnant naissance à une nouvelle institution- la zone*

(20) Cf. Délimitation de la frontière maritime Guinée/Guinée-Bissau, R.G.D.I.P; 1985-484-537, p. 533, par 124.

(21) cf. P. Weil, 1988, op.cit., p. 503.

économique exclusive (Z.E.E.)⁽²²⁾ qui a révolutionné la mer et son droit. La nouvelle distance de 200 milles marins cristallisée avant même l'adoption de la Convention du 10 décembre 1982, fait boule de neige au sein de la 3ème Conférence où la majorité des Etats ont adopté *crescendo* ce chiffre dans leurs législations nationales. Ce qui a provoqué une transformation radicale de l'univers maritime ainsi que du droit de la délimitation de l'espace marin jusqu'alors régi par le principe de liberté. Il s'agit, en d'autres termes, d'une révolution géographique qui a entraîné un nouveau «Yalta» sur la mer et la remise en cause de la délimitation maritime, (&1). Il s'agit, en fait, de tracer les nouvelles frontières entre les *territoires maritimes nationaux* et le *territoire international*. Autrement dit, c'est la limite extérieure du plateau continental qu'il faut déterminer et qui n'est rien d'autre que la limite intérieure de la Zone internationale des fonds marins. (&2)

- EMPRISE ECONOMICO-POLITIQUE DE L'ETAT SUR LA SURFACE MARITIME

A - Zone économique de 200 milles marins

La consécration par la nouvelle Convention sur le droit de la mer de l'extension maximale à 200 milles marins transforme radicalement le paysage juridique antérieur des mers entraînant ainsi le partage d'une portion importante des espaces maritimes par un certain nombre d'Etats côtiers. De nombreuses proclamations unilatérales ont concrétisé cet irrépressible besoin de projection des compétences terrestres sur la mer.

(22) R.J. Dupuy & D. Vignes, «*Traité du nouveau droit de la mer*», op.cit., p. 242 et suiv., L. Lucchini et M. Voelckel, «*Droit de la Mer*», op. cit., p. 202 et suiv.; voir aussi les nombreux travaux sur la question de la Z.E.E. de 200 milles. Notamment, A.M. Aguilar: «*The patrimonial sea or economic zone concept*», San Diego Law review, 1974, p. 575; L.M. Alexander and R.D. Hodgson: «*The impact of the 200 mile economic zone on the sea*», San Diego Review, 1975, p. 569; D.J. Attard: «*The E.E.Z. in international Law*», Oxford University Press, 1978; N.G.S. de Barberis: «*Le développement du concept de zone économique en Amérique Latine*», Thesaurus Aeroasium, vol. VII, 1977, Thessaloniki, p. 529; J. Castanêda: «*Negociations ou the E.E.Z. at the third in conference on the law of the sea*», Mélanges Lachs 1984, p. 605; B. Conforti et autres auteurs, «*La zona económica exclusiva*», A. Giuffrè, Milan 1983; D.W. Fischer: «*Hard mineral resource development policy in the role of the coastal states*», O.D.I.L., 1988, p. 101; J. MaRtray: «*Protection des mers dans les 200 milles*», Rev. maritime, 343, janv. 1975, p. 321; «*Le droit de la mer*», colloque de la Haye 1981, Nijhoff, 1982, p. 211; K.L. Walz: «*United states jurisdiction over the 200 miles maritime zone*», San Diego Law Review, mai - juin 1986, p. 545.

La distance de 200 milles tout comme la règle de 3 milles allait prendre une «valeur mythique». *Le Liban – pays maritime central de la méditerranée – ne peut jamais prétendre à une zone économique de 200 milles. Il entre en «indivision» avec les pays voisins qui pourront bénéficier de presque 55 milles marins chacun.*

Le concept de Z.E.E. a été formulé pour la première fois en 1971 par le représentant du Kenya devant le comité juridique consultatif africano-asiatique. Reprise en 1972 devant le comité des fonds marins, l'idée de zone économique fut confirmée par la déclaration de l'O.U.A., sur les questions relatives au droit de la mer adoptée le 24 mai 1973. Ainsi pour l'essentiel, la notion de Z.E.E. a été, au départ, l'œuvre des Etats africains; ils ont déposé des projets en sa faveur dès les premières sessions de la 3ème Conférence. Les pays d'Amérique latine l'ont d'emblée favorablement accueillie en y voyant une variante de la notion de «mer patrimoniale»⁽²³⁾. L'économie générale de ces projets et de ceux qui les ont suivis repose sur l'attribution à chaque Etat riverain d'une zone économique exclusive ne pouvant dépasser 188 milles marins à partir des limites des eaux territoriales et sur les ressources de laquelle il exerce des droits exclusifs. L'objectif des défenseurs de la notion de zone économique exclusive a toujours été de faire disparaître, pour les Etats côtiers, l'inégalité dérivant du régime de 1958 en ce qui concerne les Etats ne disposant que d'un plateau continental (au sens géologique du terme) très réduit. La création d'une zone maritime de largeur uniforme protectrice des intérêts des pêcheurs côtiers, est, en définitive, le fruit «d'un compromis entre les pays territorialistes favorables à une mer territoriale de 200 milles, et les protagonistes de solutions moins radicales»⁽²⁴⁾.

La magie des 200 milles a opéré avec la même puissance attractive que celle qu'a exercé la distance de 3 milles pendant une longue période historique. Ce nouveau chiffre de 200 milles qui n'était au départ qu'une particularité géographique intéressant trois Etats sud-américains riverains du Pacifique (Chili, Pérou, Equateur) et qui se justifiait dans ces circonstances par l'accès qu'il permettait à un courant prometteur, est

(23) cf. A/AC. 138/SC. 11/L. 21; voir aussi, L.D.M. Nelson: «*The patrimonial sea*», I.C.L.Q., 1973, p. 668. Voir également 3ème Conférence, Doc. off. vol. I, p. 93.

(24) cf. L. Caflisch, «*Les zones maritimes de juridiction nationale, leurs limites et leur délimitation*», R.G.D.I.P. 1980, p. 94.

devenu une «une règle de portée universelle dont le caractère mythique a été fort justement relevé». Il a joué un rôle politique considérable dans d'autres pays qui – bien que ne se trouvant pas dans les mêmes conditions géographiques, et ne disposant pas d'un courant analogue au-delà de leurs eaux nationales – ont adopté cette distance désormais, «sacralisée»⁽²⁵⁾.

Ainsi de nombreux pays industriels, d'abord réticents, ont fini par accepter la notion de zone économique exclusive. Cette réticence initiale se fondait sur des raisons d'ordre économique et stratégique. Redoutant le passage sous souveraineté territoriale d'espaces maritimes très vastes conduisant par exemple à un véritable partage de la mer Méditerranée, les Etats-Unis et l'URSS ont immédiatement manifesté leur hostilité de principe à l'égard de la Z.E.E. Mais devant la ferme résolution de nombreux pays en développement, ils ont fini par l'accepter en exigeant quelques garanties. Leur acceptation est, en effet, consécutive à des positions extrêmes prises par certains pays en développement menaçant, à défaut d'entente, de fixer unilatéralement l'étendue de leur mer territoriale à 200 milles marins. *L'alternative était donc la suivante: la souveraineté territoriale de l'Etat riverain établie unilatéralement, mais une juridiction fonctionnelle et finalisée, établie de façon concertée et inspirée des travaux de la 3ème Conférence.* Les garanties exigées par les pays industriels ont donc porté sur le maintien de la libre navigation à l'intérieur de la zone ainsi que le «droit de libre transit à travers les détroits internationaux».

Appréciant donc leurs intérêts, les pays industriels ont reconnu la notion de zone économique exclusive, qui n'est pas dépourvue d'avantages pour eux. La Partie V de la Convention consacre ses 21 articles à la zone

(25) cf. Droit de la Mer, op. cit., p. 202; Traité du nouveau droit de la mer, R.J. Dupuy, op. cit., p. 242. Voir également G. Sorel, Réflexions sur la violence 1908. Pour Sorel, le mythe est un faisceau d'images motrices ayant un effet mobilisateur sur les consciences, voire sur les ferveurs et avive ainsi leur désir de réaliser leur projet politique. En fait, l'Etat qui le premier, a conçu une notion de Zone couverte par des droits économiques du riverain est le Honduras qui, par le Décret no 25 du 17 janvier 1951 a créé la «*zona de control y protection de los recursos naturales*» d'une étendue de 200 milles au-delà de la côte atlantique. Ces détroits permettent la navigation internationale entre une partie de la haute mer et une Z.E.E. et une autre partie de la haute mer ou une Z.E.E. Dans les détroits tous les navires et aéronefs jouissent en principe du droit de passage en transit sans entraves; le régime juridique des eaux et des fonds marins correspondants n'est point affecté par ce passage. *Ce droit de passage constitue également une nouveauté juridique de la Convention* (voir art. 34 à 45).

économique exclusive. Parallèlement et par attitude conservatoire, de nombreux Etats ont opté pour la zone de 200 milles marins (étant entendu que les 12 milles situés au-delà des lignes de base utilisées pour déterminer la mer territoriale incluent celle-ci). Cette tendance s'est développée sur le plan mondial. Ainsi, 42 Z.E.E. se sont établies de 1972 à 1978 et 30 de 1979 à 1985. Une interaction s'est, en effet, produite entre les pratiques nationales et les textes de négociation successifs qui ont donné naissance, avec, bien sûr, l'apparition d'une Zone internationale des fonds marins et de nouvelles zones nationales, à une nouvelle vision du droit international de la mer qui se lit dorénavant en termes de «zones» et de «territoires» maritimes. Aussi, voit-on en juillet 1988, 74 Etats de nouveau emportés par ce mouvement extensionniste, établir une Z.E.E. de 200 milles et 22 pour une Zone de pêche (dont 4 avec une limite inférieure à 200 milles marins: Finlande, Turquie, Malte, Iran).

B - Portée

L'unité est, d'ores et déjà, acquise sur le principe d'une Z.E.E. de 200 milles. L'affirmation de cette distance pour une pratique internationale sans précédent, va donner naissance, bien avant l'adoption de la Convention sur le droit de la mer, à une «institution nouvelle», laquelle doublée de son plateau continental jusqu'à 200 milles, va transformer radicalement le paysage juridique antérieur des mers en renforçant une fois de plus, la conception «territoriale» de l'espace maritime qui se trouve, désormais, sous l'emprise d'un certain nombre d'Etats côtiers d'une part, et de l'Autorité internationale des fonds marins d'autre part. La vision d'une mer libre, si elle n'est pas mise en brèche, elle est certainement transformée. Il s'agit, avec le nouveau droit de la mer, d'une nouvelle conception de la liberté fondée, au demeurant, sur un «océan partagé».

Nouvelle venue sur la scène internationale, la Z.E.E. de 200 milles s'est vite forgée une place centrale dans le nouveau droit de la mer. Elle consacre, en effet, la victoire ostensible et rapide du mouvement expansionniste en mer. Elle constitue aussi pour les Etats une acquisition de nature irréversible. On doit, toutefois, relever que la 3ème Conférence n'a accordé qu'une faible attention à l'ample décalage existant entre l'immensité de la Z.E.E. et les moyens réels de sa maîtrise par l'Etat côtier. C'est donc aux Etats côtiers de faire la démonstration en l'an 2.000 que leur capacité de gestion est l'égale de leur capacité de conquête qui a

révolutionné la mer, laissant derrière elle un océan partagé. Or, chacun sait aujourd'hui que la technologie nécessaire pour l'exploitation et le contrôle de ces grands espaces se trouve entre les mains des pays industrialisés. D'où la double conséquence de l'extension de 200 milles vers le large:

a - Une brèche dans l'internationalisation des fonds marins

D'abord, la «nationalisation» d'une grande partie des richesses océaniques constitue une brèche importante dans l'internationalisation des fonds marins pour l'humanité toute entière. En effet, plus de 35% des eaux maritimes et de leurs fonds⁽²⁶⁾ passent sous emprise nationale. Or, c'est dans cette portion que sont concentrés 95% des richesses biologiques et 87% des dépôts d'hydrocarbures et de gaz⁽²⁷⁾. Il s'y ajoute que cette extension aussi importante vers le large produit d'une part, *une profonde inégalité* qui résulte de cette répartition des richesses et réduit d'autre part, les dimensions du domaine de l'Autorité internationale des fonds marins. En effet, alors que l'établissement de la Z.E.E. a été présenté par ses ardents défenseurs comme devant favoriser le développement économique du Tiers-monde, la réalité se révèle peu conforme à cette thèse. Selon une étude effectuée par les Pays-Bas, sur 29 Etats enclavés - et donc écartés à ce titre du partage - 21 seulement font partie du groupe des «77», dont 10 sont classés parmi les pays les moins avancés (P.M.A). En revanche, parmi les 34 Etats avantagés de l'instauration de la Z.E.E. 16 sont des Etats industrialisés. Parmi les plus privilégiés par cette nouvelle zone figurent: les Etats-Unis, l'Australie, la France, le Canada, le Royaume-Uni, Le Japon, la Nouvelle-Zélande, etc... Autrement dit la constitution de la zone de 200 milles n'a pas eu pour effet, sauf exception, de jouer un rôle correcteur d'inégalités, mais elle a plutôt tendance à accuser celles qui existent.

b - Relations complexes avec le plateau continental

Ensuite, les relations de la Z.E.E. semblent encore plus complexes avec le plateau continental. Il avait été envisagé à un moment donné que ce dernier soit absorbé dans la Z.E.E. pour ne former avec elle qu'un

(26) Sans tenir compte des plateaux continentaux se prolongeant au-delà d'une distance de 200 milles.

(27) Voir sur ce point, L. Juda: «*The exclusive economic zone and Ocean management*», O.D.I.L., 1987, vol. I, p. 305 et suiv.

espace unique dont les limites extérieures ne pourrait dépasser 200 milles marins. Il en est ainsi selon l'article 56, §1 de la Convention, où il est fait état des droits souverains qu'exerce l'Etat côtier sur «les ressources naturelles, biologiques ou non biologiques, des eaux surjacentes aux fonds marins, des fonds marins et de leurs sous-sol...». Le plateau continental a, malgré tout, été maintenu dans son indépendance institutionnelle, possédant capacité de s'étendre au-delà des 200 milles et obéissant aux dispositions particulières de la Partie VI de la nouvelle Convention sur le droit de la mer et donc de s'étendre plus loin que la distance de 200 milles pour amputer encore plus d'espaces au patrimoine commun de l'humanité qui risquerait de se transformer en une «peau de chagrin».

- EMPRISE GEO-POLITIQUE DE L'ETAT SUR LE FOND DES MERS ET DES OCEANS

Le plateau continental est une zone maritime, consacrée, certes, par le droit mais s'appuie, au départ, sur *une réalité de nature*. En effet, l'histoire du concept juridique du plateau continental est celle d'une relation complexe avec la notion géographique et d'un détachement progressif de celle-ci depuis quelques années, sans pourtant que les liens n'aient jamais été totalement rompus. C'est parce que la réalité physique reste toujours présente que la fixation des limites du plateau est si délicate, certes, à la mesure même de la complexité de la nature.

Ainsi, loin d'être généralisant, le droit du plateau continental est, au contraire, caractérisé par une *adaptation appliquée aux situations géographiques diverses qu'il doit régir*. C'est dans ce sens qu'il illustre l'impossibilité dans laquelle s'est trouvée la 3ème Conférence de contenir à 200 milles la limite d'expansion en mer des Etats. En effet, toute la difficulté consistait à préciser-compte tenu de la tendance annexionniste naturelle des Etats-jusqu'où pouvait se prolonger cette marge continentale sur laquelle l'Etat côtier serait habilité à exercer ses droits⁽²⁸⁾. Il s'agit, en d'autres termes, d'établir la limite extérieure du plateau qui

(28) Des études avaient été entreprises dans le cadre de la 3ème Conférence afin d'envisager les diverses formules de définition éventuelle et leurs incidences. (cf. demande d'une étude concernant les différentes formules pour la définition du rebord externe de la marge continentale. *Doc. off. vol. VII*, p. 35; Etude préliminaire illustrant différentes formules de définition du plateau continental (18 avril 1978 *Doc. off. vol. IX*, p. 199).

constitue la ligne de séparation entre fonds marins «nationaux» et fonds marins «internationaux». Espace très mouvant dont la limite extérieure, si l'on n'arrive pas à la fixer, risquerait d'empiéter largement sur le patrimoine commun de l'humanité. Le plateau continental - institution reconnue et codifiée par la Convention de Genève - a fait l'objet d'après discussions à la 3ème Conférence qui a abouti à une nouvelle consécration juridique dans la nouvelle Convention sur le droit de la mer.

A - Frontières instables du plateau continental

Le remplacement de l'exploitabilité par des critères produisant une *limite extérieure stable* allait devenir une tâche prioritaire à la 3ème Conférence qui s'est efforcée de trouver une solution acceptable par tous. Parallèlement aux travaux de la Conférence, c'est surtout la jurisprudence qui a joué un rôle *pionnier* dans ce domaine. Elle a, en effet, depuis les années soixante-dix cherché à dégager une conception nouvelle de la délimitation maritime fondée sur la *distance* - critère juridique capable de résorber les aléas de la nature et les appétits rampants des Plateaux «nationaux». Fondé, dans leur extension, sur le critère traditionnel du prolongement naturel, ces derniers utilisent aussi le *critère technique et évolutif de l'exploitabilité, arme sournoise ouvrant - en cas d'absence de norme nouvelle - aux Etats les plus développés l'appropriation des fonds marins*, ruinant par là même l'idée de la Zone internationale - patrimoine commun de l'humanité.

Il s'agit donc de savoir où s'arrête la limite extérieure des plateaux nationaux et où commence la limite intérieure de la Zone internationale? La *Convention retient la distance de 200 milles marins. Au delà de cette distance, l'Etat côtier doit verser «logiquement et éthyquement» des compensations financières à l'Autorité des fonds marin*. Il s'agit donc d'un compromis (a), avec la création d'une «Commission des limites du plateau continental» dotée du double rôle d'assistance technique et de contrôle (b).

a - Equation proposée

La consécration d'une Zone internationale dans l'intérêt de l'humanité devait servir, en principe, à restreindre les appétits des Etats. Or, c'est l'inverse qui s'est réalisé, et la question des limites des plateaux nationaux devenait de plus en plus inquiétante. L'affirmation d'une zone économique exclusive de 200 milles soulevait, en effet, la

question de savoir quel sort réserver au plateau continental? Va-t-il se confondre avec cette nouvelle institution ou se maintenir en tant que zone «autonome» pouvant s'étendre au gré de la nature vers le large? étant entendu que le plateau continental, dans une vision naturelle et physique de la délimitation (c'est la conception traditionnelle), est un «prolongement naturel du territoire terrestre sous la mer».

La seconde alternative qui a prévalu, est celle qui considère que la notion de plateau continental doit offrir une meilleure base juridique pour fonder les compétences des Etats sur les ressources minérales du sol et du sous-sol de la mer ouvrant ainsi la voie, pour certains d'entre eux, à une extension de ces compétences au-delà les 200 milles marins. Par conséquent, le patrimoine commun déjà fortement entamé par l'adoption d'une distance de 200 milles de Z.E.E. dans ses fonds risquait de subir d'autres secousses à la faveur d'une acceptation dite géomorphologie du plateau dont la limite extérieure devait correspondre à celle de la marge continentale, considérée comme le «socle» des continents⁽²⁹⁾. Cette position tend, en réalité, à intégrer au plateau continental proprement dit au sens géologique du terme, deux autres espaces qui le prolongent: le talus et le glacis. La conséquences sur le plan économique serait donc de réserver à l'Etat riverain toutes les ressources potentielles de cet espace marin. Par conséquent, les risques d'amoindrissement du patrimoine commun allaient réapparaître.

Or, et dès la troisième session de la 3^{ème} Conférence sur le droit de la mer (Genève, Printemps 1975), et suite à des propositions de compromis⁽³⁰⁾, il était convenu que l'extension du plateau continental à la faveur de

(29) cf. *Résolution 2467 (XXIII) du 21 décembre 1968*; La plupart des grands pays latino-américains soutinrent fermement l'extension du plateau continental jusqu'au rebord externe du glacis précontinental (Mexique, Argentine, Vénézuëla, Brésil, Colombie, Uruguay en particulier (cf. *Résolution 2574 (XXIV) du 15 décembre 1969*). Ils furent rejoints par d'autres pays du tiers-monde tels que le Bangladesh, l'Inde, Madagascar, Maurice, et même par les Etats industrialisés, qui ont réalisé tout le parti qu'ils pouvaient tirer du critère proposées, tels que les Etats-Unis, le Canada, La Grande Bretagne, l'Islande et la France. Les deux ex-puissances socialistes l'U.R.S.S. et la Chine ne se sont pas opposés au principe d'extension tout en essayant de le modérer dans la conduite des négociations.

(30) La déclaration de l'O.U.A. concernant le régime et le mécanisme international de la «zone», Doc. a/Conf. 62/72 du 26 mars 1979, et les déclarations reproduite dans les documents suivants de la 3ème Conférence sur le droit de la mer: A/Conf. 62/SR. 109 du 26 septembre 1978; A/Conf. 62/SR. 130 du 5 août 1980; A/Conf. 62/89 du 24 août 1979.

la notion de marge continentale devrait être combinée avec *«paiements et contributions au titre de l'exploitation du plateau au-delà des 200 milles»*. On admettait donc deux régimes différents qui s'appliqueraient à un espace de même nature, le plateau continental. En quelque sorte, la souveraineté est pleine et entière jusqu'à 200 milles marins, mais elle subit, au-delà de cette distance, des restrictions importantes, puisque l'exploitation entraîne l'obligation d'effectuer des paiements ou de verser des contributions en nature à l'Autorité internationale des fonds marins⁽³¹⁾.

Un premier compromis a vu le jour lors de l'adoption du T.N.C.O. (juillet 1977) qui inclut la proposition américaine initiale tout en assurant, aux pays en développement un traitement préférentiel⁽³²⁾. Mais le débat sur le régime juridique de la partie du plateau continental au-delà des 200 milles était loin d'être épuisé, il sera relancé au cours de la septième session (printemps 1978) par le représentant du Népal, qui a adressé le 5 mai 1978 au Président de la Conférence un mémoire concernant la création d'un «fonds du patrimoine commun» dans l'intérêt de l'humanité tout entière, mais en particulier des nations en développement». L'importance de ce document réside surtout dans la démystification de la notion de Z.E.E. présentée jusque-là comme une conquête des pays en développement, alors que dans les faits, elle aggrava les inégalités à la faveur des industrialisés.

La création d'un «fonds de patrimoine commun» devait, en fait, «remédier à ces effets néfastes éventuels en prévoyant un partage équitable et proportionnel des recettes tirées de l'exploitation des minéraux en mer, quelle que soit leur situation». L'article 76 de la Convention - étant le reflet des diverses contradictions apparues au sein de la Conférence, et qui n'ont été surmontées ou plutôt dépassées dans le but de réaliser un «compromis» conformément à l'esprit général de la Conférence que, bien souvent, par le recours à des artifices ou des pièces de chantage (tel par exemple, l'acquittement des contributions à la future Autorité, en contrepartie d'une extension au-delà des 2000 milles), qui ont laissé intactes les prétentions de chaque Etat ou de chaque groupe

(31) cf. *Proposition de compromis présentées par le Président du Group no 6* (26 avril. 1979, *Doc. off. vol. XI*, p. 107); Et *Rapport Aguilar* (29 mars 1980), *Doc. off. XII* p. 91).

(32) cf. M. Bennouna, «*La limite extérieure du plateau continental et la gestion des ressources pour l'humanité*», *colloque de la Haye 29-31 octobre 1981*, p. 118.

d'intérêts - ressemble plutôt à une formule qui énonce des règles dont le contenu n'existera que par les applications qui en seront faites. Quels sont donc les éléments du compromis?

b - Ses éléments:

1 - En principe, plateau continental de 200 milles marins = limite intérieure de la Zone internationale.

C'est, en effet, autour de la distance de 200 milles marins que devaient achopper les efforts, puisque les partisans de la marge continentale n'entendaient pas renoncer à une largeur minimum de leur plateau continental, même si la limite extérieure de la marge se situait, par endroits, en deçà. Il y avait là matière à contradiction que le groupe arabe a tenté, en vain, d'exploiter en proposant la définition suivante du plateau continental. «Le plateau d'un côtier comprend le fond de la mer et le sous-sol des zones sous-marines qui s'étendent au-delà de sa mer territoriale sur toute l'étendue du prolongement naturel du territoire dudit Etat jusqu'à une tendance de 200 milles marins des lignes de base à partir desquelles est mesurée la largeur de la mer territoriale»⁽³³⁾.

Considérée ainsi comme un maximum, la zone de 200 milles devait permettre de déterminer avec précision le plateau continental, comme elle servirait à égaliser les situations des Etats côtiers et protéger, corollairement, le patrimoine commun et les empiètements abusifs. Par conséquent, en raison de son caractère simple et de l'intérêt qu'y trouve un nombre important d'Etats, surtout du fait de la consolidation de la notion de Z.E.E. de 200 milles dont le fond est commandé par les principes régissant le plateau continental, le critère de «distance» jusqu'à 200 milles marins semblait être, d'ores et déjà, enraciné dans le droit coutumier⁽³⁴⁾.

Le caractère simplificateur de la distance, permet, ainsi, de mettre en évidence l'étroite corrélation avec la Z.E.E. et, en un sens, de rendre plus stables les limites extérieures du plateau continental. Or, les difficultés allaient paraître rapidement dès qu'il s'est agi pour certains Etats d'étendre

(33) cf. Formule officielle présentée le 11 mai 1978 par le groupe des Etats arabes. (*Doc. N.G. 6/2*). Ce groupe s'en tenait à la limite stricte de 200 milles.

(34) cf. Demande d'une étude concernant les différentes formules pour la définition du rebord externe de la marge continentale; *Doc. off. vol; III*, p. 35, et (*Doc. off. vol. IX*, p. 199).

leurs limites extérieures au-delà des 200 milles marins, en se fondant sur le critère traditionnel du prolongement naturel de la marge continentale.

2 - *Au-delà des 200 milles marins = compensations financières à l'Autorité internationale des fonds marins.*

Les Etats revendiquant l'extension vers le large au-delà de 200 milles se fondaient sur le critère physique du «prolongement naturel». C'est, d'ailleurs, ce critère qui est la source de toutes les complications résultant de la délimitation du plateau continental, car cette notion de prolongement naturel reprise par la jurisprudence a pour objet d'étayer le titre de certains Etats côtiers à marge continentale étendue. En effet, toute la difficulté consistait à préciser - compte tenu de la tendance annexionniste des Etats - jusqu'où pouvait se prolonger cette marge continentale sur laquelle l'Etat côtier srait habilité à exercer ses droits. Autrement dit, il s'agissait de savoir exactement où se termine le glaciais, et où commence le fond des Océans? Différentes propositions furent avancées afin de préciser les limites extérieures du plateau⁽³⁵⁾. Elles proposent la création d'une «Commission des limites du plateau continental».

B - «Commission des limites du plateau continental»

La Convention prévoit l'institution d'une «Commission des limites du plateau continental», composée de 21 membres, experts en géologie, géophysique ou hydrographie. Elle stipule également que la Commission sera créée dans un délai de 18 mois à compter de l'entrée en vigueur de la Convention, c'est-à-dire avant le 16 mai 1996. Toutefois, lors d'une réunion des Etats parties (27 novembre au 1er décembre 1955), il a été décidé de reporter à mars 1997 la création de la Commission.

Expression d'une méfiance à l'encontre des Etats qui revendiquent un plateau de plus de 200 milles marins, la Commission est investie, en vertu de l'Annexe II, article 3, d'un double rôle d'assistance technique et de contrôle dans la fixation des limites extérieures du plateau continental.

a - Assistance technique

(35) Voir, les observations du juge ad hoc Jiménez de Aréchaga dans l'affaire Tunisie - Malte, *C.I.J., Recueil* 1982, parag. 52, p. 114; et les opinions dissidentes du juge ODA dans la même affaire, *Ibid*, parag. 100-104, p. 217-220; et dans l'affaire Libye-Malte, *C.I.J., Recueil*, 1985, parag. 57, p. 155.

En vue de préparer la Commission à ses travaux, et sans préjuger des décisions qu'elle pourra prendre, la «*Division des affaires maritimes et du droit de la mer*» s'est efforcée d'identifier certaines questions que la Commission demande des Etats côtiers. Les décisions prises à cet égard pourraient être importantes pour ces derniers étant donné que la Commission doit, en vertu de l'Annexe II – article 3-b) «*émettre, à la demande de l'Etat côtier concerné, des avis scientifiques et techniques en vue de l'établissement des données relatives à sa demande*».

Ainsi, voudra-t-elle par exemple envisager, au début de ses travaux, de recommander à tous les Etats intéressés d'adopter un horizon planimétrique commun (comme la norme (WGS84) ou les autres repères du système géodésique mondial (WGS). Lorsque, en raison de la législation nationale, cet horizon ne peut pas être utilisé comme système de référence pour la collecte des données primaires, la Commission voudra peut-être demander qu'il soit procédé aux conversions appropriées entre les divers systèmes référence.

Aussi, lorsqu'elle examinera le type de données qu'elle juge satisfaisant, la Commission voudra peut-être tenir compte des conséquences de la présentation des données de haute qualité collectées à l'aide des techniques modernes dont ne disposent pas certains pays⁽³⁶⁾.

En émettant des avis scientifiques et techniques sur les données, la Commission «aide l'Etat concerné à préciser, conformément à la technologie moderne, les limites de son plateau». Si, toutefois, il appartient à l'Etat côtier de déterminer les limites extérieures de son plateau⁽³⁷⁾, il est également tenu de communiquer à la Commission les données et autres renseignements qui l'ont amené à procéder ainsi. La Commission peut alors – après une étude précise et minutieuse faite par ses sous – commissions et après un contrôle fait par elle de la demande qui lui est soumise – adresser des recommandations à l'Etat concerné, «*parce que les limites ne seront définitives et obligatoires qu'après ces recommandations*».

b - Contrôle

L'Etat côtier qui se propose de fixer la limite extérieure de son plateau continental à plus de 200 milles doit, par l'intermédiaire du

(36) Annexe II, article 2, par 2, de la Convention.

(37) Annexe II, article 3, b) de la Convention.

Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et, conformément à l'article 76 de la Convention, soumettre dans un premier temps les caractéristiques de cette limite.

Il serait préférable au stade de cette première soumission, que l'Etat côtier précise les caractéristiques de la limite en présentant les données scientifiques et techniques à l'appui. Il présente, par exemple, dans son dossier des cartes récapitulatives (A4) indiquant la limite approximative de son plateau continental, les lignes de base permettant de mesurer la mer territoriale, la façon générale dont la limite a été définie et les secteurs où des désaccords pourraient surgir avec d'autres Etats. Si, toutefois, la demande soumise est très détaillée et très technique, il est souhaitable de mettre en œuvre des logiciels et du matériel informatique spécialisé pour examiner les informations de la manière la plus efficace⁽³⁸⁾.

La Commission qui fonctionne par l'intermédiaire de deux sous-commissions composées de sept membres désignés d'une manière équilibrée compte tenu des éléments spécifiques de chaque demande soumise par un Etat côtier, examine les «*données scientifiques et techniques*» présentées par l'Etat côtier à l'appui de son tracé, et tous autres renseignements que lui soumet la sous-commission chargée d'étudier les dites données qui comprennent, en outre, tous les relevés bathymétriques, acoustiques et sismologiques concernant le tracé. Elle peut, néanmoins, pour être convaincue de la justesse de la situation géologique et géomorphologique de l'Etat côtier, s'interroger sur la qualité des données (par exemple sur le système de références géodésiques et sur les calculs qui ont abouti à la fixation de la limite extérieure du plateau continental de l'Etat côtier)⁽³⁹⁾.

La Commission peut, à cette fin, coopérer avec les organisations internationales compétentes pour se procurer les données scientifiques et techniques susceptibles de l'aider à s'acquitter de ses responsabilités (par

(38) SPLOS/CLCS/INF/1, 1996, p. 5. Voir également Annexe II, article 4 en vertu duquel, l'Etat dispose d'un délai maximum de 10 ans à compter de l'entrée en vigueur de la Convention à son endroit pour communiquer à la Commission les caractéristiques des limites extérieures de son plateau.

(39) Article 76, &8 de la Convention sur le droit de la mer. Voir également, «*Définition du plateau continental*» Division des affaires maritimes et du droit de la mer, Bureau des affaires juridiques, Nations Unies. New York, 1994, p. 28 V; et Document, S.P.L.O.S./C.L.C.S./I.N.F./1, du 10 juin 1996.

exemple, la Commission Océanographique intergouvernementale de l'UNESCO, l'Organisation hydrographique internationale et autres...)⁽⁴⁰⁾; elle peut, en outre, suite aux recommandations que lui soumet la sous-commission, adresser des recommandations portant sur les questions liées à la fixation de la limite extérieure du plateau qui n'est rien d'autre que la limite intérieure de la Zone internationale des fonds marins. Les recommandations de la Commission sont alors soumises par écrit à l'Etat côtier qui a présenté la demande, ainsi qu'au Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies⁽⁴¹⁾.

Si toutefois, la demande soumise est en désaccord avec les recommandations de la Commission, l'Etat côtier lui soumet, dans un délai raisonnable, une demande révisée ou une nouvelle demande. Si le désaccord se poursuit, la situation devient «incertaine». La Commission n'est pas un organe à vocation juridique, elle n'est pas habilitée à régler les différends. Si, tout au contraire, la Commission est convaincue de la justesse de la demande, elle approuve les recommandations de la sous-commission à la majorité des deux tiers des membres présents et votants⁽⁴²⁾.

Dès lors, les limites fixées par l'Etat côtier sur la base des recommandations de la Commission *sont définitives et de caractère obligatoire*. Elle s'imposent *erga omnes*. Le tracé extérieur du plateau continental marque, en effet, la frontière entre les fonds marins relevant de la juridiction nationale et les fonds marins internationaux dénommés la «Zone internationale». L'Etat côtier est, par conséquent, tenu de déposer des cartes ou la liste des coordonnées géographiques représentant la limite extérieure de son plateau continental auprès du

(40) S.P.L.O.S./C.L.C.S/I.N.F./1, 10 juin 1996, p. 22, IV.

(41) La sous-commission peut se réunir dans un endroit où les séries de données pertinentes peuvent être disponibles (comme, l'OHI à Monaco; le *National Geophysical Data center (NGDC)*, Boulder, Colorado (Etats-Unis) et ce, pour permettre un examen complet de la demande soumise. Dans d'autres cas, en tout état de cause, se réunir au lieu le plus approprié pour garantir un examen détaillé, complet et équitable de la demande soumise par l'Etat côtier, ce dernier peut se faire représenter aux travaux pertinents mais sans droit de vote. (cf. S.P.L.O.S./C.L.C.S./I.N.F./1, du 10 juin p. 23; et Annexe II, article 6 de la Convention).

(42) Voir, *Observations du Tribunal d'arbitrage* dans l'Affaire de la délimitation des zones maritimes entre le Canada et la France, décision du 10 juin 1992, *International legal materials*, vol. 31, 1992, 1145 paragraph 78 et 79.

Secrétaire général de l'Autorité internationale des fonds marins, responsable de l'organisation et de la surveillance des activités dans la Zone internationale.

Conclusion

Il est paradoxal de constater que la 3ème Conférence, réunie pour atténuer les inégalités entre Etats dans la répartition des richesses, aboutit à des conséquences fort différentes. Nous l'avons vu avec la Z.E.E. de 200 milles, ce sont les riches et puissants qui en ont bénéficié au mépris des pays pauvres et en voie de développement. L'article 76 aussi par la complexité de son intitulé a ouvert grand, la voie à l'extension individuelle des Etats au dépens de l'Humanité.

Alors que dans les années soixante-dix, c'est la «territorialisation» du fond des mers qui inquiétait la communauté internationale, actuellement c'est le phénomène inverse qui s'est affirmé. L'expansionnisme vers le large devient de plus en plus inquiétant. C'est un véritable bouleversement de l'univers maritime qui se trouve aujourd'hui «parsemé de frontières». Si aujourd'hui la question de frontières trouve sur terre un regain d'actualité avec la dislocation de l'Europe de l'Est, en mer c'est plutôt à l'établissement de la «cartographie des souverainetés»⁽⁴³⁾ que l'on s'applique maintenant. Il s'agit d'une opération de délimitation à caractère éminemment socio-politique⁽⁴⁴⁾.

(43) cf. L. Lucchini *Droit de la Mer, T. 2. vol. 1 Délimitation* p. 3, Paris Pedone 1996.

(44) Voir sur ce point nos précédents articles: 1) «*La résolution...*» in *Revue de la Défense Nationale*, 1998 No 25 pp. 93-138. 2) «*La négociation internationale*», dans cette même Revue (No 27 pp. 136-182).

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DEMOCRACY AND MARKET ORIENTED REFORMS PARAMETERS AND POLICY OUTLINES

Charles CHARTOUNI^(*)

A New Context

The current movement of democratization has been marked by the enhanced impact of the international environment, of independent actors and the pervasive communication networks. Yet, if one were to discern the prominent feature of the ongoing democratic transitions, that predominantly sets them apart from earlier developments, it might well be the linkages between political and economic factors. Indeed, the 1980s and early 1990s remodeled the patterns of economic development that have prevailed since the end of World War II. New actors emerged within what was conventionally called the «Third World». On the eve of the twenty first century, East Asia's Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) are about to join the developed world, whereas large stretches in Africa have witnessed dramatic decline in living standards and their socio-economic prospects are particularly dim. In between, various countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East attempt-with more or less success-to reposition themselves within the new global dynamics. Finally, a new group of Third World countries has emerged as a consequence of the collapse of the communist system. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics are now encountering the same problems as other developing countries and contending with them for available resources.

Dramatic international changes have restructured the world that

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developing countries must confront in the 1990's. The end of cold war, a new set of relations among advanced industrialized democracies, further globalization of trade and production, "shifting patterns" of international finance, macroeconomic instability, inflation and a renewed ideological setting, are the main characteristics of what might be considered as the new international framework of development. In the 1980s, it appeared that the combined effect of these transformations was to affect decisively the set of policies that Third World countries are likely to follow. The current "mood" emphasizes the role of the private sector and advocates the case of an open economy. It also tends to equate development with growth and deemphasizes the issues of income distribution. The demise of the Soviet Union as a political actor and alternative model of development, the rise of the United States as the only superpower, the critical importance of multilateral conditionality and a new ideological consensus are tendentially pushing in the same direction.

The current international trends were "superimposed onto a regional grid, which led to a differential impact and response across areas of the Third World"⁽¹⁾. In the western hemisphere where U.S. influence is predominant, governments tend to adopt policies that reduce the role of the state, remove tariff and other trade barriers, and welcome any kind of foreign investment. Whereas within the Japan's sphere of influence, privatization took place, but governments continued to cooperate with the private sector to cope with international challenges. Likewise, liberalization was selectively implemented. In the areas that are more closely related to the European sphere, a more elaborate picture has emerged. In North Africa, and especially Eastern Europe, the European Union took a non-interventionist attitude, offering substantial amounts of foreign aid but relying on international financial institutions (IFI) to provide policy guidelines. The combination of policies has not prevented the increasing marginalization of South Asia and the Middle East; some European countries which once enjoyed a prominent role, have witnessed their gradual marginalization from international trade and investment flows. It is well established that the world of nations is "at once integrated economically and socially to an unprecedented extent and yet beset by

(1) Barbara Stallings, *Global Change Regional Response*, Cambridge, 1995, introduction, p. 2.

fundamentally and increasingly disparate conditions of national existence and prospects for change”⁽²⁾.

The boundaries of nation-states are permeated by various economic, political and economic factors that have reshaped the concept of development. Among the substantive innovations of the last two decades has been the rise of new technologies that promoted the rearrangement of production structures on a world wide basis. The earlier divides between an industrialized First world and a Third World supplying raw materials and foodstuffs have become obsolete. As core economies move toward services, a steady process of industrialization characterizes the periphery, at least partially. This process entails in parallel the rapid de-industrialization of former developed regions; the quick industrialization of previous backward areas, on the basis of plants producing everything from clothing to sophisticated electronics; and the emergence of networks of small scale producers as a substitute to the Ford-like enterprises. Manufacturing systems in which production assignments are interspersed between an unprecedented number of locations around the world are steadily increasing. In addition, these systems are not exclusively composed of transnational corporations, for in various countries local and private firms are the main partners. In parallel, the economic opportunities promoted by the new technologies are not “without drawbacks, nor have all countries been able to take advantage of them. While some have registered spectacular successes, others have seen their own industrialization checked by these developments. Even in those nations that have most benefited, export-oriented industrialization has yielded an unequal distribution of its rewards. The process of global economic restructuring has contributed to the rise of new forms of dependency and the familiar paradox of social actors whose lot worsens as their national economies grow”⁽³⁾.

The present day literature has documented a variety of arrangements which impugn the evolutionary concept common to both modernization

(2) A. Douglas Kincaid, Alejandro Portes, “Sociology of Development in the 1990’s, Critical Challenges and Empirical Trends”, in *Comparative National Development, Society and Economy in the New Global Order*, A. Kincaid and A. Portes, eds., Chapel Hill, 1994, p. 1.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 13.

and Marxist theories. Earlier theories on modernization and dependency addressed a situation whereby economic growth sets the "norm in the Third World: Unequal and dependent growth, to be sure, but growth nonetheless. At present, the process has been reversed, with national economies shrinking and many populations revisiting living conditions that were left behind years ago. For this reason, the terms of debate in many countries have shifted from how to promote independent national growth [to how should they] reactivate their economies in any form"⁽⁴⁾. The underlying assumptions of this analysis are quite pessimistic and do not account for new opportunities of development in different areas. The demise of the Ford model, based on large industrial structures with a highly regimented labor force opens the way for the emergence of an alternative pattern of dynamic, technologically sophisticated small firms as illustrated by the electronics industry in California and the machinery and ceramics in central Italy. The malleability of small size firms and their contextual embeddedness foster cooperative arrangements and raise their capacity to compete in rapidly changing markets than that of more rigidly structured plants. The highly performing model of export-led growth adopted by several Asian countries offers another perspective. Singapore's output per capita increased from 1,054 to 5,001US for an average annual growth rate of 5.88%. Taiwan and Korea tripled their GDP per capita between 1980 and 1989. The considered experiences point to the fact that the image of a uniformly underdeveloping periphery and the dismissal of significant national and regional variations are misleading. Instead, we are confronted with a variety of situations-development reversals as well as performances-that do not easily fit broader generalizations. The critical review of these experiences and their systematic comparison provide the intellectual space for a renewed sociology of development. Besides, the decentralization effects of the new technologies have yielded capitalist firms an edge in domestic class conflicts. The ongoing global rearrangement has proven to be "a powerful solvent of union strength and a effective instrument for reversing the outcomes of working class efforts to regulate capital. It has also spurred the runaway shop, where working class mobilization and protest are met with simple expedient of relocating production elsewhere"⁽⁵⁾. Sociology has much to offer in the activities

(4) A. Douglas Kincaid and A. Portes, *Ibid.*, p. 9.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 11.

within overarching social structures; it pinpoints factors and explains processes and outcomes that are flatly disregarded by orthodox economic analysis.

Redefining Dependency

Dependency as commonly defined is a situation in which a certain number of countries have their economy conditioned by extraneous dynamics, relegating dependent countries in a position of subordination within the prevailing power structure. Castells and Laserna⁽⁶⁾ posit that dependency continues to be heuristically valid because of enduring cleavages between dominant and subordinate countries, but in a substantially different manner. Latest investigations have come to the conclusion that dependency does not imply a uniform stagnation. It is well established that:

1) The last two decades have witnessed an increasing number of dependent countries which have successfully used opportunities provided by global restructuring to boost economic growth and refine technological development; and those which have maintained a primary good production structures. In between, are countries that have established themselves as export platforms for labor-intensive products but have not evolved autonomous technological capacity. Gary Gereffi considers that dependency theory uses the concept of dependent development to pinpoint the structural dependency on foreign capital and external markets in rapidly industrializing Third World countries like the Latin American and East Asians NIC's "constrains and distorts, but is not incompatible with capitalist economic development⁽⁷⁾". This view departs from previous stagnationist theories that considered dependency as leading to underdevelopment and revolution.

2) Those nations that followed the restrictions of classic dependency theory and sought full independence from foreign influence have literally plummeted in terms of sustained economic growth or in developing autonomous technological capacities. This perspective applies either to

(6) Manuel Castells, Roberto Laserna, "Technological Change and socio-economic Restructuring", in *Comparative...*, op. cit.

(7) Gary Gereffi, "Rethinking Development theory, Insights from East Asia and Latin America", in *Comparative...*, op. cit., p. 28.

countries which pursued self sufficiency such as, Cambodia, Burma or Albania, or those that aligned themselves to the Soviet Bloc, such as Vietnam, Ethiopia and North Korea.

3) The downfall of communism has largely invalidated the pattern of centrally planned economy. Already, and before political transitions took place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, their respective economies have been forced to reckon with market dynamics. The evolution of Eastern Europe has confirmed the assumption of World-System analysts (*Wallerstein 1976; Frank 1980; Chase-Dunn 1989*) that there was never a socialist “counter-system” but rather a number of states trying to improve their relative standing in the world capitalist economy. Overall, we should recognize the rise of new distinctive forms of dependency, along with the demise of autarchic and anti-systemic strategies. In an increasingly interdependent world, less developed countries cannot simply turn inward and follow a so called idiosyncratic path. Instead, they are induced to negotiate their integration into the international economic system and their relationships with major economic actors. National development hinges upon the state’s ability to provide suitable openings and to convince or force “domestic actors-capital and labor alike-to follow suit. In this context, the least enviable position may not be dependency but the lack of it. Such a fate threatens these countries whose domestic markets are too small to attract external interest or whose traditional exports have been made redundant by technological innovations⁽⁸⁾”. Barbara Stallings considers that the priority of technological development has “made it much more difficult for Third World countries to break into high value added production but the costs of not doing so have risen while there are certainly niches for specialization in low-value added goods, countries that rely exclusively on these products run the risk of falling further behind. Not only do they face the traditional problems of low income elasticities of demand for basic food items, textiles, low grade steel, and so on but the spillover in terms of training and technology are lost⁽⁹⁾”.

Obviously, these countries which continue to concentrate their exports on raw materials are seriously disadvantaged since new technologies affect the utility of such inputs. The development discourse of the 1990/s has

(8) A. Kincaid, A. Portes, art. cit., in *Comparative...*, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

(9) Barbara Stallings, art. cit., in *Global Change...*, op. cit., p. 9.

profoundly changed. Although there remain significant variations in the economic policy ideas in various countries, the discourse has changed on fundamental issues. The core premise of theorizing about development was to be “formed within developing countries themselves. Decades of unwise government in the economy, not the structure of the international economic system, were held principally responsible for the failure in development. Violation of the basic (*universal*) laws of neo classical economics was considered the source of the main problems of development, and it was pronounced important to remove distortions, eliminate rent-seeking practices and establish market relationships throughout the economy⁽¹⁰⁾”. Development was mainly defined in terms of enhanced productive capacity, while concerns with repartition and provision of basic needs were set aside, at least momentarily. The first norm in development is to correct the distortions of state interventions and enable the market dynamics to run their course. By and large, the economic ideas that are shaping policy making in the developing world today tend to stress downsizing and the transformation of state economic intervention, from production and distribution toward enhanced mediation and redefinition of regulation. The change of discourse was described by John Williamson as the formation of a “consensus” or “universal convergence”⁽¹¹⁾ around basic objectives in economic restructuring: fiscal discipline, establishing public expenditures priorities, tax reform, financial liberalization, deregulation, exchange rate adjustment and security of property rights. However controversial, this consensus reflects the acceptance of market dynamics and a change in public-private relations in the sense of a steady support of, and a greater reliance on the private sector. There has been a major change from inward-oriented import substitution toward export-led production. There is also a larger acceptance of the idea that major fiscal policy reform is demanded for development. This implies that countries are reducing the rate of growth in government expenditure, reforming the tax structure, rationalizing public spending, phasing out and reduction of government subsidies and redirection of public investment from production to infrastructure and

(10) Thomas Bierstecker, “The Triumph of Liberal Economic Ideas in the Developing World”, in *Global Change...*, op. cit., pp. 177-178.

(11) John Williamson, “The progress of Policy Reform in Latin America”, Institute for International Economics, WS-DC, 1990, p. 59.

social policy. There is also a widespread acceptance of monetarist policies, even for long term financial reforms. Liberalizing foreign exchange controls is a common held objective, as is the endeavor to reduce or remove subsidized credit, either by simplifying or eliminating existing limits on interest rates and credit.

Although the issue, place and sequence of trade liberalization remain subject to debate, they still have become central topics in economic policy discussions. Exchange rate elasticity, the removal of trade licensing systems, the introduction of export incentives, the replacement of quantitative strictures by tariffs, and the overall reduction of tariff levels are all being proposed, as developing countries open up to the international market. A package of other policy reforms is also being considered, depending on national idiosyncracies. Specific measures entail reducing price controls, termination or reduction of government subsidies, adjustment of agriculture pricing policy, introduction of new incentive schemes, restructuring public enterprises, removing state-marketing boards, liberalizing restrictions on foreign investment, and setting limits on wage indexation. Privatization have often been recommended as an element of World Bank structural adjustment programs, at least since the mid 1980s, but still many developing countries are coping with privatization scenarios without World Bank support. The general tenor of this change is well epitomized by a UNDP official who considers that "the South must recognize that the sterile dialogue of the 1970s must give way to a more enlightened dialogue on new patterns of development cooperation in a changing world-mutual interests, not unilateral concessions; two sided responsibility, not one sided accusations; more equitable access to global opportunities, not massive transfer of financial resources; more open markets, not more managed markets⁽¹²⁾".

Ideas as suggested earlier in our review, are potent factors in policy making. First there may be contamination effects and policy emulation or what is termed "Policy bandwagoning" (*J. Ikenberry, 1988*). Policy performances are likely to promote reformist policies and increase their political credibility. Second, there may be a "trickle up" process, whereby

(12) Mahbub Ul Haq, "Human Development in Changing World", speech delivered at the launching of the UNDP's annual Human Development Report, Stockholm, Sweden, April 1992.

ideas accepted initially by academic economists, affect political decision making. The influence of the “Chicago Boys” in Chile under Pinochet is quite illustrative of the phenomenon. The World Bank has lately devised a new training program to “build African institutional capacity” in what could be deemed “an effort to create a transnational epistemic community around economic policy reform. Its emphasis on governance, institutional accountability, and the transparency of economic transaction is also evidence of an effort to institutionalize liberal economic ideas⁽¹³⁾”. Third, the ongoing negotiations between developing countries and international financial institutions (*The World Bank and the IMF*) over the terms of assistance, structural adjustment, or debt relief can provide the effective framework for new ideas. Fourth, ideas can affect policy making in situations where exist multiple options to a given problem. Finally, once they crystallize in political institutions, they can influence policy shaping long after interests that promoted these institutions have changed. Fifth, systemic changes in the world economy provided an important platform for change in economic policy in the developing world. Sustained competition, the globalization of production, and the exhaustion of financial resources, compelled developing countries to concentrate more intensely on their relationships (*and their competitiveness*) within the world economy. However critical they may be, these factors could not account for major “epistemological breaks”. In various contexts, it took a system-wide shock to induce major intellectual rearrangements.

Policy Making, Performances and Discrepancies

There is a legitimate questioning about the commitment of developing countries to liberal economic reforms. The World Bank and IMF officers are particularly wary about the feasibility of the projected reforms. After all, governments subjected to major financial pressure will approve in principle to meet obligations in exchange for assistance. The implementation of policy reform and its institutionalization in practical governance, are the ultimate gauges which allow to evaluate the efficacy of liberal reforms. The epistemic shifts that are taking place are not uniformly interpreted and implemented. Indeed, the meaning of economic liberalization tends to vary to a large extent from country to country. In addition, a recurring problem emerges with the shifts in development discourse away from statist patterns

(13) Th. Bierstecker, art. cit., in *Global Change...*, op. cit., p. 184.

toward liberal paradigms, is the difficulty if not the inability - as some pessimists would suggest - of economic liberalism to provide for the basic needs of the majority, (*as if it were at loggerheads with equality both within and between states*). The materialist connotation of "capitalist developmentalism is increasingly at odds with ecological preservation and environmental protection. A related difficulty for economic liberalism is its association with individualism, technical achievement, and hyperrationality, and its undervaluing of the collective dimension of human existence, a point some recent feminist theorizing has also identified."⁽¹⁴⁾

The depth and sustainability of economic reforms in the developing world is largely related to effective performances. If successful, economic reform programs should be able to generate local constituencies supportive of the ongoing programs. If they don't, the current trends in economic policy may prove to be short-lived. Although many countries have been moving along the reform path (*away from the statist, inward-oriented economic nationalism of the 1970's*), it is critical to remember that they had different headstarts and performances and eventually yield different results. The erratic impact of liberalism and its "perverse effects" have proven to be disruptive of social and natural ecosystems. Far from being restricted to the economic realm, it has induced a set of counter movements, which counterpoised its rationale on behalf of different values. Alternatives to liberalism might and have emerged in various parts of the developing world, eventually out of what Ken Jowitt has called "movements of rage". He defines movements of rage as "nihilistic backlashes against failure: the failure of the Third World to create productive economies, equitable societies, ethical elites and sovereign nations. They are desperate responses to the fact that nothing seems to work. The hoped - for magical effect of adopted labels like "one party democracy", "Leninism", or (*as is now becoming fashionable*) "market capitalist democracy" has been and will continue to be a disappointment for most Third World countries. Movements of rage are violent nativist responses to the resulting frustration and perplexity"⁽¹⁵⁾.

(14) Th. Bierstecker, art. cit. p. 188.

(15) Kenneth Jowitt, "After Leninism: the New World Disorder", *Journal of Democracy*, Winter 1991; reproduced in the *Global Resurgence of Democracy*, edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Johns Hopkins, 1993, p. 255; See also, K. Jowitt, *New World Disorder, the Leninist Extinction*, California, 1992.

Movements such as the Shining Path and Tupac Amaro in Peru, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Zapatistas in Mexico and the FIS in Algeria are representative of the growing marginalization within and between states. It is no coincidence to consider the extent to which the location of these counter movements overlaps geographically with those countries (*or region within countries*) most strikingly marginalized from the flows of global trade and finance. Primordial loyalties have taken over and the parameters of political identification in many parts of the developing world are not anymore state-bound. The rising importance of ethnicity in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and Central Europe, as well as throughout Africa (*Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Asia, India, Sri Lanka, Philippines*); and the centrality of Religion in the fashioning of political identities is well illustrated in the Islamic World, where most of the opposition movements are based on religious sources. It is obvious that these new foci of identification will lay the foundation for still other counter - discourses and movements to contain the eventual effects of economic and political liberalism on societies and polities. We should add to the picture those economies which have been marginalized by the technoeconomic restructuring of an international system based on information processing, have been reorganized through a large criminal economy, which entails drugs production and circulation, money laundering and a black market for hard currencies. The case of Bolivia and Burma epitomizes the new marginality induced by the internationalization of the informational economy, and the disruptive changes brought about in many developing countries by "underground economies" (*Castells and Laserna, 1994*). In the Bolivian scenario, there are few opportunities for the country to reorganize itself on the basis of information, technology and forthcoming markets, because those are missing assets. Meanwhile, the social and political conditions of Bolivia do not promote the career of fundamentalist movements Like Sendero Luminoso or Tupac Amaro in Peru, despite the attempts of the native Katarist movement to sever the connections to the international system. Hence, Bolivia left on its own could develop toward the disintegration of the whole society, notwithstanding the richness and momentum of the Bolivian social movements. Indeed, they have been arraying themselves against an "elusive enemy" whose enduring feature is a well entrenched indifference. In the middle of the economic crisis, the cocaine system is

supplying the national economy and restructuring the social and political system. Between “switching-off” and “perverse integration”, Bolivia makes its way into a deeply segmented international system.

We live in dynamic and highly unpredictable times and the basics of development have considerably changed. The dichotomy between the capitalist West and the socialist East is largely discredited and no longer characterizes the range of choice in development policies in terms of alternation between public and private (*of more or less state intervention*), but rather in terms of different combinations of private and public initiative within an increasingly integrated global capitalist mode of production. Although the range of options is restricted to “choices within capitalism our consciousness of the range of choice within capitalism has broadened appreciably. Hence, it is increasingly useful to characterize development choices by differentiating Anglo - American liberalism (*liberal productivism*), forms of Asian corporatism, the social democratic kalmarian model and a variety of other forms of flexible production within capitalism - all the while keeping an eye on developments at the margins of the world economy that may provide an empirical basis for some of the discursive alternatives of the future”⁽¹⁶⁾.

International Finance and Development

One of the most significant political - economic changes over the last fifteen years have been the shifts in the patterns of international finance. The different types of flows have important implications on development prospects. In financial terms, the official transfers from bilateral aid agencies and the specific programs of IFI's are the most beneficial kind of flow, since they either do not have to be reimbursed at all (*grants*) or have very low interest rates and long maturities (*concessional loans*). Precisely because of the favorable terms, such funds are accessible only to the poorest countries, mainly in Sub Saharan Africa. Although Africa is the largest recipient of such transfers within the Third World, they have been inadequate to stimulate much growth on account of the overwhelming problems of the region. The next set of financial transfers were the bilateral and multilateral concessional loans. the former was export credits attached to the purchase of the exports of the donor nation. In the

(16) Th. Bierstecker, art. cit., p. 196.

case of Japan, a new kind of “untied” loan for middle - income countries was initiated in the late 1980’s, as part of a Japanese strategy to recycle the large trade surplus and dampen the grievances of the United States. Although these credits - be they bilateral or multilateral - have shorter maturities and higher interest rates than concessional loans, they have markets. However in the 1990’s, ‘creditworthy’ developing countries were able to increase private funding although with shorter maturities and in proportions larger than multilateral loans. Commercial bank loans, overall, have higher interest rates, and mainly shorter maturities. They also tend to have floating interests which complicate further the calculation of service requirements and increase the instability of debt service. Commercial bank loans were viewed as preferential to bilateral and multinational loans because they were not tied to any form of conditionality and because recipient governments tend to exercise more control over their use. Once these loans expanded to the extent they could not be serviced, multilateral conditionality resurfaced.

The type of direct investment set aside in the 1970’s for the sake of bank loans, happens to have been favored in the 1980’s. Several factors accounted for the change of opinion in developing countries, in addition to the fact that bank loans are not anymore available except in Asia. First, the flows were perceived as steadier because it is difficult to dismiss fixed capital assets; second, the benefit outflows covary with the economic cycle, so that servicing investment is easier than servicing the loans; third, direct investment is the path to technology transfer and acquisition of technical know how. Finally, there is the new portfolio investment. These flows could be classified under various categories: the largest is bonds which account for over half of portfolio investment in the last few years. Bonds have the privilege of being basically at fixed interest rates, but the average maturity for bonds emitted by developing countries in the 1990’s is very short (*circa four years for Latin America*). This implies that a significant part of the stock bonds could be rapidly exhausted, should the bonds not be reissued in the future. Less dramatic, but also worrisome, is the risk that even if the bonds are renewed, the cost of borrowing will greatly increase. The problem of non renewal of bonds played a major role in the Mexican crisis, in particular since many of these bonds had maturities of less than a year. We should also add a new form of external private financing: international equity investment made up of direct

equity investment, American and global depository receipts and investments via mutual funds. For miscellaneous reasons, investors refrain from investing in equities and even sell their shares, if they apprehend political or economic deterioration in whatever country. This may lead to pressures on the exchange rate and prices plummet in local stock exchanges. Summarily, there were four major shifts in international capital transfer during the last two decades: First, the global volume of transfers largely increased. Second, a major change in recipients shifted financial flows away from developing toward industrialized countries in the 1980's; a movement partly reversed in the 1990's. Within the developing world, from the mid-1980's Asia replaced Latin America as the major recipient of foreign financial assistance and investment. Third, direct investment and portfolio investment removed commercial bank credit as the main types of capital transfers. Fourth, the United States was supplanted by Japan and Germany as the largest financial supplier of the late 1980's. By the early 1990's, the three levelled, as US capital exports increased and those of Japan diminished.

In addition, to their impact on investment and macroeconomic policy in recipient countries, financial flows also have influence via conditionality. In the 1980's, a major side - effect of the debt crises of Latin America and Africa, was the enhanced role that IMF, the World Bank and regional development banks played in regrouping and restructuring reform packages in both continents. These packages are attached to an array of policy conditions which largely affected economic policy making in various countries of both regions. At least three kinds of conditionality are to be discerned. The first relates to macroeconomic conditions, initially devised to eliminate budget and balance of payment deficits. IFI conditionality was weakened by increased access to private funding because several Latin American countries became "reluctant borrowers" from the IFI's. In the last decade, private creditors battered the influence of IFI's by channeling large fundings to the richest developing countries in Latin America and East Asia with virtually no binding ties. Consequently, only Africa was on the whole subjected to strict conditionality in the 1970's. During the debt crisis, the Latin American countries joined the circle of conditioned finance, although most of the Asian countries did not.

The second type of conditionality entailed structural reforms, devised

to create market-oriented economies in recipient countries. It has particularly emphasized the opening up of Third World economies to international trade and capital and restraining the role of the state. The latter was tied to the reduction of fiscal deficits but also included liberalization, deregulation and sale of state firms. The basic instrument for these policy conditions became the structural adjustment loans of the World Bank. A brief review of the main policy guidelines designed by the IFI's can help us understand the nature of trade-off attached to official loans in the 1980's. The policy conditions contain: 1) elimination of large fiscal deficits, mainly through control of government spending; 2) redirection of public spending, mainly toward education, health and infrastructure; 3) providing of a large tax base with moderate rate; 4) market definition of interest rates; 5) maintaining competitive exchange rate to promote exports; 6) promotion of exports, especially non conventional and liberalization of imports; 7) Encouraging DFI to provide capital, skills and technology; 8) sale of public enterprises to alleviate the demand for subsidies since the private sector is deemed more effective; 9) deregulation to promote competition and allow the private sector to engage in economic undertaking; 10) securing of property rights in order to boost private investment, both local and foreign.

As for the third kind of conditionality, it is basically predicated on non economic variables. Typical of this new policy orientation are conditions to assist pro-poor policies, respect for human rights, democracy, environmental protection, good governance and demilitarization scenarios. These conditions were basically initiated by bilateral donors. There is hardly an overarching consensus insofar as these non economic objectives are concerned and individual donors tend to emphasize different priorities. In general external finance can promote economic development by supplying additional resources for investment, foreign market outlets and technological know how; yet, if financial flows are particularly volatile, and if this volatility operates in a procyclical manner, their virtual impact is likely to dissipate. Likewise, if such flows lead to an increased appreciation of the local currency, they can undercut attempts to stimulate exports, an important characteristic of the new patterns of development. Even more controversial, would be large scale promotion of consumerism or speculative investments, which will distort price

mechanisms and make market-oriented reforms more questionable. In addition, they will not help create the productive capacity which enables the country to service the future debt. This could yield a future debt crisis. External financial flows will continue to have an important impact on economic development prospects in the Third World. Based on crosscutting data, economic forecasting predicts that foreign capital will play a more effective role in Asia than in Latin America. From the strictly financial point of view, the impact of financial flows in Africa should be even more positive but it is likely to be counterbalanced by the deep-seated structural problems facing the continent.

Politics and Economics of Transition

In the last decades, the developing world has witnessed political and economic changes of epochal dimensions. The most striking development has been the massive movement away from authoritarianism toward democracy. Political transitions occurred in such different places as Argentina, Chile, Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and Pakistan... the economic transformations of the developing world were no less significant. External shocks at the beginning of the decade have hit harder than the great depression and led to recession and macroeconomic instability throughout the 1980's. These problems continued over the 1990's. The response to these shocks has been a major change in development strategies, away from state-led, inward-oriented patterns of growth toward more emphasis on the market, private ownership and more openness to international trade and foreign capital. The pace of economic liberalization has differed across countries, but its general course is unmistakable.

The co-occurrence of these epochal events raises persistent questions about the nexus between economic and political change. What role have economic crises played in the overall wave of political liberalization and democratization? can new democracies cope with daunting problems caused by economic crises and reform efforts? under what economic and institutional conditions is democracy most likely to thrive? Modernization theory posited a positive correlation between capitalist development and democratization and thus failed to forecast the new authoritarianism that permeated the relatively industrialized Latin American countries. Nor could it explain the economically successful capitalist authoritarianism

that took hold of East Asia for long stretches of time. Closer investigation of both democratic and authoritarian regimes have also questioned the role of socio-economic variables in Marxist and dependency writings and in the literature on bureaucratic authoritarianism. By the beginning of the 1990's, most analysts have shifted from all economic explanations, emphasizing instead the autonomy of political processes. Although the political emphasis constitutes an important corrective to earlier intellectual tendencies, it is inappropriate to separate the political and economic spheres of analysis; economic conditions and policy, as well as the nature of political systems that shape the course of democracy.

As we turn to the issue of democratization, the experiences of industrial democracies provide significant landmarks for current reformers in the developing world. The stability of postwar welfare states testifies that "it is possible to manage the tensions between the egalitarian logic of democracy and economic systems based on private property and initiative which imply inequality of both income and wealth. Such societies have not been immune to severe social conflicts and political breakdowns, but there appears to be no inherent contradiction between the two forms of social organization as both Marxists and certain liberals once assumed. On the contrary, the historical correlation between democracy and capitalism suggests that market economies have at times contributed to the expansion of human freedom by strengthening the distinction between public and private domains of power⁽¹⁷⁾". The compatibility between capitalism and democracy in the advanced industrialized societies should be reassuring to those reformists who are attempting to implement market-oriented schemes and to establish democratic governance. The existence of such a possibility does not necessarily imply that there is a charted road toward the desired goal. Indeed, in the poorer developing countries and in the various new republics of the former Soviet Union, new democratic governments face major problems of state building similar to those confronted by Western Europe in early modern times. It is useful to remember that in these historical cases, the installation of central power structures involved centuries of royal absolutism, civil wars and revolutions. Even when

(17) Stephen Haggard, Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Transitions*, Princeton, 1995, p. 377.

problems are less critical, the reconstruction of the state in the wake of disruptive fiscal crises, remains a major challenge to democratic politics. The ongoing surveys on the politics of initiation and consolidation of economic reforms, demonstrate that government may not be able to draw support for launching reforms. Political systems with “weak executives and fragmented party system, divided government and decentralized power structures have responded poorly to crises and may well continue to do so. The weaknesses with respect to policy making, can in turn, have implications for democracy itself. If the current young wave of democratization begins to reverse, we expect the first casualties to be those countries that are incapable, in the face of crisis, of achieving adequate executive authority to overcome crippling institutional and political divisions⁽¹⁸⁾”. It is likely that societies which initiate reforms will continue to experience poor economic performance either because the impending reforms are poorly conceived or because of constraining factors that sway governance. Even if reforms are likely to generate sustainable growth, inequalities and changes in class structure may undermine reform attempts.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that even if economic reforms are successful, democratic projects can still implode. Such scenarios could be induced by ethnic conflicts that are indirectly connected to economic problems. It is also possible that leaders who have successfully addressed the economic crises of their societies, may use this political advantage to withstand the depersonalization of power and the installation of checks and balances. The costs of democratic transitions matched with *decretismo* and the abuse of emergency powers should not be underrated. The variety of obstacles to economic and political reform suggest that some societies willing to consolidate democratic institutions are unable to do so. On the other hand, the survey of the various economic strategies that have successfully generated growth and the set of institutional arrangements in which they are embedded, make us reckon with “the existence of multiple equilibria - of a variety of possible combinations of the market and democracy - [Which imply] that there is variety of possible transition paths. Combinations among these are not open ended, and the multiplicity of paths by no means [suggest] that they

(18) Stephen Haggard, Robert R. Kaufman, *Ibid.*, p. 378.

are available to all comers. But countries do have a number of different models they might follow while still managing to combine the benefits of representative government and market means of resource allocation⁽¹⁹⁾”.

Equally critical are the uncertainties built into the process of democratization. Indeed, the democratic process is unlikely to take hold if large differences persist with respect to basic assumptions about economic policy. Yet this does not suggest, that there is no possibility within each system for contestation about policy options and modes of representation; as a matter of fact, within the bounds of a market economy and political pluralism, such debate is a major ingredient of democratic development. Democratic debates and institutionalized contestation are “themselves a form of collective learning in which citizens acquire the capacity to reject what fails and attempt something new. The capacity to learn means that the unexpected is possible, that neither politics nor policy is simply a game of repeating what has become before. It is on this fundamental characteristic of democracy that we pin our hopes⁽²⁰⁾”. In order to achieve the consensus required for the implementation of economic reforms, democratic governments are urged to earn the trust of their citizens. The eventual success of a reformist policy is largely tied to the legitimacy of its regime. Diffused political cynicism would undermine the credibility of economic reforms. If politicians are perceived as corrupt, they cannot demand austerity from their constituencies. Brazil under Fernando de Mello and Venezuela under Carlos Peres amply testify that popular perception of corruption at the top weakens governments ability to carry out reforms. Political distrust and cynicism are pervasive in budding democracies. Recent surveys conducted in Hungary, Poland and Chile have demonstrated that three out of four citizens in the first two cases and two out of three in the second one, think that policies are untrustworthy and that politicians are mainly nursing their private interests. The same mood prevailed in Southern Europe, where popular support for economic reforms eroded not only in account of citizen’s evaluation of economic performances but also by their perception of corruption and awareness that their leaders did not care much about people’s interests. The consolidation of

(19) S. Haggard, R. Kaufman, *Ibid.*, p. 378.

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 379.

democratic institutions requires necessarily the gradual transformation of public ethos. In new democracies, politics has a strong moral connotation, and political disaffection can easily develop not only from bad economic achievements but also from moral disappointments which on the whole undermine the credibility of public life.

Moral scandals often cripple governments and block agendas even in well established democracies; in new democracies the mixture of moral and political issues are even more decisive. Such ethical problems are more likely to affect the nature of the democratic process than the ongoing consolidation of democracy. Yet in times of economic turbulence they may have serious political consequences because they undermine the politicians credibility to conduct the economic reform process. Reformist politicians embark” on a process of democratization with the hope that they will be spared the cruel choice between development and democracy. If they manage their mandates skillfully, take advantage of [emerging opportunities], and work hard to build consensus in their societies, their risk of failure will diminish. The successful combination of political and economic reform, however, will also require a careful redesign of the state and the implementation of new social policies, as well as the maintenance of governmental legitimacy through the moral behavior of politicians⁽²¹⁾”. We assume that the chances for political elites to mobilize popular support or trigger opposition will depend on how economic policy and performance affect the income of various social groups. The analysis of the socio-economic structure is essential for pinpointing the politically relevant groups and their policy options and for understanding political alignments and conflicts. Both the aggregate economic performances and the distributive issues are critical to politics everywhere, influencing the course of both, politicians in power and opposition. Economic crises such as those that have hit the developing world in the last decades, affect not only the options of various social actors within a given range of policies, but also their preferences among several institutional arrangements and their ability to stabilize or change these institutions.

(21) José Maria Maravall, “The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage”, in *Economic Reform and Democracy*, Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Johns Hopkins, 1995, pp. 25-26.

Finally, we consider that it is difficult to derive political or policy outcomes without reckoning with the institutional framework in which groups operate. The character of institutions determine to a large extent whether and how countries improve their standing in the international division of labor. Governmental structures are potential sites for economic agency. Strong structures make agency easier; agency transforms the structures that made it possible. Without a well structured bureaucratic system, states are reduced to the poor vision of the state advocated by the neo-utilitarian school. Rules and decisions are perceived as mere commodities to be sold to the highest bidder; without a well structured political decision making system, long term investment is highly improbable. State power used for extractive purposes and wasteful consumption, reduces private production capacities rather than promote them. Welfare and growth are both affected. This leads us to discuss the typical case of the predatory state as an epitome of the antidevelopmental state and a major obstacle to democratization.

Predatory Versus Developmental State

Extracting larger portion from a shrinking pie is not the best way to increase revenues, but it may be the only way to perpetuate predatory states. The disorganization of civil society is a prerequisite for the survival of predatory state structures. The creation of an entrepreneurial class may seem as dangerous economically as promoting the political organization of civil society. For predatory states “lower level equilibrium traps” are not something to be eluded; they are something to be cultivated. The predatory state is an ideal type, but empirical approximations are likely to be found in various parts of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America. Neo utilitarians are right in highlighting the existence of predation, but they are wrong in tracing its origins. For neo-utilitarians, state power is the cause of predation. Reducing state power is the remedy.

The ideal type of the developmental state demonstrates that state capacity is “antidote” to predation. If states were to be performing and deliver collective goods, they ought to act as coherent entities. Institutionalized bureaucracy prevents “individual incumbents from peddling rules and decisions to the highest bidder. Being a coherent

actor involves more than just reining in the greed of individual office holders. It involves entrepreneurship as well. Developmental states help formulate projects that go beyond responding to the immediate demands of political powerful constituents⁽²²⁾". Autonomy is a major trait of the developmental state however not sufficient. The ability to carry out changes depends on solid state-society relationships. Autonomous states which are insulated from society could be effective predators. Developmental states must be involved in an elaborate network of ties which connects them to societal allies with reformist agendas. Embedded autonomy, not just autonomy, gives the developmental state its effectiveness. The efficacy of embedded autonomy stems from the "fusion of what seem at first to be contradictory characteristics. Embeddedness provides sources of intelligence and channels of implementation that enhance the competence of the state. Autonomy complements embeddedness, protecting the state from piecemeal capture, which would destroy the cohesiveness of the state itself and eventually undermine the coherence of its social interlocutors; the state's corporate coherence enhances the cohesiveness of external networks and helps groups that share its vision overcome their own collective problems. Just as predatory states deliberately disorganize society, developmental states help organize it⁽²³⁾". Comparative analysis leads to a different vision which contrasts with the neo utilitarian assumptions. A few general propositions that match with this perspective are worth considering: First and foremost, the future of civil society is firmly connected to the consistence of the state apparatus. Impairing state institutions is likely to go hand in hand with the disarray of civil society. Sustaining and rehabilitating the institutional integrity of state bureaucracies increase the chances of carrying out projects of social change. The second proposition derives from the first; predation is not corollary to state capacity. The idea that removing state bureaucracies will eliminate predators is misplaced; to the contrary, the formation of state bureaucracies in Weber's sense is an ultimate safeguard against predation.

Finally bureaucracy is not self fulfilling, even the most cohesive state bureaucracy cannot effectuate changes without a working relationship with

(22) Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy, States and Industrial Transformation*, Princeton, 1995, p. 248.

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 248.

groups and classes with which it shares reformist objectives. Connectedness is as critical as coherence and cohesion. Bureaucracy becomes even more important in an environment where the market has thoroughly perverted the public ethos. The case of Zaïre as an illustration of this predatory structure was well characterized by Mobutu's governance whereby "everything is for sale, everything is bought off. In this traffic, holding any slice of public power constitutes a veritable exchange instrument, convertible into illicit acquisition of money and other goods⁽²⁴⁾". The prevalence of such a pervasive market ethos matches perfectly with personalism and plundering at the top which destroys any legal-bound behavior at the lower levels of bureaucracy and gives free rein to individual greed and profit maximization. In such a context, the formation of a bourgeoisie oriented toward long term investment strategies seems unlikely. With a bureaucracy whose motto "is make the quest of wealth and money an obsession", (*T. Nzembele, 1979*), anyone who risks a long term investment must be considered more reckless than entrepreneurial. The stagnation and deterioration that "follow from the state's active disorganization of civil society is not a disadvantage from the point of view of the predatory state; it is an advantage. Transformation might give rise to organized social groups. "Departicipation" is the goal politically, and there is no possibility of joint projects⁽²⁵⁾". It typically generates the kind of loosely structured society which undercuts any reformist agenda. Zaïre confirms our initial assumption that it is not bureaucracy but its absence which makes the state ravenous. In addition, the case of Zaïre 'suggests that it is not so much "weakness" in relation to civil society that prevents the state from fostering transformation. Instead, the state's energies are directed toward preventing the emergence of social groups that might have an interest in transformation. It is not just poor developmental performance that defines the predatory state. Internal organization and the structure of its ties to society define it just as clearly. On both of these dimensions, the predatory state can be sharply distinguished from states whose performance has earned them the label "developmental"⁽²⁶⁾".

(24) René Lemarchand, "The politics of Penury in Rural Zaïre, the View from Bandundu." in *Zaïre, the Political Economy of Underdevelopment*, ed. Guy Grand, New York, Praeger, 1919, p. 248.

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 248.

(26) P. Evans, *Embedded...*, op. cit., p. 47.

The Zairian case offers useful examples on state-society relations. While the Zairian state's ability to penetrate and restructure civil society is obviously limited, the Mobutu system has been quite instrumental at disorganizing civil society. It has actively worked at wrecking the cohesion of traditional groups. At the same time, it has made sure to prevent the emergence of coherent interest groups at the national level and which may be potential power contenders. Lacking its proper agenda of social and economic reform, the predatory state is ultimately put at risk by the alternative agendas of civil society. The case of the Middle East in this respect is particularly significant. Protected by strategic rents which derive from oil production, circulation of petrodollars and the immobilizing impact of the cold war context, Middle Eastern regimes constructed unwieldy and burdensome bureaucracies, more appropriate to regime perpetuation than promoting the growth of a modern productive economy. In the Middle East, the greatest hurdle to general reform are political regimes themselves. The process of state formation which succeeded state independence, entailed assertions of sovereignty within frameworks that never matched the political realities on the ground. Most political regimes, have major legitimacy problems and usually rest on narrow bases of support within their respective societies. Anyway, whether sectarian, national populist or oil monarchies, they all have maintained their hold on power for long periods of time. Even where there has been a shift of rulers, such as in Egypt and Tunisia, the regime base of support remains very limited. The state policy aims at the maintenance in power. Middle Eastern regimes have two major preoccupations: threats to the regime and the problems of succession. The cases of Syria, Iraq, and the oil monarchies are particularly instructive. The favored strategy of rulers in their endeavors for self maintenance has been a mixture of repressive and redistributive policies. In Algeria, for instance the industrialization process was launched by actors whose overriding objective was to secure their own survival. Authoritarian regimes decide upon economic policy with little interest for their economic rationality; political goals and political means to legitimize their exclusive hold on power set the standards of governance.

Abundant economic rents can make governing seem painless. But such rents, particularly when they derive, from oil as in the Middle East, can corrupt the functioning of the market system. As Lisa Anderson

suggests: "in these rentier-states, the relationship between power and wealth characteristic of the extractive state is reversed: here wealth derives from power"⁽²⁷⁾. The economies of the Middle East are well known for their misallocation of resources. This improper allocation is partly due to the political motivation of the incumbents in charge with economic decision making. For the political decision making in the economic sphere, "leads to endemic and pervasive corruption, nepotism, and cronyism, and ultimately undermines society's confidence in economic decision making. The more abundant the rents sought through such means, the narrower is the regime's base and the more inefficient is the market. In effect, one finds in some of the rentier states a "kind of capitalism without markets"⁽²⁸⁾".

Middle Eastern states as commonly held "can reign but not rule", they can impose arbitrary measures but never generate consensus. States are vulnerable in the sense that citizens adhere either because they were bought off, terrorized, or both. Owing to modern technology, Middle Eastern states have a better control over their populations; Spying on their own people, these states have been unable to devise policies and lead by the means of a sound and dynamic interaction with civil society. To the contrary, with no autonomous civil society to deal with, Middle Eastern states incur the risk of "atrophy". Reviewing the Syrian case, Volker Perthes⁽²⁹⁾ talks of a "civil society" that is pervaded by the state, with even associations that were formerly semi-autonomous and were brought under the state's tutelage. In fact, the label of civil society is "the regime's own construction, composed of layers of patronage networks. Businessmen owe their contracts to the state; union leaders are appointed by the state, and the union's rank and file employed by the state; intellectuals are in the state's pay; and professional associations exist at the whim of state leaders. The result is a precarious structure destabilized even further by unsettled questions [of] succession"⁽³⁰⁾.

(27) Lisa Anderson, "Liberalism, Islam and the Arab State", *Dissent*, 41, Fall 1994, p. 441.

(28) Henri Barkey, "Can the Middle East compete", in *Economic Reform and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 174.

(29) Volker Perthes, "Le Secteur privé, la libéralisation économique et les perspectives de démocratisation: Le cas de la Syrie et de certains autres pays arabes", in *Démocraties sans Démocrates*, Ghassan Salamé éd., Fayard, 1994. The same book was published in English, I.B Tauris, 1994.

(30) Henri Barkey, art. cit., p. 175.

On the other hand, the archetype of the "Developmental state" (*Ch. Johnson, 1982*) is particularly illustrated by the role played by the Japanese state after World War II. The Japanese state acted as a surrogate for an absent capital market while working to promote transformative investment strategies. State institutions from the postal saving system to Japan Development Bank were essential in drawing investment capital to industry. The state central role in providing the necessary capital enabled it to implement "industrial rationalization" and "industrial structure policy". MITI played a pivotal role in this process, given its role in the approval of investment loans from the Japan Development Bank, its authority over foreign currency allocations for industrial purposes and licenses to import foreign technology, its ability to provide tax breaks, and its capacity to articulate "administrative guidance cartels" that would regulate competition in industry, MITI was in perfect position to "maximize induced decision making"⁽³¹⁾.

Weberian statements regarding the necessity of a coherent meritocratic bureaucracy are well documented in the Japanese case, which goes even beyond this prescription. The functioning of the Japanese state emphasizes the indispensability of informal networks, both internal and external. Informal networks supply bureaucracy with "internal coherence and corporate identity that meritocracy alone could not provide, but the character and consequences of these networks depend fundamentally on the strict selection process through which civil servants are chosen"⁽³²⁾. The fact that formal competence rather than clientelist connections or traditional loyalties is the prime requisite for entering the network, is a kind of "reinforced weberianism" whereby the "nonbureaucratic elements of bureaucracy" consolidate the formal organizational structure the same way Durkheim's "non contractual elements of contract" reinforce the market (*Rueschemeyer and Evans, 1985*). External networks connected to the state and civil society are even more decisive. The administrative structure is thoroughly embedded in the texture of Japanese society, more than any other in the world. Japanese industry depends largely on the intricate web of ties that connects ministries and major industries. "Deliberation councils" which regroup bureaucrats and businessmen in sessions of data collection and policy formation around specific issues, are

(31) P. Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

(32) *Ibid.*, p. 49.

only one illustration of the “administrative web”. The central role played by external ties has induced some to suggest that the states effectiveness is not owed to “its own inherent capacity but from the complexity and stability of interaction with market players”⁽³³⁾. This perspective complements the descriptions provided by Johnson and which underscore MITI “ability to act authoritatively rather than emphasizing its ability to facilitate exchange of information and build consensus. The danger in this view is that it sets external networks and internal corporate coherence against each other, as opposing alternative explanations. Instead, internal bureaucratic coherence should be seen as an essential precondition for the state’s effective participation in external networks”⁽³⁴⁾.

Proviso Quod

The disillusionment with the state as a pervasive mood of the 1970’s, was quite understandable. In Africa, even sympathetic observers could not dismiss the “cruel parody” of post-colonial hopes being performed by most states of the continent. This was equally true for Latin America. Unfortunately, rather than trying to discern what states might be able to do from what they were unable to do, and then impose the necessary institutional changes that would improve state performance, critics simply damned the state. Voracious politicians and corrupt bureaucrats were only byproducts, the real “culprit” was the state itself. Bureaucracies were either smothering entrepreneurship or converting it into unproductive “rent-seeking” activities. Setting them aside was the first step on the development agenda priorities. Abandoning the state as a virtual agent of development yields an unqualified pessimism and invites an “uncritical faith in the market” as basic alternatives. It is not by chance that the market became the solution. The ideological doctrine that was commonly held by neo liberals, took shape around a set of policies devised to place full confidence on market forces. The neo utilitarian perception of the state as “an aggregation of individual maximizers does more than impugn the possibility of serving the public good. It makes the kind of limited state that neo utilitarian economics requires an impossibility”⁽³⁵⁾.

(33) Richard Samuels, *the Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective*, Cornell, 1987, p. 262.

(34) P. Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

(35) P. Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

The neo utilitarian view of an efficient economy requires a neo classical theory of the state as a “nightwatchman” whose effective role is restricted almost entirely to “protecting individual rights, persons and property and enforcing voluntarily negotiated contracts”⁽³⁶⁾. The idea that states are more effective when their connections to society are minimal is no more credible than the idea that markets operate in insulation from other social ties. Just as markets in real life operate as if they were embedded in other forms of social relations, states are bound to be “embedded” in order to be effective. Indeed, We need to overcome the segmented vision between market and the state and look at “the covariation of state-structure, state-society relations, and development outcomes. What separates states that embody the neo utilitarian nightmare from states that can legitimately claim to be developmental? How do successful shared projects change relations between the state and its collaborators? Using comparative historical evidence to answer all these questions will exploit the opportunity opened up by neo utilitarianism’s retreat and forge a more satisfying vision of the state’s place in the process of development”⁽³⁷⁾. Neo utilitarian inability to come up with a coherent theory of the state was inevitable since it failed to restrain the heuristical validity of “methodological individualism” and to emphasize institutional abilities. The neo utilitarian conception of state behavior as the mere aggregation of individual motivations prevents them from evolving a realistic picture of the state’s role. State managers do not engage in abstract decision making. Their decisions are tightly related to “an institutional context composed of complex, historically emergent patterns of interaction that are embodied in social structures and taken for granted by the individuals that work within them. These patterns have a reality that is prior to “individual interests”. They define priorities of competing individual goals and the range of means that will be considered to pursue them”⁽³⁸⁾.

The other important aspect that should be considered, relates to the anti-poverty programs which are meant to compensate the groups mostly hurt by economic reforms. These policies are part of the politics of

(36) James Buchanan James, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, eds., *Toward a Theory of Rent Seeking Society*, Texas A&M, 1980, p. 9.

(37) P. Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

(38) P. Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

adjustment. Two assumptions underline them. The first is that, in most countries, postponing difficult but necessary reforms exacerbate macro-economics distortions, involving prohibitive social and economic costs and requiring more complicated measures than would have been necessary had reforms been carried out earlier. The second assumption is that reforms provide a suitable environment for adopting new strategies to protect the poor and which basically rely on the participation of the potential beneficiaries. By restraining the role of centralized solutions, these strategies not only contribute to structural treatment of poverty, they also promote the social empowerment of the poor. However, the creation of safety nets in such a way "can have a positive effect on democratization more generally. By reducing the short term dislocations caused by market oriented reforms, safety nets ease the political constraints that such reforms pose for new and fragile democratic governments. Furthermore, encouraging the poor to participate in addressing their own problems and exercise their political voice can give the marginalized members of society a stake in both economic reform and the democratic system"⁽³⁹⁾. In addition to political context, the nature of safety net programs determine decisively their political as well as their economic outcomes. Demand-based programs are more likely to favor the creation of self sustaining projects that contribute to lasting reductions of poverty and to increasing of democratic governance at the local level. However, centrally devised public work schemes may be more suitable for alleviating the social costs of adjustment and assisting the poorest groups rapidly and on a wider scale. Safety nets cannot be expected to serve as substitute to basic public services, nor to induce structural reforms in resources distribution and ownership arrangements. Neither can they replace major adjustment measures in real wages or sectoral spending. They can at best, usefully supplement the activities of "weak line ministries" while securing short term income or employment. They cannot relay long term development. Nevertheless safety net programs contribute powerfully to local institutional transformations by "incorporating the participation of previously marginal groups such as NGO's or community organizations. This participation may take the form of cooperation with the state in the designing or delivery of social services as well as in providing more effective channels for demand-making

(39) Carol Graham, "the Politics of Safety Nets", in *Economic Reform...*, op. cit., 211-212.

channels that play a critical role in any viable democratic system”⁽⁴⁰⁾.

Among the most exciting transformations of the 1980’s and early 1990’s was the reenergizing of “civic society” (*M. Grindle, 1996*) in many developing countries. Groups in civic society organized and requested more from their governments, not only in terms of tangible economic benefits but also in terms of larger political participation, contribution into national and local decision making, and autonomy from state intrusion. These claims often crystallized in “movements for democratic government and basic human rights. The mobilization of civic society coincided with a period in which politicians and regimes—many of whom had traditionally relied on state resources to manage and control dissent—found themselves without the means to dominate political space and to close off arenas of contestation”⁽⁴¹⁾. Even when politicians and regimes endeavored to assert themselves and maintain their hold on public decision making, civic organizations sought to enlarge their political space and preserve their autonomy from state’s encroachment. The challenge of state’s capacity is primarily for civic society. How could such groups safeguard their autonomy and ability to request participation and responsiveness? How could they build alliances with other democratic partners and civic organizations? how could they survive and build civic capacity that would match state capacity? Generating larger political capacity in developing countries depends to a large extent on the ability of civil society to confront state’s power, invest the public space, and emphasize participation and responsiveness over time.

(40) C. Graham, art. cit., p. 225.

(41) Merilee S. Grindle, *Challenging the State, Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa*, Cambridge, 1996, p. 183.

WESTERN LITERATURE ON ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Abdallah EL-SAYED^(*)

Introduction

For a long time, studies of Islam were written by Western Orientalists. But the theoretical approaches and frameworks developed by the Western social and political sciences are being increasingly used to analyse the Muslim world and have now become one of the prime sources of information about Islam and the Muslim countries.

In recent times resurgent Islam has had a bigger impact on the West than any other Third World movement. The West is profoundly disturbed by the assertiveness of Islamic groups throughout the Muslim World. Resurgent Islam is seen as a threat to political stability and to Western interests especially in the Middle East because of its strategically important area and its energy resources.

Particularly, during the last three decades, the overthrow of the Shah and establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran, the struggle of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the assassination of president Sadat, and the rise of the Ikhwan and Islamic groupings in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, the takeover of (al-Haram) the grand mosque in Mecca, the Palestinian intifada, the Lebanese Muslim resistance against Israel, the Iran-Iraq war, and finally the invasion of Kuwait which led to the biggest armed campaign in the human history - all that have made the West much more alert to the complexities of Islam and to the revolutionary potential of Fundamentalism.

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However, the outcome of all this anxiety in the West has led to a growth industry concerning the recent Islamic phenomenon which is described by various terms such as revivalism, resurgence, Fundamentalism renewal, reform, militant Islam... etc⁽¹⁾. Hundreds of books and articles have been written by social and political scholars to try to understand the complexities of Islam and the phenomenon of Fundamentalism in this various guises. Experts (academic and government) and the media alike became aware of this phenomenon.

Accordingly, this study is a review of some Western literature on Islamic Fundamentalism sets out to investigate and point out how Western theorists have viewed, understood and analysed this phenomenon which is dominant in world politics today.

Many scholars have agreed that the crises which have buffeted Islamic Society have produced the contemporary Islamic Fundamentalism. This "crisis hypothesis" is prominent in many scholarly studies of the recent Islamic experience.

R. Hrair Dekmejian and John Esposito appear to agree on the crises that resulted Fundamentalism Islam. Dekmejian speaks of a 'protracted crisis milieu' in the Islamic world. Even historically, he links the Fundamentalism movements with periods of great turmoil, and he speaks of intense spiritual, social and political crisis which have caused the phenomenon of return to Islamic ethos (see the review of Dekmejian later in this study).

Although Esposito has agreed on the "crisis hypothesis", he has also believed in the importance of a sense of success as a generator of the current resurgence. He indicates to the Arab victory over Israel in 1973, and the Arab oil embargo which have restored the success, pride and self confidence and led to a revival in Islamic practice and politics (see the review of Esposito later in this study).

Another scholar, Daniel Pipes, has also linked the resurgence to the sense of power and success generated by the oil boom of the early 1970's.

(1) In my research, I will use the term Islamic Fundamentalism because it is a widely known concept. I would prefer to say Salafiyyah movement which means pious ancestors, or Islamic revivalism, or Islamic resurgence since Islamic Fundamentalism is a Western concept and not identical with Christian Fundamentalism, which is a mainly protestant phenomenon. (see the argument of William M. Watt later in this study).

He states: 'the oil boom marked a turning point in Muslim consciousness more than anything else, it prepared the way for widespread Islamic political activity'⁽²⁾.

W.M. Watt sees Islamic Fundamentalism as a response to the tremendous impact the West has had on Muslims and to less emphasis he asserts on the internal problems of the Muslim societies when he says: "Some Muslims involved in the resurgence are aware of current social problems in their various countries, but this is not a concern of the resurgence as such". (See the review of W.M. Watt later in this study).

Some scholars like John O. Voll insist that the current religious resurgence is not simply a reaction to the west, but rather is part of an on-going process of revival, renewal and reform "tajdid and islah" which reflects a continuing tradition in Islamic history. The central of the process of renewal in Islam is the resurgent call for a return to the Fundamentals of Islam⁽³⁾.

These are some of the approaches used by Western scholars in analysing the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic Fundamentalism which is dominant in world politics today. However, in this study my concern is focused on the following:

- John Esposito and Richard Dekmejian since they are two distinguished scholars who have specialized in examining the interaction between religion and politics in the Middle East and written a great deal about the recent Islamic phenomenon.
- William Montgomery Watt for he is an authority in the Islamic studies, and very concerned with the developments that took place in the Muslim world, as well as the encounter between Islam and the West.

John Esposito and Islamic Fundamentalism

John Esposito has been particularly effective in explaining Islamic

(2) Daniel Pipes, "this World is Political: The Islamic Revival of the Seventies", *Orbis*, vol. XXIV, no. 1, 1980, p. 20.

See also Daniel Pipe's argument of the oil boom and its effect on Islamic resurgence in "In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power" New York: Basic Books, 1983.

(3) See John O. Voll "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah" in John Esposito ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 32-47.

Fundamentalism to the Western public. He is editor and author of many works on various aspects of Islam⁽⁴⁾. Esposito in his various works seeks to explain the interaction between religion and politics in the contemporary Muslim world; the Muslims belief and practice; the Muslim Society today... etc. What particular about Esposito here is that he seeks to provide some perspective and insight into the complex and living role of Islam in sociopolitical change, he provides some insight into the phenomenon that has swept the Muslim world, which has been described by various titles, Islamic resurgence, Islamic revival, Militant Islam, Islamists, Islamic Fundamentalism... etc.

Analysis of the recent phenomenon of Islamic Fundamentalism shows the extent to which Islam has continued to be an important power in the twentieth century Muslim life as well as an important factor in political development. In many parts of the Muslim world, In North Africa (Egypt, Algeria - Libya), India, Indonesia, Islam served as a common denominator in mass mobilization during their independence movement⁽⁵⁾. Religious symbols and slogans fire the imaginations of Muslims; the mosques and the Orators, Imams and Ulama provided the necessary centres for political organization and communication. In the post-independence period, Islam receded from politics while elites pursued a more secular path towards nation building. However, during the late 1950s and the 1960s the political Islam again arose in the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood (Fundamentalism), and in the use by revolutionary

(4) John Esposito, ed. *"Voices of Resurgent Islam"* New York, Oxford: Oxford University press, 1983; John, Espopito *"Islam and Politics"* Syracuse: Syracuse University press, 1984; John Esposito *"Islam: the Straight Path"* New York, Oxford: Oxford University press, 1988; John Esposito, ed., *"Islam and Development"* Syracuse: Syracuse University press, 1984; John Esposito, ed. *"Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society"* New York, Oxford: Oxford University press, 1987; John Esposito, *"Muslim Societies Today"* in Marjorie Kelly ed., *The Religious and Political Life of a World Community*, New York: published for the Foreign Policy Association, 1984; John Esposito and John Donohue eds. *"Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives"* New York, Oxford: Oxford University press, 1982; John Esposito *"The Iranian Revolution: its Global Impact"* paper from an international conference held in Washington D.C. Feb. 4-5, 1989; John Esposito, Presidential Address 1989 *"The Study of Islam: Challenges and Prospects"* Middle East Studies Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 1 July 1990, p.p. 1-11; John Esposito *"Islam in the Politics of the Middle East"* Current History, Feb. 1986, pp. 53-81.

(5) See John Esposito *"Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics and Society"* op. cit., p. 16.

regimes of Islam to buttress and legitimate their national ideologies and policies. I mean by revolutionary regimes here, Nasirism in Egypt, Ba'thism in both Syria and Iraq, Algerian' National Liberation Front and Qadhdhafi's third way.

But why has religion again become such a visible force in Middle Eastern politics? And why has the phenomenon of Fundamentalism become a dominant force in Middle Eastern policies and societies? In his effort, John Esposito provides a clear understanding of the political impulses surging through today's Muslim world. There is no single answer to the above questions. Rather, a confluence of events has contributed to the current emergence of Islamic resurgence and the link between Islam and politics. These as John Esposito points out may be expressed by three themes: "(1) - the continued impotence of Muslim Society, i.e., the failure and ineffectiveness of Muslim governments and nationalist ideologies; (2) - a disillusionment with the west; and (3) - the desire to articulate a more authentic identity"⁽⁶⁾.

Many Muslim countries have become progressively ambivalent toward Western models of political, social and economic development - inappropriate transplants from an alien culture with a different sense of history and values. Liberal nationalism, capitalism and varieties of socialism have failed to meet the political and social needs of Muslim societies. Problems of political legitimacy and authoritarianism continue to exist. The political and cultural past of Islam had been reversed by European colonial rule as Esposito put it⁽⁷⁾. He adds "European colonialism was replaced by American neo-colonialism as represented by America's foreign policies"⁽⁸⁾. Moreover, "political leaders failed to establish a legitimate effective public order and to adequately address the profound socioeconomic disparities in wealth and class in most Muslim countries"⁽⁹⁾. However, recognition of a moral and cultural decline was accompanied by military weakness and military loss. The creation of Israel, the Arab-Israeli wars, and the prosperity of Israel symbolized Arab

(6) John Esposito "*Islam and Politics*" op. cit., p. 152; See also John, Esposito "*Islam: The Straight Path*" op. cit., pp. 162-169; John, Esposito "*Voices of Resurgent Islam*" op. cit., pp. 11-14.

(7) John Esposito, "*Islam and Politics*" op. cit., p. 153.

(8) Ibid., p. 153.

(9) Ibid., p. 153.

impotence before the forces of Western neo-colonialism. The quick and utter defeat in the 1967 Arab - Israeli war, with its loss of the sacred city of Jerusalem, was vivid testimony before the world that while the Jewish state of Israel was strong, Muslims remained weak.

The defeat of 1967 resulted in a period of soul-searching and debate over the cause of Arab weakness. However, this despair and disillusionment with the West, and the self-criticism were accompanied as John Esposito put it 'by an increased emphasis on the need for greater self-reliance, a desire to reclaim one's past and to root individual and national self-identity more indigenously, to find pride and strength in an Islamic past and cultural tradition that had once been a dominant world civilization'⁽¹⁰⁾.

However, along his argument concerning the defeat and the loss of the Muslims, Esposito has also emphasized the importance of success as another element which led to the current resurgence. He states: "For many Muslims, the early 1970s signaled an important turning point in modern Muslim history. The centuries-long decline of Islamic fortunes seemed reversed by the Egyptian "victory" over Israel in 1973 war and by the Arab oil embargo... The restoration of success, pride and self-confidence was accompanied by a significant revival in Islamic practice and politics"⁽¹¹⁾. In another place Esposito states: "The war and thus the victory had been placed in an Islamic context. Islamic symbols and slogans were emphasized; from its name, the Ramadan war; its battle cry (Allahu Akbar - "God is Most Great"); its code name (Badr), Muhammad's first victory over his Meccan opponents"⁽¹²⁾. Thus, Esposito sees the victory and the oil boycott have instilled a new sense of pride and strengthened a commitment of the Muslim identity.

All these are reflected in an Islamic revival which has embraced both the personal and the public spheres of life. Among its more striking manifestation is the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and the call and emphasis on the identify and solidarity of the Muslim community.

Despite the distinctive differences among Islamic movements

(10) Ibid., p. 154.

(11) Ibid., p. 211.

(12) Ibid., p. 154.

“Fundamentalism” they share common themes in Islamic politics and sociopolitical thought. John Esposito identified these common themes as follows: “the failure of the West, i.e. the inappropriateness of transplanted, imported Western models of political, social, and economic development. The need to throw off Western political and cultural domination which foster secularism, materialism, and spiritual bankruptcy; the need to ‘return to Islam’ in order to restore a lost identity, moral purpose and character; an emphasis on the unity and totality of Islam, rooted in the doctrine of the Unity of God, i.e. belief that religion is integral to politics and society because Islam is both religion and government; a call for the reintroduction of Sharia law for establishing a more Islamic state and society”⁽¹³⁾.

For John Esposito, the current resurgence of Islam should not be unexpected. In order to understand the sources and inspiration of the contemporary resurgence, he sees the relationship of religion to politics and society in Islam is essential. “Both in Muslim belief and in Muslim history, Islam has occupied an important place in the ideology of the state and in the conduct of Muslim politics from its seventh-century beginnings to the twentieth century”⁽¹⁴⁾. Esposito here presumably has in mind the “Islamic past” when the Caliph was the spiritual Imam and in the same time the political leader of the community. In other words, when religion and politics were not separated, and there are certainly strong arguments for maintaining that the movement of Islamic resurgence today looks back to the past period of Islam as a model which it seeks to create again.

John Esposito in “Muslim Societies today” maintains that at heart of contemporary Islamic resurgence is a search for identity in the Modern World⁽¹⁵⁾. He offers some examples from several countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, Egypt and Iran where Islamic activists focus on the Westernization of their societies which resulted the loss of their own history and values. Esposito remarks that “the process of

(13) Ibid., p. 154.

(14) John Esposito *“Voices of Resurgent Islam”* op. cit., p. 3.

(15) John, Esposito *“Muslim Societies Today”* in Marjorie Kelly ed., *The Religious Life of a World Community*, published for the Foreign Policy Association, New York, Praeger 1984, p. 197: See also John, Esposito *“Pakistan: Quest for Islamic Identity”* in John Esposito ed., *Islam and Development*, op. cit., pp. 139-162.

modernization, which applied alien models to the political and sociocultural development of Muslim countries, has failed to produce its desired goals and has resulted in a serious identity crisis. Nationalism, Capitalism, and a variety of Socialist experiments have not met the needs of Muslim societies”⁽¹⁶⁾. He adds, problems of political legitimacy and authoritarianism continue to exist. The gap between rich and poor widens... Traditional patterns of social and religious life have been disrupted⁽¹⁷⁾. This concern for identity and authenticity (asala) have motivated Muslims to look at their Islamic heritage which becomes the major themes of the Fundamentalism movements.

However, Fundamentalism is the term used for the effort to define the fundamentals of a religious system and adhere to them. Related to Fundamentalism is Islamic revival or resurgence, a renewed interest in Islam. John Esposito shows with care the ideological framework of Islamic Fundamentalism where he divides two sorts of Islamic groups. The first one believes in the following:

- 1 - Islam is a total and comprehensive way of life, religion is integral to politics, law and society.
- 2 - The failure of Muslim societies is due to their departure from the straight path of Islam and thier following a Western secular path...
- 3 - The renewal of society requires a return to Islam, an Islamic religiopolitical and social reformation or revolution, that draws its inspiration from the Quran and from the Sunnah (tradition) of the prophet Mohammad.
- 4 - To restore God’s rule and inaugurate a true Islamic social order, Western-inspired civil codes must be replaced by Islamic law...
- 5 - Although the Westernization of society is condemned, modernization as such is not. Science and technology are accepted, but they are to be subordinated to Islamic belief and values in order to guard against the Westernization and secularization of Muslim Society...

The other group is the radical one which goes beyond these precepts and operate on the following assumptions, believing that theological

(16) John, Esposito *“Muslim Societies Today”* in Marjorie Kelly ed., *the Religious Life of a World Community*, op. cit., p. 197.

(17) Ibid., p. 197.

doctrine and political realism necessitate violent revolution:

- 1 - A Crusader mentality, Western neocolonialism, and the power of Zionism pit the west against the Islamic world.
- 2 - Establishment of an Islamic system of government is not simply an alternative but an Islamic imperative, based on God's command or will...
- 3 - Since the legitimacy of Muslim governments is based on the Sharia, those governments that do not follow it are illegitimate. Those who fail to follow Islamic law, government and individuals, are guilty of unbelief. They are no longer Muslims, but are atheists whose unbelief demands holy war.
- 4 - Opposition to illegitimate governments extends to the official Ulama, the religious establishment, and state-supported mosques and preachers who are considered to have been co-opted by the government.
- 5 - Jihad (holy war) against unbelief and unbelievers is a religious duty. Therefore, all true believers are obliged to combat such governments and their supporters, whether individuals or foreign governments...
- 6 - Christians and Jews are generally regarded as unbelievers rather than "people of the Book"...⁽¹⁸⁾.

Esposito sets the stage for assessing political Islam today by succinctly describing the early centuries of the faith, the rise and Fall of medieval empires and the views of leading Muslim political writers and activists including Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Mawdudi. He also discusses the crisis in Islamic history and Muslim identity precipitated by the advent of European colonialism and the imposition upon Muslim Societies of Western political and cultural systems.

Within the large community of all Muslims, there is a very general consensus on the basic principles of the faith. But there is little agreement on such specific issues as the form of Islamic government, the role of the Ulama, the place of Islamic law "Sharia" and the position of women. "Whose Islam are we talking about?" Esposito asks, Is it that enunciated by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya or Pakistan? and again, "What Islam?" How

(18) See John, Esposito *"Islam: The Straight Path"* op. cit., pp. 169-171.

can Muslims decide which practices are “genuinely Islamic” and which are manipulative tactics by ruling elites to hold power against opponents who also use Islamic-symbols to arouse the public against traditional regimes? This is the issue posed today to “establishment Islam”.

Esposito does not try to answer these questions. Instead, he examines countries as case studies (see *Islam and Politics*). However, one special aspect of Esposito coverage needs to be noted. He provides special coverage of Muslim resurgence, its causes, ideologues and complexities which I have already reviewed. Esposito’s position is that of a sympathetic observer, he presents Islam in a way that is recognizable and acceptable to most Muslims. Most of his work, for example, has been listed in bibliographies for further reading by Islamic organizations.

Richard Hrair Dekmejian and Islamic Fundamentalism

Muslim Fundamentalism and Crisis

It is often said that the current Islamic Fundamentalism is a product of crisis. Fundamentalism is said to come out of the real fears raised by challenges that appear to overwhelm Islam. R. Hrair Dekmejian is a leading Scholar in the very Subject⁽¹⁹⁾. In his often-cited articles on Islamic Fundamentalism, (in describing the modern Islamic experience, Dekmejian used different terms - Fundamentalism - revival - resurgence - return to the Islamic ethos - the Islamic rebirth movement - Islamists) the crisis hypothesis is prominent. Dekmejian states that the “recent quest for a return to the Islamic ethos appears to be a natural response to the successive pathological experiences which have buffeted Islamic societies

(19) See Richard Hrair Dekmejian “*The Islamic Revival in the Middle East and North Africa*” *Current History*, April 1980, pp. 169-79; Richard Hrair Dekmejian “*The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives*” in *Religion and Politics in the Middle East*, Edited by Michael Curtis, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981 pp. 31-42; Richard Hrair Dekmejian “*Fundamentalist Islam: Theories, Typologies and Trends*” *Middle East Review*, Vol. 4, 1985, pp. 28-33; Richard Hrair Dekmejian “*Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*” Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985; Richard Hrair Dekmejian “*Charismatic Leadership in Messianic and Revolutionary Movement*” in Richard Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland eds, *Religious Resurgence*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987, pp. 78-107.

in contemporary times⁽²⁰⁾, and he speaks of a “protracted crisis milieu” in the Islamic world including the disorienting political economic and social impact of Western imperialism, the various struggles for independence, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab loss of Palestine and Jerusalem, the failure of the governments in the Islamic countries to establish legitimate public order within the communities, the ineffective rulership and the failure of the governments to make good on their promises and to achieve development and social justice⁽²¹⁾. Dekmejian considered these factors as the constituents of the crisis “catalyst of the the crisis” which play the role of an intermediate and cause the demand for a return to Islamic roots or revival as a reaction. He broadens this out with a long-term generalization in a later work: “A causal pattern can be discerned whereby manifestation of religious resurgence corresponds to periods of intense spiritual, social, and political crisis”. Islamic Fundamentalism, he adds: “is no exception to this historical pattern. Indeed, throughout Islamic history, the incidence of Fundamentalist resurgence has been closely associated with periods of great turmoil when the very existence of the Islamic polity and/or its moral integrity were under threat”⁽²²⁾.

To seek an explanation in social crisis theory for the incidence of Islamic Fundamentalism requires substantial elaboration. Dekmejian sees the explanation most commonly advanced by Western theorists is one that rests on economic determinism. Thus, religious resurgence is seen as the consequence of economic crisis. Undoubtedly these materialist conceptualizations in which economic crisis lead to religious revivalism possess considerable theoretical power, with respect to the economic crisis which leads to religious revivalism, and in the context of increasing class polarization and massive poverty, where political elites are perceived as the perpetrators of social and economic injustice, Islam could well become a potent protest ideology to oppose the establishment with religious sanction. (Khomeini’s revolution, the January 1977 protest in Egypt directed at the government’s lifting of price subsidies for basic commodities, as well as the protests in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria). All these are seen as Islamic proletarianism movements. However,

(20) R. Hrair Dekmejian *“The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives”* op. cit., p. 33.

(21) Ibid., p. 33.

(22) See R. Hrair Dekmejian *“Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World”* op. cit., p. 9.

Dekmejian sees that Western and Marxist theorists provide only partial answers to the complex phenomenon of Islamic Fundamentalism. His arguments is based on the causal relationship between social crisis and religious Fundamentalism which can be demonstrated to possess considerable historical validity since the time of the prophet Muhammad⁽²³⁾. Dekmejian exposes the specific triggers of Islamic Fundamentalism in different historical cases which have been quite diverse. For example, Umar's II (720 AD) milieu was primarily social-spiritual-moral degeneration against the Umayyad. The movement of Ibn Hazm (1064 AD) centred on internal dissension because of the Umayyad decline and defeat in Spain, as well as the movement of Ibn Taymiyyah (1328 AD) centred on Turco-Tartar conquests besides the moral and economic crisis and the state repression. Ibn Abd al-wahhab (1791 AD) fought against Ottoman power as well as bid'ah diniyyah (religious innovations), i.e. the Ottoman decline and religious-moral crisis. The Sanusiyyah movement (1800's) began as a tribal Sufi movement which became radicalized in response to Italian imperialism. The Salafiyyah Movement (1890's) was a reformist movement led by Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani - a response to European imperial rule and cultural-economic penetration⁽²⁴⁾. Salafiyyah originates from Salaf. Salaf means pious ancestors. Finally, in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood (1930's) the crisis catalysts included socio-economic decline, and military impotence against the British imperial presence and the powerful cultural, and ideological influences radiating from Europe. However, the Muslim Brotherhood movement is considered to be a Salafi movement and the mother of the Islamic movement today. Dekmejian himself realized the link between the Muslim Brotherhood of Hasan al-Banna 1930's and the contemporary movements of Islamic revival "The multi-dimensional nature of Banna' crisis milieu presaged the characteristics of the present phase of pervasive and intense crisis, which has produced the contemporary movements of Islamic revival"⁽²⁵⁾. To conclude, therefore,

(23) See R. Hrair Dekmejian *"Fundamentalist Islam: Theories, Typologies and Trends"* op. cit., p. 28.

(24) See R. Hrair Dekmejian *"Fundamentalist Islam: Theories, Typologies and Trends"* op. cit., p. 29. For the history of Islamist Movements - Cyclical pattern, see R. Hrair Dekmejian *"Islam in Revolution"* op. cit., pp. 9-23.

(25) R. Hrair Dekmejian *"Fundamentalist Islam: Theories, Typologies and Trends"* op. cit., p. 29.

R. Hrair Dekmejian sees that the present Islamic resurgence as a response to an environment of deepening social crisis which possesses at least six dimensions constituting the catalysts that evoke Fundamentalist's reactions. These dimensions of crisis are: identity crisis, legitimacy crisis, misrule and coercion, economic crisis, military impotence and cultural crisis⁽²⁶⁾. In such crisis, Islamic Fundamentalism becomes "a medium of salvation". For the dispossessed masses and alienated counterelites⁽²⁷⁾.

However, the significance of R. Hrair Dekmejian's works on Islamic Fundamentalism and especially his book "Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World" is that he makes a valuable contribution to the literature on Islamic Fundamentalists "Islamist Groups", since he surveyed 91 groups "case studies" with state responses to major Islamist societies in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. He provides a useful service of analyzing various economic, social, and psychological bases for the appeal of Islam to individuals. Dekmejian's work is also unusual in the sense that it is concerned with providing an analysis of the ideology of the groups; besides investigating their relations with their respective governments. Of the 91 groups surveyed, roughly one-third originated in Egypt. Undoubtedly, there is ground for giving Egypt the weight it richly deserves, for it is the cradle of Islamic Fundamentalism. Apart from Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the case studies which include the other Gulf states, are presented in skeletal summaries, perhaps owing to a lack of sufficient data. This is not surprising since, as the author points out, information on the militants is a closely guarded secret.

Finally, it is evident that Islamic Fundamentalism has become an important factor in the politics of the Muslim states. Meanwhile, the developing anatomy of Islamic Fundamentalism may be shaped by unforeseen events that will surely buffet the Islamic conscience in the coming decade. For that R. Hrair Dekmejian suggests that in order to stem the Fundamentalist tide and reduce the level of social tension: A – The Arab elites need to pursue three interrelated policies - comprehen-

(26) See Ibid., p. 29. See also, R. Hrair Dekmejian *"Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World"* op. cit., p. 9.

(27) See R. Hrair Dekmejian *"Islamic Revival in the Middle East and North Africa"* op. cit., p. 169.

sive reform, systematic socialization and moderation in the use of state power against opponents⁽²⁸⁾. **B** - Since the United State is perceived as a major source of external and internal stimuli (U.S. policy in favour of Israel over the Arabs and the unconditional support for it - support of pro-American Arab regimes over the Islamic movements) which have provoked Fundamentalists responses. Consequently, two lines of policy need to be pursued a viable response to Fundamentalism from one side and to safeguard vital Western interests in the Arab-Islamic orbit:

- 1 - "Peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would provide for a Palestinian entity along with an unambiguous Islamic presence at the holy sanctuaries in Jerusalem".
- 2 - "Explicit American encouragement and support of socio-political reform, particularly in pro-American Arab states, to promote greater socio-economic justice and to safeguard basic human rights"⁽²⁹⁾.

Such policy, Dekmejian states, would remove "two major provocations that have evoked Fundamentalist responses"⁽³⁰⁾ and "The consequent amelioration of the crisis milieu is likely to neutralize the more extremist exponents of Fundamentalism and provide a propitious environment for reformist elites to emerge"⁽³¹⁾.

However, since Dekmejian's work "Islam in revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World" acknowledges that the study upon which it was based was "supported and monitored by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, and since he is a lecturer on Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, and served as consultant to the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and the United State Information Agency, it seems that he recommends such a policy to be adopted by the United States for the stability of the region. But the succeeding events which took place there (In Algeria, Iraq, Palestinian - Israeli negotiation, South of Lebanon, Bosnia, province of Kosovo and Chechenia today) Shows that hte moderate line which Dekmejian has indicated is yet to be adopted.

(28) See R. Hrair Dekmejian "Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World" op. cit., p. 162.

(29) Ibid., p. 174.

(30) Ibid., p. 174.

(31) Ibid., p. 174.

William Montgomery Watt and Islamic Fundamentalism

William M. Watt is widely known and respected as an Anglican clergyman and academic who has shown himself capable of the most profound insight into historical and religious questions central to Islam. He stands out as a scholar by the high intellectual calibre of his numerous books. Given his background and general orientation, he is an orientalist by definition. Watt has been able to distinguish himself from other Western Orientalists, to which the Easterners are so sensitive. Watt contributed to the Western knowledge of the East⁽³²⁾. The Easterners are not offended by his criticism because he is equally critical of the West. This explains his credibility. As an Orientalist, he respects the Islamic culture and is, in turn, respected by Muslim scholars. Very often, Muslim writers quote his opinion as a Westerner about Islam, the Quran and the Prophet. As an example Watt writes "not merely must we credit Muhammad with essential honesty and integrity of purpose, if we are to understand him at all; we are to correct the errors we have inherited from the past"⁽³³⁾.

About the appreciation of the Prophet Muhammad in the West Watt states: "His readiness to undergo persecution for his beliefs, the high moral character of the men who believed in him and looked up to him as leader, and the greatness of his ultimate achievement - all argue his fundamental integrity. to suppose Muhammadan imposter raises more problems than it solves. Moreover, none of the great figures of history is so poorly appreciated in the West as Muhammad..."⁽³⁴⁾. Watt has always treated Muslim sensibilities with the greatest respect. In another book he writes: "I consider that Muhammad was truly a Prophet... If he is a Prophet... in accordance with the Christian doctrine that the Holy Spirit spoke by the Prophet, the Quran may be accepted as of divine origin"⁽³⁵⁾.

However, the distorted image of Islam started to appear in the West

(32) See Josef Von Ess "Tribute to William Montgomery Watt" in, *Islam: Past Influence and Present challenge*, which is a Festschrift for Professor Watt, edited by Alford T. Welch and Pierre Cachia, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979, pp. ix-xiii; see also in the same volume, Michael V. McDonald "Bibliography: the Published Works of William Montgomery Watt" pp. 331-347.

(33) W. Montgomery Watt "Muhammad at Mecca" Oxford: 1953, p. 52.

(34) Ibid., p. 52.

(35) W. Montgomery Watt "Muhammad's Mecca: History in the Quran" Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press, 1988, p. 1.

when the Christians of Western Europe elaborated their intellectual defences against Islam after the occupation of Sapin by Muslims. Immediately after this period, Watt states: "Christian scholars produced what can only be called a distorted image of Islam"⁽³⁶⁾. Among their allegations were that as Watt put it "Islam was a religion which spread by the sword, that Muhammad was consciously an imposter, and the Muslims were encouraged to sexual laxity by the Quran"⁽³⁷⁾. Watt adds: "These allegations are definitely false. It is, of course, true that the Islamic state or empire spread by the sword but the conquered Christians or Jews, far from being forced to become Muslims, became protected minorities "dhimmis", following their own religion and having a degree of autonomy under their religious head"⁽³⁸⁾. And again, Watt believes in Muhammad as a true Prophet, and about the question of sexuality, he believes that the Quran was trying to bring about a stricter control of sexual practices.

However, the distorted image of Islam in the West (Watt has, in fact, contributed to the discussion by explaining Islam in the West and treated it with equity)⁽³⁹⁾ has dominated most European and Western and Christian thinking until the later eighteenth century and even yet has not completely lost its influence as Watt notes elsewhere.

To start with the old image of Islam and later on the colonialism of many Muslim countries, and the success and dominance of the Western civilization, I believe, we are holding the key entrance to the very subject "Islamic Fundamentalism". Fundamentalists, as it is evident, strongly

(36) W. Montgomery Watt "Islam and the West" in Islam in the Modern World, Edited by Denis Maceoin and Ahmed al-Shahi, London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983, p. 2.

(37) Ibid., p. 2, See also W.M. Watt "Muslim - Christian Encounters" under the title the Christian Perception of Islam, London and New York: Routledge 1991, pp. 83-88.

(38) Ibid., p. 2.

(39) See for example, W.M. Watt "Muhammad at Mecca" Oxford: Clarendon Press 1953; W.M. Watt "Muhammad at Medina" Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956; W.M. Watt "Islam and the Integration of Society" London: routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961; W.M. Watt "Muhammad, Prophet and Statesman" Oxford University Press, 1961; W.M. Watt "A History of Islamic Spain" Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1965; W.M. Watt "What is Islam" London: Longmans, Librairie du Liban, 1968; W.M. Watt "Introduction to the Quran" Edinburgh, Edinburg University Press, 1970; W.M. Watt "The Majesty that was Islam" The Islamic World, 661-1100, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1974.

oppose the Westernization of their societies. Watt sees the Islamic Fundamentalism movement which is affecting both predominantly Islamic countries and those where Muslims are in a minority as “a response to the tremendous impact the West has had on Muslims everywhere”⁽⁴⁰⁾. The aspects of this impact were political and economical. From the political point of view, and as a result of colonialism many Muslims found themselves under non-Muslim rule. The economic aspect is that the spread of the products of Western technology in Muslim societies which leads to social changes. In turn people feel unsettled and anxious because the social world they knew has disappeared. This is the situation out of which has come the Islamic Fundamentalism as Watt describes.

However, W.M. Watt asserts on the above aspects of the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence which “is a genuine movement of ordinary people who in their insecurity turn back to the old religion. Because so much in their daily lives has been westernized, they feel in danger of losing their identity as Muslims”⁽⁴¹⁾ and he states in another place: “all Muslims have had to respond in one way or another to the total impact of the West on their civilization”⁽⁴²⁾. And to less emphasis he asserts on the internal problems of the Muslim societies. He says: “some Muslims involved in the resurgence are aware of current social problems in their various countries, but this is not a concern of the resurgence as such”⁽⁴³⁾. In fact, the internal problems or crisis seem to be a major concern of the resurgence if one examines the successive pathological experiences which have buffeted Islamic societies in contemporary times - the legitimacy crisis and ineffective rulership and the dominance of military regimes and dictatorships. Thus, the establishment of a legitimate order is one of the most important demands of the Islamic resurgence, as well as the paucity of social justice, and the failure of Middle East governments to make good on their promises of achieving development and social justice. These are considered to be the motives behind the emergence of the Islamic resurgence⁽⁴⁴⁾.

(40) W.M. Watt *“Islam and the West”* op. cit., p. 5.

(41) Ibid., p. 6.

(42) W.M. Watt *“Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity”* London and New York: Routledge 1988, p. 44.

(43) W.M. Watt. *“Islam and the West”* op. cit., p. 6.

(44) Perhaps the most complete presentation of Islamic resurgence as a “response to crisis” is found in the works of R. Hrair Dekmejian as we have seen earlier.

It is important to mention here that the vast majority of people, the uneducated people if you like, know nothing about the impact of the West and colonialism on Muslim societies, but what they know and recognise is the incompetence and corruption of the elite, and the failure of the system in their societies to do justice and achieve development.

At this point, the terminology with its weighted social emphasis should be examined. The choice of words is between Islamic revival, resurgence or Fundamentalism. They all lead to one meaning. Through his discussion Watt used these three terms. Later on in his book "Muslim - Christian Encounters, 1991" he states "I would prefer to say traditionalism, since Islamic Fundamentalism is not identical with Christian Fundamentalism, which is a mainly Protestant phenomenon"⁽⁴⁵⁾. And as he states elsewhere, he used the term Fundamentalism "because of popular journalistic usage it has been thought convenient to retain the term Fundamentalism in the title of this book although it is inexact"⁽⁴⁶⁾. Whatever term Watt used, there are certainly strong arguments for maintaining that the recent Islamic movements under their various titles are a phenomenon of the return to religion because people in their insecurity turn back to the old religion.

However, Muslim traditionalists (to use Watt's term)⁽⁴⁷⁾ in its current form is offered as a system, an ideology, and a comprehensive world view. It is proposed as a genuine and authentic worldview grounded in the teachings of the Quran and the Sunna traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. They believe in *din wa-dawlah* (religion and state) insisting that religion and government (state) must go hand in hand in order to guarantee the implementation of laws (Sharia) to control society. In a sense Muslim traditionalists' ideology contains seeds of revolution. In other words, traditionalism is unique in the sense that its most militant wings advocate revolution, struggle against all forces that want to impede implementation of God's will on earth. At the heart of the matter lies the attempt to deal with the problems that are facing Muslim societies. Very often one can hear people saying that the problem is that we have not kept

(45) W.M. Watt "Muslim-Christian Encounters" op. cit., p 119.

(46) W.M. Watt "Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity" op. cit., p. 2; - for further reading on Fundamentalism see Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby "Fundamentalism Observed" Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 1991.

(47) W.M. Watt "Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity" op. cit., pp. 88-92.

to Islam, if we go back to Islam we will solve these problems or as Watt put it "many traditionalists were promising that a return to the true Islam of the earliest period would solve all social problems"⁽⁴⁸⁾. From the other side disenchantment with previous ideologies has facilitated the use of slogans and increased their appeal: we tried nationalism and it failed; we tried socialism and it failed; now is the time for Islam. Another famous slogan that appeared after the Iranian revolution *la sharqiyya, la gharbiyya, Islamiyya Islamiyya* (no Eastern, no Western, but Islamic Islamic).

Muslim traditionalists seek to create the Muslim ideal that prevailed during the era of the Prophet Muhammad and the right guided Caliphs. It is agreed that the Islamic state during the era of the Prophet and the guided Caliphs was an ideal one. But for the present time, Montgomery Watt has argued that Islamic history offers no clear model for a truly Islamic state today⁽⁴⁹⁾. In the past he states: "Muslim statesmen have been pragmatists, using whatever political ideals seemed helpful in their particular situation"⁽⁵⁰⁾.

The question whether Islamic history offers a clear model for an Islamic state or not, should be considered. How should Muslim traditionalists solve the problems of the twentieth century in the light of the seventh century? How should Muslim traditionalists make progress, development and improvement without benefitting from other people's experience (Western civilization)? What are they going to do with industry? What are they going to do with the banks if they come to power? What are they going to do with the political system? What are they going to do with the parties?... etc. In other words, how will Islam help the Muslim Societies to fit into the modern world in which we live? All of these points need proper answers from the Muslim Ulama in order to prove Islam of today, and offer a clear model for Islamic state.

Watt has described at length the main themes that dominate Muslim thinking today. He writes about the traditional self image of Islam, the self sufficiency of Islam, the idealization of the Prophet Muhammad and early Islam, the finality of Islam⁽⁵¹⁾. These themes are of immense pride to the

(48) Ibid., p. 61.

(49) Ibid., p. 90.

(50) Ibid., p. 90.

(51) Ibid., pp. 1-23.

Muslims and Muslim traditionalists are promising and insisting on these themes in order to gain and restore identity and to create the Islamic state. However, while Watt is sympathetic with classical Islam as we have seen earlier, he criticizes Muslims today (Fundamentalists - traditionalists), who have failed to take into account the present day reality and adhere strictly to the traditional self image as it was elaborated in medieval times. Watt articulates the need for Muslims to rethink some of the central concepts and features of Islam. He clearly criticized Ulama who show themselves to be still dominated by the belief in the self-sufficiency of Islam. Watt states: "there is also little realization among most of the Ulama of the vast amount of work to be done in the Sharia is to be applied in Modern states..."⁽⁵²⁾. And some of the questions Watt raises concerning the modern times are: what does the Sharia say about human rights... about diplomatic immunities... about the international court of justice... about trade union rights... about the use of nuclear weapons?⁽⁵³⁾ Such questions have no answer in the Quran or in the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad since these matters did not exist before. Other social matters also raised by Watt like the amputation of a thief's hand, the prohibition of interest on loans (riba), the position of women in society. These matters also need to be reconsidered in the light of modern times.

Finally (as far as Islam and the West, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity and Muslim-Christian Encounters concern, which are my basic review), Watt presents a constructive criticism of contemporary Islam which aims at contributing to a truer, more realistic Islamic self-image for today. He draws the attention of Muslims to certain facts such as the danger of insisting on Islamic self-sufficiency which may make it impossible for Muslims to associate themselves with other members of the human race. The need for reformulation of the Sharia (Islamic Law) in order to adapt it to the new social structures of life at the end of the twentieth century. At the end, Watt shows some optimistic signs that while there is a large, mainly silent, body of liberal opinion in Islam, there is some of the Ulama who are beginning to show more liberal tendencies. He ended his discussions with a prayer for the believer in God, Muslim or non-Muslim. It is a reaching out for dialogue, what is

(52) W.M. Watt *"Islam and the West"* op. cit., p. 6.

(53) Ibid., p. 7.

required from Christians and Muslims, he calls for a comity of religions.

Conclusion

Let me start my conclusion from the point where R. Hrair Dekmejian has ended his discussion about Islamic Fundamentalism. He rightly believes that "Given the long-term propensity of crisis conditions, the present resurgence of political Islam is not likely to constitute a temporary phenomenon... Indeed, Islamic militancy shall persist as long as crisis conditions persist..."⁽⁵⁴⁾.

First of all, I would like to speak a little about the recent Islamic experience, "Islamic Fundamentalism". The whole idea of Muslim Fundamentalism is to return to the things that they understand and know and to certain moral values. In religion moral values are an important force, people are looking for moral values, they are against corruption and injustice, and they think that the way out is religion. Or as W.M. Watt puts it "people who in their insecurity turn back to the old religion"⁽⁵⁵⁾. Why? because many other things have failed. Algerian-born Muhammad Arkoun, professor of Islamic thought at the Sorbonne in Paris, notes that "Muslims are a population completely detached from its traditions, its lands, its ethical codes and customs, thrust into shanty towns of large cities and forced to listen to slogans seeking to legitimize the power of a state with no legitimacy"⁽⁵⁶⁾. Privileged elites monopolize opportunities and resources. Governments rule in the name of a tainted nationalism or socialism and are too often corrupt. There are all sorts of very difficult problems.

There is an economic crisis, people are unemployed, there is no work, lots of people are migrating from villages to towns with no work, no housing (one million people live in the cemeteries of Cairo), no water, very little food and so on, and nobody has been able to solve these problems. And so people say that the problem is that we have not kept to Islam, if we go back to Islam we will solve these problems.

(54) R. Hrair Dekmejian *"Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World"* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985, p. 177.

(55) W.M. Watt *"Islam and the West"* op. cit., p. 5.

(56) Quoted by James Walsh *"The Sword of Islam"* The Times International, No. 24, 15 June, 1992, p. 30.

This state of bad conditions is very obvious in Algeria. By 1992, at least 14 million of Algeria's 25 million population were estimated to live below the poverty line. With a 25 billion dollars foreign debt that consumed almost 70 percent of its oil revenues, the government had little left to address mass grievances over chronic housing shortages, unemployment, substandard education and social services and limited development⁽⁵⁷⁾.

Another aspect of misrule, poverty and maldistribution of wealth in many Muslim states, in the mid 1970's the richest 5 percent of households in Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan received over 20 percent of the income, while the poorest 20 percent of the households received about 5 percent of the income. In the same period the percentage of population in absolute poverty was 9 percent in Egypt, 28 percent in Morocco, and 40 percent in Sudan. In less than a decade the percentage of Moroccans in absolute poverty had risen from 28 to 45 percent⁽⁵⁸⁾.

What I would like to stress here is that the great majority of Muslims are not political at all. Their religion consist of daily and seasonal observances, with various degrees of piety and devotion from orthodox prayers and recitations to mystical exercises. Some of those Muslims may be mobilized politically around issues which are supposed to offend against the basic tenets of religion⁽⁵⁹⁾. The Salman Rushdie affair is a case in point. But what is going on in Muslim societies, I mean the state of corruption, suppression, imprisonment and sometimes the state of killing, provide fertile ground for the growth of Fundamentalism.

To resume why has religion or waht so called Fundamentalism become such a visible force in Middle Eastern politics and societies, John Esposito as we have seen earlier, points out three major reasons:

(1) - the continued impotence of Muslim Society, i.e. the failure and

(57) See Robin Wright, *"Islam Democracy and the West"* Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 134.

(58) See R. Hrair Dekmejian *"Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World"* op. cit., p. 30.

(59) See Sami Zubaida *"Hijacked by Khomeini"* the New Internationalist, No. 210, August 1990, p. 8. See also in the same issue, Erica Simmons *"Passion for Justice"* who discovers the social roots of Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 9 and Akbar Ahmed *"The Sufi Soul"* who argues that Islam does not equal violence, p. 10.

ineffectiveness of Muslim governments and nationalist ideologies; (2) - disillusionment with the West; and (3) - the desire to articulate a more authentic identity. Along with this line, R. Hrair Dekmejian sees this phenomenon is resulting from the fact that people are living in a crisis situation in many ways. Or as W.M. Watt sees it as a response to the tremendous impact that the West has had on Muslims everywhere.

From the perspective of many Middle Easterners, the role of the West in the Middle East has traditionally been destructive, self-serving and condescending (Edward Said). It culminated in political actions such as the support of the Shah of Iran by the West against the will of the Iranian people, the creation of the state of Israel, the support of corrupt governments by the West, and disregard for the rights of the Palestinians⁽⁶⁰⁾.

However, if we regard Edward Said's critique of Orientalism, deficiency and bias in the Western scholarship of the past⁽⁶¹⁾, "new forms of Orientalism flourish today in the hands of those who equate revivalism, Fundamentalism, or the Islamist movement solely with violent revolutionaries and who fail to focus on the vast majority of Islamically committed Muslims who belong to the moderate mainstream of society rather than a radicalized minority" Esposito says⁽⁶²⁾. He adds: "compare how much many of us know about Tabligh (Islamic group for transmission) with its millions of members and Takfir (Muslim group for denouncement) with its few hundred members. Compare the number of substantive studies on moderate Islamic organizations during the past ten years with those on radical Islamic movements"⁽⁶³⁾.

In the study of the Islamic movements in the West, attention is focused more on the politically explosive matter "media'marketing approach" like the study of the violent extremists which underestimates the influence and activities of moderate organizations⁽⁶⁴⁾. Along with this

(60) For a polemical but insightful discussion of such issues see Edward Said "The Question of Palestine" New York: Times Books, 1979.

(61) See Edward Said "Orientalism" London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

(62) John Esposito, Presidential Address 1989 "The Study of Islam: Challenge and Prospects" Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Vol., 24, No. 1 July 1990, p. 4.

(63) Ibid., p. 4.

(64) Ibid., p. 9-10.

background, W.M. Watt highlights the role of Western media in the Islamic resurgence which focuses on the "Conservative-minded Ulama and their Fundamentalism" and finds it a newsworthy. By doing this, the media produces a misleading picture⁽⁶⁵⁾. By way of correction, Watt sees the necessity of emphasizing on other intelligent Muslims, liberal-minded Muslims include statesmen and higher civil servants, writers and intellectuals, university professors in many fields and others. Those Muslims retain and practice their Islamic faith without insisting that they have nothing to learn from the Western civilization. And at the same time they realize that through their contacts with Western thought the intelligent Muslim of today has to seek answers to questions which are not asked in the traditional books⁽⁶⁶⁾.

Finally, it is necessary more than ever that Muslims must realize we are in a new stage, and the requirements of contemporary society require a fresh look, or to use an Islamic term, *ijtihad*, which should be equivalent to the twenty first century and not less than that. This is from one side, from the other, the West and especially the United States, or what so-called the new world order, must see the reality of the Muslim people in their countries and push towards a true democracy there. However, the policy of countering or containing Islamist movements by backing or aiding corrupt governments that repress them could bring more Fundamentalists, extremists and terrorists and it may lead to more East-West divide, more problems and more dangers.

(65) See W.M. Watt *"Islam and the West"* op. cit., p. 7.

(66) Ibid., p. 7.

FERTILITY TRANSITION IN LEBANON^(*)

Hala Naufal RIZKALLAH^()**

With a crude birth rate of 27 per 1000 and an average of 2.5 Children per Woman, Lebanon has the lowest fertility rates in the arab Countries. Over the last three decades, fertility in Lebanon has decreased, and this Country is currently engaged in the process of the third stage of the Demographic transition.

After an overview of the sources of data and the demographic situation in the country, this paper will analyse the fertility transition and differentials, as well as the effects of proximate determinants on its level, from the available data on fertility, and the Lebanon Mother and Child Health Survey results.

I - Sources of data and Demographic Situation

I - 1 - Sources of data

The only official census was conducted in 1932 when Lebanon was under the French Mandate. During the period from 1943 to 1975, the main sources of Population and related data were the 1970 national Survey on the Economically Active Population conducted by the Ministry of Planning, based on a stratified two stage cluster sample of dwellings, and the 1971 National Fertility and Family Planning Survey, carried out by the Lebanon Family Planning Association, using the households from the 1970 Survey as a sampling frame.

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Considerable information on Population characteristics and fertility is currently available from the "Housing and Population Data base Project" conducted in 1996 by the Ministry of Social Affairs in collaboration with UNFPA, and the Lebanon Maternal and Child Health Survey (LMCHS) carried out in 1996 by the Ministry of Public Health in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs, within the framework of the Pan Arab Project of Child development (LAS, AGFUND, UNFPA, UNICEF, WHO, UNSTAT and IPPF).

I - 2 - Demographic Situation

Estimated at 2.1 million in 1970⁽¹⁾, the total Population of the country fluctuated widely during the armed conflict between 1975 and 1991, as a result of international migration. According to the Housing and Population Data base Survey results, the resident Population was estimated at 3.100 000 in 1996. The average annual rate of Growth, higher than 2 percent before 1975, is estimated at 0.9 per cent during the period 1975-1996⁽²⁾.

As in all of the countries in the region, the Population was a relatively young one in 1970: 42 per cent were below 15 years, and 5 percent were over 65 years⁽³⁾. These two percentages fell to 32.2 per cent and 6.7 per cent respectively in 1996⁽⁴⁾.

Around 34.4 per 1000 in 1970⁽⁵⁾, the crude birth rate decreased to 27

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- (1) République Libanaise, Ministère du plan, Direction Centrale de la Statistique. L'Enquête par sondage sur la population active au Liban, Novembre 1970. Volume 1: Méthodes, Analyse et présentation des Résultats. Beyrouth, Juillet 1972, p. 59.
 - (2) Estimation of the author based on the estimation of the total population in 1975 (2.6 million: Youssef Courbage and Philippe Fargues in: La Situation démographique au Liban, II: analyse des données. Publications du Centre de Recherches, Université Libanaise, Institut des Sciences Sociales. Beyrouth 1974, p. 92), and the total population estimated at 3.1 million in 1996 by the Housing and Population data base project.
 - (3) Enquête par sondage sur la population active au Liban..., op. cit. p. 62.
 - (4) Republic of Lebanon, Ministry of Social Affairs in collaboration with UNFPA: Housing and Population data base project 1996.
 - (5) Youssef Courbage et Philippe Fargues. La Situation Démographique au Liban; II. Analyse des données. Publications du Centre de Recherches, Université Libanaise, Institut des Sciences Sociales. Beyrouth 1973. p. 28.

in 1996⁽⁶⁾. The total fertility rate, estimated at 4.6 in 1971⁽⁷⁾, between the high rates in many less developed countries and the low rates achieved in the more developed countries, fell to 2.5 during the period 1991-1995 according to the 1996 LMCHS results, classifying Lebanon as having the lowest fertility among the Arab countries.

The mortality level lie between the high rates of less developed arab countries and the low rates of the more developed arab countries. The crude death rate was about 9 per 1000 in 1970⁽⁸⁾ and is estimated at approximately 7 per 1000 in 1996⁽⁹⁾. The Infant mortality rate fell from 65,1 around 1970⁽¹⁰⁾ to 41 during 1981-1985, then to 38.9 during the period 1986-1990, and to 28.0 during the period 1991-1995 according to 1996 LMCHS data. During the last three periods, the under five Mortality rate fell from 43.6 to 40.6, then to 32.0 (1996 LMCHS).

II - Fertility Levels and Trends

II - 1 - Fertility Levels and Trends before 1975

Drawing on the births statistics registered by the Directorate General of Vital Registration, Courbage and Fargues found that fertility declined in Lebanon between 1959 and 1971. They estimate that the Crude birth rate decreased from 40 per 1000 during the 1959-1962 period, to 34.6 per 1000 in 1970-1971. This represents a reduction of 14 percent. This reduction was not attributed to changes in the size of cohorts of women in the peak reproductive years during this period, but to real declines in fertility assured by their estimates of completed family size, which also consistently declined since 1964. The estimated number of Children born per marriage has decreased from 5.7 Children per marriage in the 1958-1963 period, to 4.7 in 1973.

Table (1) summarise the fertility levels and trends from 1959-62 to 1973, by period and Source.

(6) UNFPA, Annual Report of the Regional director (updated figures).

(7) Lebanon Family Planning Association. The Family in Lebanon. Sample Survey, June 1971. Beirut, June 1974.

(8) La Situation Démographique au Liban... (II), op. cit. p. 35.

(9) UNFPA, Annual Report of the Regional director, op. cit.

(10) La Situation démographique au Liban... (II), op. cit. p. 36.

II - 2 - Fertility Levels and Trends from 1996 LMCHS

The 1996 LMCHS results confirms the decline in fertility for recent years.

Fertility trends can be examined from three perspectives:

- Comparing the completed fertility of Women aged 45-49 at the time of the Survey with the level of current fertility as measured by the period total fertility rate.
- Using the birth history data collected to estimate total fertility rates for successive periods before the Survey.
- Examining changes in cohorts rates.

- Mean number of Children ever born per Woman

A measure of the mean cumulative fertility at a given time is given by the mean number of Children ever born per Woman. Table (2) shows that this mean increases rapidly with age for the three groups of Women: all, ever - married and currently married.

Apart from the young ages, the difference between ever - married Women and all Women may be explained by the number of Women who do not marry young, which is important. But there is no difference between currently married Women and all ever - married Women, which means that dissolved marriages (divorce or widowed) do not seem to have any effect on reducing fertility.

The most important characteristic is the high level of completed fertility at age 45 to 49: 4.4 for all Women and 5 for currently married Women. If this fertility characterizes cohorts of Women no longer in Childbearing age, the 1996 LMCHS allows us to measure current fertility for the different cohorts of Childbearing age. By cumulating the age - specific fertility rates for The Three - years preceding the Survey, we obtain a "current" index, the total fertility rate, which is comparable with the mean number of Children per Woman. It is much lower than the completed fertility: 2.4 instead of 4.4 at age 45 to 49 years old. The difference reflects the decline in fertility over the last few decades.

– Changes in period rates

Long - term trends in fertility can be explored for up to 20 years preceding the 1996 LMCHS by using the birth history information to estimate total fertility rates for successive periods before the survey. Table (3) shows fertility rates for four five - year periods before the Survey. The fertility rates are cumulated only up to age 39 because of the progressive truncation of data for older Women.

Table (3) shows that fertility rates for Women age 15-39 fell by 1.8 births during the 20 year period preceding the survey. The pace of the decline has accelerated over time. As a result, fertility changes are heavily concentrated in the most recent periods.

– Changes in Cohorts Rates

Changes in fertility rates over time are examined in table (4) for cohorts of Women born during the period 1946-1980. Unlike period fertility rates, which measure the level of Childbearing at a given time period for all age groups in a population, Cohorts fertility measures allow an examination of changes over time in the fertility behavior of a given birth Cohort.

For each successive Cohort, fertility is generally lower at any given age (figure 1). The Substantial reduction in fertility at ages 15-19 and ages 20-24 observed for the youngest Cohorts (born between 1961-1965 and 1976-1980) is a result of an increasing trend toward later marriage which delayed the start of Childbearing and hence, reduced fertility levels for these Women.

Figure 1 also shows steady decrease in the fertility in the late twenties and early thirties for all Cohorts. This suggests that successive Cohorts are practicing fertility control earlier. The changes are particularly notable for the Cohorts 1951-1956, 1961-1965 and 1966-1970. The Women in this Cohorts would have reached their peak Childbearing ages in the 1970s, 1980s and the 1990s when rates of family planning use were increasing rapidly in Lebanon.

III - Fertility Differentials

Table (5) shows the total fertility rate for the three years preceding

the survey and the mean number of Children ever born to Women age 45-49 by Mohafazah and educational level.

Differentials in current fertility by Mohafazah are significant. The highest level of fertility recorded was in the North (3.4 births per Woman) followed by the South (2.7), Nabatieh (2.6), the Bekaa (2.5), Mount Lebanon (2) and Beirut.

Differentials by Mohafazah are evident in the mean number of Children ever born (cumulative fertility) Comparison of the two fertility measures provides an indication of the direction of the fertility change in the past 25-30 years. The largest decline in fertility is observed in the Bekaa and the South where the total fertility rate is 3 births lower than the mean number of Children ever born to Women 40-49, followed by Nabatieh where it is 2.2 births lower.

Differentials by educational level are marked. Table (5) shows a uniformly inverse relationship between current levels of fertility and Women's educational level. The TFR for Women with no education is more than 1.9 births higher than the rate for Women who have completed secondary or higher (3.6 births and 1.7 births per Women respectively). The differentials in completed fertility among educational groups are even more striking; the mean number of Children ever born is 6.9 among Women with no education compared with 2.9 among Women who have completed secondary school or higher. The decline in fertility by comparison of the TFR with the mean number of Children ever born has been greater among illiterate Women than among those who have completed intermediate and secondary or higher.

Recent changes in fertility differentials can be also examined by looking at the trends in age-specific and total fertility rates between the two periods (0-3) and (10-14) years prior to the 1996 LMCHS.

Table (6) shows that the total fertility rate fell in all Mohafazahs during the 15 - year period. The decline is particularly notable in the Bekaa (from 4.85 to 2.5 births), and the North (from 5.4 to 3.3 births), followed by the South (from 4.51 to 2.74).

Comparing the two periods, fertility is also generally lower at any age. The decline is particularly noted for the youngest and oldest age groups. In all Mohafazahs except Beirut, the age-specific fertility rates peak in the

25-29 age group, an indicator of the effect of the rising age at marriage. Concerning Beirut, the changing of the peak from 20-24 to 30-34 age group indicates that the mean age at first marriage is higher than in the other Mohafazahs.

Concerning changes in fertility by educational level, Table (6) shows that the total fertility rate fell in all educational levels during the 15 - year period. The decline is particularly notable for the illiterate Women (from 5.74 to 3.55 births) and those who have completed primary (from 3.86 to 2.66 births), followed by those who can read & write (from 4.2 to 3.13 births) and the other levels.

Examining changes by age between the two periods, fertility is generally lower at any age group. The drop is particularly important in the high - risk age groups and oldest age group for illiterate Women and those who completed secondary or higher. Decline is also notable for the youngest and oldest age groups among those who have completed primary and intermediate levels.

For illiterate Women and those who can read and write and those who have completed secondary or higher, the age-specific fertility rates peak in the 25-29 age group. Concerning Women who have completed primary and intermediate levels, the changing of the peak from 20-24 to 25-29 is an indicator of a rise in the age at marriage.

IV - Impact of proximate determinants on fertility

This part discussed the nuptiality and contraceptive use pattern and attempts to quantify the relative influence of marriage and contraceptive use on fertility level by using the Bongaarts model.

1 - Nuptiality

In Lebanon, marriage and fertility are interrelated, and marriage is considered as a crucial proximate determinant of fertility, because it affects fertility through its impact on the duration of Women's exposure to the risk of pregnancy. Empirical research has shown that early age at marriage is associated with early Childbearing and high fertility. Consequently delayed marriage reduces the number of years of exposure to risk of pregnancy which, other things remaining constant, may reduce

fertility⁽¹¹⁾⁽¹²⁾. A recent study on the role of nuptiality in fertility decline has shown that changes in age at marriage have reduced average family size in four Arab Countries of North Africa⁽¹³⁾.

Nuptiality is considered moderate in Lebanon with 11 percent of female unmarried at age 50 years and 5 percent of male, in 1996⁽¹⁴⁾. These two percentages were 7 and 6 respectively in 1970⁽¹⁵⁾. However, comparison of the 1970 Economically Active Population Survey and the 1987 displaced Population Survey and 1996 LMCHS results indicates that the average age at which Women first marry has increased substantially since the 1970s. The trend toward delayed marriage is evident in the increase that have occurred in the mean age at first marriage which increases from 23.3 in 1970 to 27.5 in 1996. Table (7) shows also substantial increase over time in the percentage of unmarried Women at (20-24) age group.

This important transformation in the tempo of female nuptiality may be illustrated by an examination of trends in the median age at first marriage, i.e the age by which 50 percent of the Women of any given cohorts had entered into a first marriage. Figure (2) shows that this age has increased from 19.9 among the generations of Women currently aged 45-49, to 23.5 among those currently aged 25-29.

2 - Contraception

In addition to the increasing age at first marriage, significant changes in contraceptive behavior have contributed to fertility declines. Table (8) shows that 61 percent of currently married Women were using any contraceptive method at the time of the LMCHS, with 37.2 depending on modern methods and 23.8 using traditional method. The IUD is the most widely used modern method (17.1 percent) followed by pills (10.0 percent).

(11) Adlakha A., Ayad, M. and Kumar, S. The Role of nuptiality in Fertility decline: A Comparative Analysis. DHS world Conference, Washington, D.C., 5-6 August, 1991.

(12) Njogu W., and Martin, T.C. Fertility decline in Kenya: the role of timing and spacing of births. DHS World Conference, Washington, D.C., 5-7 August 1991.

(13) Adlakha A., Ayad, M. and Kumar, S. op. cit.

(14) 1996 LMCHS results

(15) Enquête par sondage sur la population active au Liban... op. cit. p. 66.

3 - Bongaarts model

Bongaarts (1978, 1980, and 1983) presents evidence that most of the variation in fertility is attributable to just 4 of 11 proximate determinants, namely marriage, contraception, abortion and postpartum infecundability. According to the model, each component is expressed as an index, and the total fertility rate (TFR) can be written as follows:

$$TFR = C_m \times C_c \times C_a \times C_i \times TF$$

Where C_m is the index of marriage, C_c the index of contraception, C_a the index of abortion, C_i the index of postpartum infecundability and TF the total fecundity rate, which represents the potential fertility level in the absence of fertility - inhibiting effects.

Table (9) presents the indexes of the three major proximate determinants (marriage, contraception and post-partum infecundability) calculated from 1996 LMCHS data. The abortion is not considered due to lack of information.

The results suggest that the largest inhibiting index is C_m , the index of marriage which reduced potential fertility by 61 percent ($1 - 0.39$), followed by C_c , the index of contraception with 54 percent ($1 - 0.46$) and C_i , the index of postpartum infecundability with 16 percent ($1 - 0.84$).

Conclusion

The results presented in this paper clearly suggest that Lebanon is currently engaged in an accelerated fertility transition. The 1996 LMCHS reveal also that fertility differentials by Mohafazah and educationa level are important. The application of the Bongaarts model indicates that the age at which women marry has become an increasingly important determinant of the fertility level in Lebanon, while the contraception continues to be a major determinant of fertility.

However a considerable effort is required to analyse all the informations on population dynamics available from the national surveys conducted recently, namely the 1996 Housing and Population data base project and the 1996 Lebanon Maternal and Child Health Survey, and in research with respect to the Social and economic changes, in particular the changes in the status of Women and the structure of the Lebanon family.

Table (1) *Estimated Fertility Indexes by Source and Period/Year*

Period/Year	1959 - 1962	1970 - 1971		1973
Source Index	Courbage and Fargues (1)	Courbage and Fargues (1)	KAP Survey (2)	Courbage and Fargues (1)
Crude birth Rate	40	34.6		
Number of Children born per marriage	5.7			4.7
Total Fertility Rate			4.6	

- (1) Courbage (Y) et Fargues (P). La situation démographique au Liban. Publication du centre de recherches, Université Libanaise, Institut des Sciences Sociales, Beyrouth, 1974.
- (2) Lebanon Family Planning Association. The Family in Lebanon. Sample Survey, June 1971. Beirut, June 1974.

Table (2) *Mean number of Children ever born per Woman, by age group, for different groups of Women (1996)*

Age Group	All Women		Ever married		Currently married	
	Mean Number	Number of Women	Mean Number	Number of Women	Mean Number	Number of Women
15 - 19	0.035	1147	0.81	49	0.81	49
20 - 24	0.46	1062	1.52	320	1.53	311
25 - 29	1.36	929	2.34	539	2.37	522
30 - 34	2.17	909	3.18	621	3.20	598
35 - 39	3.18	769	4.02	608	4.09	578
40 - 44	3.70	589	4.43	491	4.49	449
45 - 49	4.40	422	4.98	372	5.09	329
Total	1.7	5827	3.4	3000	3.4	2836

Source: Based on The LMCHS, 1996

Table (3) Fertility rates (per 1000 Women) during the 20 - year period preceding the Survey - 1996 LMCHS

Age group	Periods			
	0 - 4	5 - 9	10 - 14	15 - 19
15 -19	30	47	62	73
20 - 24	123	150	179	210
25 - 29	147	175	199	235
30 - 34	112	126	156	175
35 - 39	67	86	89	154
40 - 44	22	25	67	–
45 - 49	5	8	–	–
TFR 15-39	2.4	2.9	3.4	4.2

Source: Based on The LMCHS, 1996

Table (4) Fertility rates (per 1000 Women) by cohort and age at Child birth 1946-1980

Age at Child birth	Cohorts						
	1976 - 1980	1971 - 1975	1966 - 1970	1961 - 1965	1956 - 1960	1951 - 1955	1946 - 1950
15 - 19	7	18.2	31	36	38	44.2	49.2
20 - 24		69	114	125.6	165.6	162.2	185.2
25 - 29			115.4	149.8	183.2	210.2	235.2
30 - 34				103.2	140	153	186.6
35 - 39					67.8	88	104.4
40 - 44						27	34.4
45 - 49							–

Source: Based on The LMCHS, 1996

Table (5) Total Fertility rate for the three years preceding the survey and the mean number of Children ever born to Women age 45-49 by Mohafazah and Education

Mohafazah and Education	Total Fertility Rate	Mean number of Children ever born to Women age 45-49
Mohafazah		
Beirut	1.7	3.0
Mount Lebanon	2.0	4.0
North	3.4	5.0
Bekaa	2.5	5.6
South	2.7	5.7
Nabatieh	2.6	4.8
Education		
Illiterate	3.6	6.5
Read & Write	3.1	4.2
Primary	2.7	4.3
Intermediate	2.5	3.2
Secondary	1.7	2.5

Source: Based on The LMCHS, 1996

Table (6) Age - specific and Total fertility rates for two periods preceding the Survey by Mohafazah, 1996 LMCHS

Mohafazah	Period Preceding the Survey	Age group						TFR
		15 - 19	20 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 34	35 - 39	40 - 44	
Beirut	0 - 3	17	81	101	108	38	4	1.74
	10 - 14	34	117	115	103	42	34	2.22
Mount Lebanon	0 - 3	30	95	122	90	55	9	2.01
	10 - 14	48	146	174	129	77	50	3.12
North	0 - 3	28	148	191	146	109	41	3.31
	10 - 14	100	260	268	216	127	115	5.4
Bekaa	0 - 3	30	127	148	94	59	41	2.5
	10 - 14	63	193	279	188	135	113	4.85
South	0 - 3	28	169	161	89	83	18	2.74
	10 - 14	59	222	227	169	66	159	4.51
Nabatieh	0 - 3	41	131	133	153	60	0	2.59
	10 - 14	78	191	199	152	171	0	3.95

Source: Based on The LMCHS, 1996

Table (7) Age - specific and Total fertility rates for two periods preceding the Survey by Educational level, 1996 LMCHS

Education	Period Preceding the Survey	Age group						TFR
		15 - 19	20 - 24	25 - 29	30 - 34	35 - 39	40 - 44	
Illiterate	0-3	72	172	175	143	121	28	3.55
	10-14	114	270	285	239	137	103	5.74
Read & Write	0-3	61	166	209	111	47	32	3.13
	10-14	116	209	227	171	97	20	4.20
Primary	0-3	34	152	164	107	59	15	2.66
	10-14	106	223	183	133	63	65	3.86
Intermediate	0-3	25	151	139	101	41	23	2.41
	10-14	62	176	172	121	46	43	3.1
Secondary	0-3	8	62	109	97	58	6	1.7
	10-14	7	92	165	103	63	31	2.3

Source: Based on The LMCHS, 1996

Table (8) Trends in Female Nuptiality in Lebanon, 1970, 1987, 1996

Year	Mean age at First marriage	Percentage unmarried at age 20 to 24
1970 ⁽¹⁾	23.3	50.9
1987 ⁽²⁾	25.7	58.0
1996 ⁽³⁾	27.5	69.5

(1) Direction Centrale de la Statistique. L'Enquête par Sondage sur la Population Active au Liban. Novembre 1970. Volume 1: Méthodes, Analyse et Présentation des résultats. Beyrouth, Juillet 1972, pp. 65 et 66.

(2) Université Saint Joseph - Université Laval. La Population déplacée par la guerre au Liban (1975-1987), Vol. I, Juin 1991, p. 134.

(3) LMCHS, 1996.

Table (9) Percent distribution of Currently Married Women (15-19) by method of Contraception currently used

Contraception Method	Percentage
Using any modern method	37.2
- pill	10.0
- IUD	17.1
- Injection	0.1
- Vaginal method/Cream	0.2
- Male condom	5.6
- Female sterilisation	4.2
Using any Traditional method	23.8
- Safe period	9.9
- Withdrawal	11.8
- Breastfeeding	1.8
- Other	0.3
Not currently using	39.0
Total	100.0

Source: LMCHS, 1996


Table (10) Indexes of the proximate determinants of fertility according to Bongaarts model, 1996 LMCHS

Index	value
Index of marriage C_m	0.38
Index of contraception C_c	0.46
Index of Post Partum Infecundability $C_i^{(*)}$	0.84

(*) The mean duration of breastfeeding (births 24 months preceding the Survey) is 9.1.


Note: C_a assumed to be equal to one.

Figure (1) Age Specific Fertility Rates by Cohort



Source: Based on the LMCHS, 1996

Figure (2) Median age at first marriage by cohort



Source: Based on the LMCHS, 1996

AMOUR INCONDITIONNEL ET RELATIONS INTERSUBJECTIVES

Aïda GEBRAEL(*)

Toute union d'amour non basée sur l'inconditionnalité, serait déçue dans son sens et sa dimension spirituels.

Etant cette expression classique d'amour que Dieu voue à ses créatures, l'amour inconditionnel correspond à l'une des plus profondes aspirations humaines.

Cet amour, est-il toutefois concevable et pratique dans le cadre de l'intersubjectivité? Si oui, comment fonctionne-t-il?

Précisons que l'amour mérité naît dans le cadre d'une «relation spéciale»⁽¹⁾ basée sur la peur et la mystification. Dans ce sens, il laisse toujours des doutes, car il y a constamment une peur que l'amour n'aille disparaître. Là, on est aimé pour notre «faire» et non pour notre «être», ce qui prouve en dernière analyse qu'on n'est pas vraiment aimé, mais plutôt utilisé, et à la limite exploité et abusé.

Par ailleurs, l'amour inconditionnel se donne librement, c'est un cadeau. Il implique le choix de se réjouir de la présence de l'autre, plutôt que de se satisfaire à travers l'instrumentalité de l'autre. Ce choix est à la base du dialogue et de la communion où chacun se respecte et se considère dans sa propre totalité comme une valeur à part entière, tout en sachant néanmoins que nous avons tous des blessures dans notre tréfonds, à soigner et à guérir.

Dans une relation spéciale, c'est l'ego qui guide notre réflexion à

(*) Institut des Sciences Sociales II, Université Libanaise.

(1) MARIANNE WILLIAMSON, «A Return to love», «Reflexions on the Principles of a Course in Miracles», Harper Collins Publishers, 1992.

travers une corrélation de masques; tandis que dans une relation d'amour, on se rencontre cœur à cœur.

Il faut absolument que l'amour ne devienne pas quelque chose qu'on «trouve», et qu'on «fait», car dans ce cas, il cesse d'être une faculté pour devenir un objet. D'où l'hypocrisie et le manque de sincérité, c'est qu'en l'occurrence, tout le poids est placé autour des moyens en vue d'attirer et de séduire l'objet de l'amour.

L'amour inconditionnel est vrai, il se traduit par le fait d'«être»⁽²⁾. Il est un attribut de l'être humain qui est fondamentalement un être spirituel. Il est cette communion qui est et doit être une chose transcendante.

Le rêve d'amour paraît être un «rêve impossible» tout simplement parce qu'on essaie de réaliser dans l'«extérieur» ce qui peut être trouvé seulement en notre for intérieur.

C'est pourquoi MEISTER ECKHART, le mystique médiéval dominicain allemand, voit que le but transcendant de la vie, c'est de laisser Dieu être Dieu en nous.

L'amour inconditionnel, serait-il possible dans les relations intersubjectives?

En vue de répondre à la question soulevée, nous sommes amenés à soulever d'autres questions plus franches encore, plus honnêtes, et probablement angoissantes et pénibles, surtout parce que la famille⁽³⁾ a toujours été la pierre angulaire de l'édifice de notre culture, et qu'il y a toute raison à examiner attentivement le changement des prototypes dans toutes les formes des relations interhumaines et entre autres le mariage.

- 1 - La relation d'amour, serait-elle vouée au succès ou à l'échec? Serait-il que les personnes sont responsables de la réussite ou de l'échec à vouloir se donner complètement l'un à l'autre?
- 2 - Par ailleurs, suffit-il que dans la relation d'amour, les deux personnes s'entendent, ou bien il y a plus que cela?

(2) MAURICE NEDONCELLE, «La Réciprocité des Consciences», essai sur la nature de la personne, Thèse, Paris, Aubier, 1942, 3^{ème} édition, 1962.

(3) JOHN BRADSHAW, «The Family», Bantam Books, 1989.

- 3 - Certainement, il y a d'autres questions concernant les deux partenaires⁽⁴⁾: Qui sont-ils? Quelle est la nature du lien qui les unit? Et puis il y a l'inévitable fait de la séparation et du divorce.
- 4 - Qu'est-ce qui provoque la cassure et le divorce?
- 5 - Les gens mariés devraient-ils rester ensemble jusqu'à ce que la mort les sépare? Actuellement, le pourcentage des divorces ne traduit pas réellement toute la vérité sur l'histoire des cassures dans l'institution du mariage, car des millions en demeurent intacts légalement, alors que spirituellement et en amour, ils sont totalement déchirés.
- 6 - Le divorce, serait-il immoral? N'est-il pas plus immoral de continuer au sein d'une relation spirituellement déchue?
- 7 - L'amour inconditionnel est-il pratique?
- 8 - Comment fonctionne-t-il?

Qu'est-ce que l'amour inconditionnel? essai de définition

Dans cette expression classique d'amour que Dieu voue à ses créatures, nous allons vous aider à comprendre la réalité de cet amour.

L'amour inconditionnel correspond à l'une des plus profondes aspirations de toute créature humaine. Toutefois, être aimé pour un mérite quelconque, laisse des doutes toujours. Peut-être m'est-il difficile de plaire à une personne de qui je désire l'amour, peut-être ceci, ou peut-être cela...

Il y a constamment une peur que l'amour ne disparaisse. Encore, l'amour mérité laisse-t-il un sentiment d'amertume résultant du fait qu'on n'est pas aimé pour notre propre personne, mais seulement pour ce que l'on fait de plaisant, de brillant, et de méritoire⁽⁵⁾, ce qui en dernière analyse prouve qu'on n'est pas vraiment aimé, mais plutôt utilisé et à la limite abusé. C'est pourquoi une personne ne doit pas exister comme une réflexion de l'amour d'une autre personne; elle ne doit pas jouer un rôle qui soit le prix d'admission pour être aimé.

Dans ce sens, R.M. RILKE définit l'amour comme étant deux

(4) MAURICE NEDONCELLE, «De la Fidélité», Paris, Aubier, Ed. Montaigne, 1953.

(5) JOHN BRADSHAW, «Homecoming», Reclaiming and championing your inner Child, BANTAM Books, 1992.

solitudes qui se protègent, se touchent et s'entraident l'une l'autre.

L'amour se donne librement, c'est-à-dire deux identités: G.K. GIBRAN dans «Le prophète» considère l'amour non comme deux îles construites sur une et unique terre ferme; pour lui, une relation d'amour devrait plutôt être comme deux îles qui demeurent séparées et distinctes, mais dont les plages sont baignées et partagées par les eaux de l'amour.

Il est possible qu'une personne abdique son identité pour l'amour de quelqu'un: cela s'expliquerait, ou bien par un manque de respect de soi, ou bien par besoin d'affirmation; seulement personne ne le fera au nom de l'amour vrai.

Une personne qui ne s'aime pas au départ, et qui ne considère pas sa propre personne comme une valeur à part entière, ne réussit qu'à utiliser les autres, sans pouvoir les aimer vraiment⁽⁶⁾.

La relation spéciale: source de peur et de mystification

Dans une relation spéciale, c'est l'ego qui guide notre réflexion, et l'on se rencontre dans la peur, c'est une relation de masque à masque. Tandis que dans une relation d'amour, on se rencontre cœur à cœur.

Une relation spéciale est basée sur des différences où chacun pense que l'autre possède ce que lui ne possède pas. Les deux personnes sont ensemble chacun pour se compléter et voler l'autre. Les deux restent ensemble jusqu'à ce qu'il ne reste plus rien à voler, puis elles s'en vont pour continuer à errer dans un monde d'étrangers dans un même lit peut-être, mais tout un monde les sépare, vivant sous un même toit avec leurs corps, mais ce toit ne protège aucun des partenaires.

Alors qu'une relation d'amour prend naissance à partir de différentes prémisses: chacun se considère total dans son identité. Acceptant sa propre totalité, chacun n'a qu'à l'offrir en se joignant à l'autre personne totale dans sa totalité et son identité foncière.

L'objectif d'une relation spéciale nous apprend à nous mépriser alors que celui d'une relation d'amour nous guérit du mépris de notre personne.

(6) M. NE DONCELLE, «Vers une Philosophie de l'Amour et de la Personne», Paris, Aubier, 1957.

Dans une relation spéciale, on est sans cesse sur nos gardes préoccupés à dissimuler nos faiblesses; tandis que dans une relation d'amour c'est entendu que nous avons tous, des blessures à soigner et à guérir, c'est cela le but de notre présence avec une autre personne. Loin d'essayer de cacher nos faiblesses, on est plutôt invité à comprendre qu'une telle relation fait le contexte au sein duquel toute sorte de guérison psychique est possible grâce à la tolérance et l'acceptation mutuelles.

ADAM ET EVE étaient tout nous au paradis, mais nullement embarrassés, cela ne signifie pas qu'ils aient été physiquement nus, mais nus émotionnellement, c'est-à-dire totalement réels et honnêtes: ils se sentaient totalement acceptés pour ce qu'il sont dans leur identité foncière⁽⁷⁾.

L'essence de la relation spéciale ne saurait être l'amour, mais l'exploitation: Un partenaire ne doit pas nous intéresser pour ce qu'il peut faire pour nous. Il nous intéresse et c'est tout.

L'aspiration inquiète pour l'union

Qu'est-ce qu'une union d'amour? Et pourquoi le mariage? Quand deux personnes s'aiment mutuellement et décident qu'elles peuvent à jamais s'entendre l'une avec l'autre, elles se marient. «Gai, gai, marions-nous!» Ce qui a toujours été commun à tous les gens et à travers tous les temps, c'est cette aspiration inquiète pour l'union et la totalité. Peut-être cela est-il au-delà de toute explication, mais c'est cette aspiration comme imminence fondamentale qui pousse l'homme et la femme également à rechercher la compagnie et l'amour.

D'aucuns voient que la principale motivation serait la procréation par l'union des deux sexes. Certainement, le besoin de la compagnie et de la parenté est primordial chez l'espèce humaine. Seulement, il y a une motivation beaucoup plus profonde et une implication de plus large envergure encore.

Dans le tréfonds de chacun, il y a cette vision d'amour et de totalité,

(7) M. NE DONCELLE, «Intersubjectivité et Ontologie», «le défi personnaliste», Louvain, Paris, Nauwelaerts, 1974.

un sens intuitif de notre unité singulière avec Dieu et l'autre. Cette vision est accompagnée de cette aspiration à un genre d'unité ou d'union avec une personne spécifique qui nous apporterait la totalité dans notre vie.

Il s'avère donc indubitable que cette aspiration vers cet état idéal ne nous permet aucunement d'accepter une relation de moindre qualité, ou d'être satisfait avec un «arrangement» qui soit un mariage légal aux yeux de la société et de l'église quoiqu'il soit spirituellement stérile.

Les bases du vrai amour⁽⁸⁾

L'un des problèmes les plus fondamentaux dans le cadre des relations d'amour, avec la consécutive incidence du divorce dans le mariage, revient à ce que les personnes en question ont été décidément amenées à entrer dans la relation pour maintes raisons autre que le vrai amour.

L'étonnant, c'est que les pressions sont tellement immenses que la personne n'est pas même consciente de l'absence du vrai amour.

La plupart des mariages sont conclus pour une convenance, pour une nécessité économique, pour des intérêts communs, pour une satisfaction sexuelle, et même sous l'influence d'autres pressions relevant de la société: «A ton âge tu devrais être marié(e) déjà!», «Aurais-tu un problème?», etc...

Les gens seuls et esseulés cherchent à tout prix quelqu'un à se marier avec plutôt que de chercher l'attraction d'un vrai compagnon. Ça relève du miracle que de voir le nombre actuel des mariages survivre sous de pareilles circonstances.

L'amour est relativement un phénomène rare dans notre société de consommation et commercialisée; bien qu'il y ait maintes relations et émotions appelées «amour». L'amour est un mot quasi totalement abusé et perverti, dans ce sens où il est souvent utilisé comme une respiration pour le manque de sincérité et pour l'hypocrisie. Nous sommes conditionnés pour une orientation extérieure de la vie et ainsi l'amour est devenu quelque chose qu'on «trouve» et puis après, quelque chose qu'on «fait» (On dit: «Faire l'amour»). L'amour dans ce sens devient un

(8) JOHN BRADSHAW, «Creating Love», «The Next Great Stage of Growth», Bantam Books, 1992.

objet au lieu d'être une faculté.

Tout le poids est placé autour des moyens en vue d'attirer et de séduire l'objet de l'amour.

Dans notre culture, la majorité comprend qu'être aimable revient à être populaire, doté de ce qu'on appelle le «sex appeal». Il est rare que des mariages conclus de la sorte, réussissent. Il y a peut-

tre une attirance de corps, mais pas un sens inné d'union.

Qu'est-ce qui en reste, sauf la résignation à s'établir dans un «arrangement». Au sein de cet «arrangement», le couple passe par des motions, jouant le rôle d'amoureux et d'amis. S'il n'y a pas un sentiment d'unité en chacun et entre les deux partenaires, si peu d'amour transcendantal sera libéré dans ce cadre; même s'il y a un accord mutuel et non formel concernant l'importance de dire des mots aimables et de faire des gestes d'amour. Cela serait une constante tentative pour aimer, or l'amour n'est pas un essai; l'amour c'est «être».

«Essayer» d'aimer revient à être totalement démuné du genre d'amour qui soit impératif pour toute relation saine.

L'amour est un attribut divin de l'être humain qui est fondamentalement un être spirituel. Parler d'amour et laisser Dieu dehors, c'est comme vous voulez faire du foin pendant que le soleil brille, et omettre quand même le soleil.

L'amour n'est pas une émotion, il n'est pas sensuel, l'amour n'est pas nécessairement «faire l'amour» quoiqu'il puisse et doive utiliser tous ces domaines d'expériences comme une conduite à travers laquelle il émane naturellement dans le processus de la communion. Seulement, cette communion est et doit être une chose transcendante.

Afin de comprendre l'union de deux personnes, on a besoin de comprendre que chacun d'entre nous possède une immuable et éternelle union spirituelle avec le Dieu créateur. Cet état de fait n'est pas à être mérité ou créé, c'est une réalité du vrai et authentique être de chacun.

Cette aspiration à l'amour et la communion avec une autre personne est originellement cette aspiration à savoir et être la personne unique et totale que nous sommes essentiellement, C'est pourquoi M. ECKHART,

le mystique dominicain allemand, voit que le but transcendant de la vie c'est de laisser Dieu être Dieu en nous.

Le rêve d'amour paraît être un rêve impossible simplement parce qu'on essaie de réaliser dans l'extérieur ce qui peut être trouvé seulement en notre for intérieur.

On a l'impression qu'on puisse «tomber amoureux (dans l'amour)» d'une autre personne, mais à vrai dire, nous sommes «dans l'amour» avec tout le monde parce que tous les gens sont créés dans et de l'amour.

On ferait mieux de décrire le fait de tomber dans l'amour comme étant une chute du contexte de l'amour, c'est-à-dire tomber d'un amour centré intérieurement (être dans l'amour), vers un centre externe d'expériences indulgeant les émotions et les sentiments sexuels. Il n'y a pas de plus facile que deux personnes solitaires «tombent dans l'amour» assumant qu'elles sont faites l'une pour l'autre.

L'union spirituelle reflète le vrai amour⁽⁹⁾, un amour sans ego, c'est-à-dire sans une seule motivation de la satisfaction du moi ou le désir des sens, sachant que cela pourrait et devrait venir par la suite, mais venant en premier lieu, la relation ne serait plus qu'un «arrangement» sans profondeur, ni intensité. Quand deux personnes «tombent dans l'amour», un engagement de sens s'ensuit dans un «voyage d'ego»: à ce point là, l'amour n'est pas seulement aveugle, mais égoïste. Les partenaires sont fragiles et susceptibles à la moindre blessure, car ils vivent dans l'insécurité vis-à-vis de cette conscience d'amour inné.

Comment savoir si la relation est ou peut être apte à parvenir à ce niveau d'union spirituelle?

Tout dépend de l'abdication volontaire des impératifs de l'ego n'acceptant qu'une seule loi, celle de l'inviolabilité de l'intégrité de la personne: utiliser une créature humaine, revient à la chosifier et à violer ses droits.

Dans tout réjouissement ou satisfaction, il y a un choix à faire: Ou bien se réjouir de la présence de l'autre; ou bien se satisfaire à travers l'instrumentalité de l'autre. Le premier choix fait la joie de l'amour; le deuxième choix fait la satisfaction des plaisirs charnels. Le premier choix

(9) JOHN POWELL, S.J., «Unconditional Love», Tabor Publishing, 1978.

est la base du dialogue et de la communion⁽¹⁰⁾; le deuxième est totalement inadéquat pour constituer le fondement de n'importe quelle relations solide.

Quand deux personnes se satisfont l'une avec l'autre, les impératifs et les besoins de leur ego, elles ne se rencontrent pas en tant que personnes: leur réalité est perdue.

Elles se rencontrent plutôt comme des ombres ou des fantômes, et ainsi leur plaisir serait une ombre de plaisir qui ne pourrait prétendre ou même commencer à satisfaire l'âme humaine dans ses aspirations.

«Que l'homme ne sépare pas ce que Dieu unit ensemble». (I9: 4-6), cela semble suffisamment clair et sans équivoque, semble prohiber le divorce.

C'est que l'union divine est une loi et non un caprice, autant dire de la force de gravité qui nous retient absolument attachés à la terre.

Un prêtre ne saurait unir par la parole: «Je vous déclare époux et épouse», s'il n'y a pas au fond cette conscience d'une union intrinsèque. Cette union, c'est Dieu, c'est une loi que personne ne peut casser.

L'union spirituelle n'est pas un béquêt, c'est une conquête de soi et de tout idéal centré autour de l'ego, allant de l'indulgence des désirs charnels jusqu'aux désirs de possession: les mots «je t'aime» signifient souvent «je m'aime et je te veux pour moi», c'est essentiellement ce que la conscience de «tomber dans l'amour» signifie.

Il est dit que toute relation doit commencer par le divorce, celui de l'ego. L'amour n'est pas une commodité qu'on puisse acheter, vendre, échanger, ou voler. Quand un amant ou un époux est «volé» au nom de l'amour, cette personne est déjà prête à l'être, car elle est déjà prédisposée pour une nouvelle relation.

Le «voleur d'amour» n'a pris que ce qui attendait à être pris, et qui voulait être pris. La tierce personne a servi tout simplement de prétexte pour dissoudre la relation qui n'était qu'une façade d'un mensonge vide.

Des fois la séparation semble nécessaire pour que la maturité puisse

(10) M. NEDONCELLE, «Le Chrétien appartient à Deux Mondes», Paris, Ed. du Centurion, 1970.

avoir lieu, mais du moment où la tradition religieuse ne tolère pas cette possibilité, les couples continuent à se détruire psychologiquement et spirituellement, et même physiquement, ils vivent dans l'arrangement et se disent tant bien que mal «jusqu'à ce que la mort nous sépare!»

Quand la cassure psychologique et spirituelle est consommée dans le divorce, l'on se demande: «Qu'est-il donc arrivé?»

Tout précisément et réellement, c'est la vie qui est arrivée!

Aurions-nous besoin toujours de penser le divorce et la séparation comme nécessairement négatifs, ou immoraux? Ne serait-il pas moins moral et certainement plus destructif pour des gens qui n'étaient pas prêts l'un pour l'autre de rester ensemble et vivre un mensonge décevant?

L'idéal objectif de vie

Dans une relation d'amour authentique. L'important critère serait de savoir dans quelle mesure pourrait-on s'élever en amour au-delà de l'attraction des corps, vers un sens transcendant d'union spirituelle?

Quand deux personnes s'engagent réellement à travers un processus de mutualité réciproque, il y a en cela une maturité progressive à la fois individuellement et dans le plus profond de la relation.

Il y a là une expérience d'amour transcendant profond et gratifiant qui ne connaît pas d'obstacle qui ne soit insurmontable. C'est tout simplement une aventure de maturité continue, accompagnée d'une meilleure et grandissante appréciation mutuelle.

Dans le cadre d'une relation d'amour saine, la cassure est impensable, car il n'y a ni jalousie, ni peur, vu la conscience des inébranlables unité et totalité. Comme le suggère G.K. GIBRAN, il y a cette intention d'avoir des espaces au sein de l'union, c'est pourquoi dans certains pays, certaines lois sanctionnent «l'aliénation des affections».

L'important ne revient pas à sortir d'une relation si vite que notre ego le demande, il s'agit plutôt de comprendre le caractère transcendant de l'amour et d'apprendre à devenir une vraie présence promotionnelle, source de maturité et d'unité préparant pour un mariage réussi.