



CONFESSIONALISM IN LEBANON

**A Study of Confessional Minorities
in Tyre and Jbail-Amchit**

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A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR

This issue of "SOCIETAS" addresses the problem of confessionalism and national integration in Lebanon. It attempts to provide some answers to the polemics over the Lebanese confessional question.

The study is a fieldwork research conducted in the Christian Community of Tyre and the Muslim Community of Jbail-Amchit. It comprises four parts: (1) sociology of the confessional minorities, (2) inter-confessional relationships, (3) national integration, (4) correlation between selected socio-economic variables and confessionalism.

This work falls within the academic interests of the Research Center of the Institute of Social Sciences (II) at the Lebanese University. It is realized by two sociologists at the Institute: Raed JREIDINI and Thérèse ATTALLAH.

We hope you find this issue interesting and thought-provoking, with the understanding that the problems raised represent a drop in the ocean of studies pertaining to confessionalism in Lebanon.

Editor

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PREFACE

The polemics over Lebanon's confessional social order abound explicitly in the literature. Some writers see the virtues of the confessional system and some see its evils. Those who see the virtues, report the success story of the merchant republic (Salibi 1966a; Gates 1998) and its readiness to embrace modernization (Salem 1973) and sustain a viable system of economic liberalism and political democracy (Issawi 1966; Hurewitz 1966; Salibi 1966b). The vitality of the country is highlighted in the Lebanonization of communal groupings (Dagher 2000) as well as in the political management of cultural pluralism (El-Khazin 1991; Chartouni 1993). It is seen as an exemplary model of consociative democracy engendering a universal message of communal coexistence that might be exported to all societies (Messarra 1994, 1997).

Those who see the evils of the confessional system, talk about the shattered country (Picard 1996), the precarious republic (Hudson 1985), the fragmented nation (Gordon 1980) and the improbable nation (Meo 1965). Writers of this persuasion point to the shaky and archaic foundation of the country (Barakat 1977; Ajami 1988; Randal 1983; Odeh 1985) expressed in sharp economic and social disparities and inequalities (Dubar and Nasr 1976; Hamdan 1998), in the middle man and rentier economy (Corm 1986, 1996) as well as in the backward and failed political clientelist system (Beydoun 1999; Johnson 1986; Hudson 1976; Dekmejian 1978). It is argued that clientelism reproduces fragmentation, fanaticism, and violence. It marginalizes civil society and trivializes democracy (Corm 1986, 1996).

The polemical analyses of the Lebanese confessional system can be broadly divided into two approaches: primordial and structural. The primordial approach assumes that confessional ties are givens of the

Lebanese social existence and, thereby, have an ineffable and overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves. Therefore, the primordial ties of confessional social relationships are considered fundamental facts of Lebanese society and politics (Khalaf 1968, Hanf 1993). Socially, confessionalism permeates all levels of social life. It is at once both infrastructure and suprastructure (El-Hashim 2000) because it plays a role in the relations of production and distribution. It determines recruitment and promotion of labor, residence, marriage, educational attainment, culture and language (Beydoun 1984). Politically, confessional labels and flags not only articulate communal difference but also underline and perpetuate the communal differential access to political power (Salibi, 1988; Cobban, 1985).

Besides, writers of the primordial approach are inclined to see national integration in terms of the provision of institutional mechanisms capable of the management of confessional pluralism. Inter-confessional dialogue and reconciliation, as well as balanced-power sharing between the various communities, are considered the appropriate devices of nation building.

On the other hand, writers of the structural approach explain the reproduction of confessional consciousness in terms of the differential access to the resources of the Lebanese society. Confessionalism, thereby, is situated in the context of the prevailing economic, social, political and educational structures of the country. The uneven capitalist development (Johnson 1986; Dubar and Nasr 1976; Labaki 1984; Polk 1963; Corm 1996; Daher 1981; Chevallier 1971), the rapid urbanization and the massive rural migration (Khuri 1975; Johnson 2001; Nasr 1978, 1985; Ajami 1986; Norton 1987) are posited as conducive to increased communal tension and conflict. In addition, the representation of the various confessions in the class structure, whether it is an over and/or an under representation, (Chamie 1988; Hamdan 1998; Dubar and Nasr 1976; Harik 1968; Fawaz 1983; Sayigh 1962) along with the so-called sect-classes (Farsoun 1988) are considered accountable for Lebanon's endless communal strife.

Another stimulant of confessional identity in the structural approach is the clientelist political system. This system is believed to be an enormous bulwark against change and effective management of the

problems of society. The accumulation of unsolved problems inevitably fuel communal turbulences and tensions (Dekmejian 1978; Hudson 1966, 1968, 1976; Johnson 1986; Corm 1996). Furthermore, the educational system, likewise, has an impact on confessionalism. It is argued that the distribution of the institutions of learning in the country and the differential access of the various communities to education are important factors underlining and reinforcing confessional identities (Labaki 1988; Beydoun 1999; Hamdan 1998).

Advocates of the structural approach insist that national integration is contingent on the redressing of economic, social, political and educational imbalances between the confessions with the view of delivering a more egalitarian distribution of economic goods and other benefits. Some go a step forward and demand the complete abolishment of confessionalism as a prerequisite for economic, social, and political reforms (Corm 1986, 1996).

Translated into the terminology of empirical research, it is plausible to argue that the primordial point of view posits confessionalism - as a result of its givenness and coerciveness in and of itself - as the independent variable of meaningful social action. In contrast, it is reasonable to claim that the structural perspective impart to the broad societal forces the function of independent variables of meaningful social action. In this sense, confessionalism, the dependent variable of meaningful social action, is reproduced and reinforced by the social structure.

This empirical study is an endeavor to address the questions posed by the students of confessionalism and national integration in Lebanon. An attempt was made to investigate the correlation between confessional variables, on one hand, and economic, social, political, and cultural variables on the other. The two communities under study of this empirical research were the Christian minority in Tyre and the Muslim minority in Jbail-Amchit.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this empirical research is to study two confessional minorities, namely, the Christian minority in Tyre and the Muslim minority in Jbail-Amchit. The study is concerned with the Christian community living in the Christian Quarter of Tyre and the Muslim community living in El-Harah in Jbail and Kfarsala in Amchit. Both communities are confessional minorities living amidst another confessional majority. Christians live in a city dominated by Shiites, and the Muslims live in two cities, Jbail and Amchit, dominated by Maronites.

The Christians of Tyre⁽¹⁾

The Christians in Tyre are clustered in what is known as the Christian Quarter which is part of the old historic quarters of the city. The Christian Quarter borders the sea and is an extension of the old seaport of the city. The eastern and southern fringes of the Christian Quarter are adjacent to the historic archaeological sites of the city. The old Christian Quarter, the archaeological sites and their old surrounding constitute what is considered the archaeological zone of the city. There is a clear segregation in the residence of Christians and Shiites in Tyre. First, the Al-Jadid Avenue separates clearly the Christian quarters from the Muslim quarters. Second, the Christian quarters are inhabited only by Christians.

Since the Christian quarters fall in the archaeological zone, there was no spatial expansion of these quarters. Building new houses was

(1) Information about Christians of Tyre was provided by the four headmen of the Christian Quarter: 1- Georges Barade'e (Catholic); 2- Michell Abed (Catholic); 3- Antoine Khairallah (Maronite); 4- Yolla Khoury (Greek Orthodox).

prohibited by the law and, hence, the size of the Christian population remained relatively stable. Consequently, population growth of the Christians deflated into three settlement areas in the city: Hay El-Ramel, Jal El-Bahr, and Mafraq El-Abbasiyya.

Historically, the settlement of Christians in Tyre goes far back in time. It goes back to centuries as reported by our interlocutors. Some families measured their presence in Tyre in centuries, some in decades and others in few years. The differences in the history of families in Tyre goes back to the inflow and outflow of Christian families to and from the Christian Quarter over the years. Historically, too, these Christians were salesmen engaged in maritime trade between Tyre and the neighboring cities along the Mediterranean sea. Beside maritime commerce, Christians were skillful in fishing and in manufacturing fishing boats and nets. Nowadays, Christians are still masters in fishing industry although many of them are engaged in other forms of formal and informal employment.

Did out-migration of Christians from the Christian Quarter lead to the decline of the size of the population? Our interlocutors reported that the last decade has witnessed the out-migration of some old families from the Christian Quarter, while new families moved in and resettled in their place. This outflow and inflow of families, as our interlocutors confirmed, had no noticeable impact on the size of the population in the beginning of the twentieth century.

Nowadays, as interlocutors reported, Christians leave their quarters looking for job opportunities or to pursue their studies in Beirut. They confirmed that out-migration of Christians from Tyre is by no means related or induced by any kind of confessional hostility, but rather by limited job opportunities and educational facilities. This out-migration of Christians is similar to other migrations that took place from any Lebanese poor or rural areas to cities. However, the scale of this Christian out-migration is smaller in size, and its impact on the size of the Christian population is clear in the relative decline of the size of the Christian population. Today, the Christian quarters are inhabited by 300 families. The confessional distribution of these families is: 200 Catholic families, 60 Maronite, and 40 Greek Orthodox.

The Muslims of Jbail and Amchit⁽²⁾

In Jbail, Muslims, predominantly Shiites, are concentrated in El-Harat or Harat Jahjah Ahmed (named after the family name of the largest family Ahmad); and in Amchit Muslims are concentrated in Kfarsala. These two localities form bordering quarters that are inseparable ecologically and confessionally. El-Harat lies in the northern fringes of Jbail, located to the east of old historic Jbail, and Kfarsala is situated in the southern fringes of Amchit. Ecologically, the two localities constitute some sort of a bridge linking Jbail with Amchit.

Confessionally, Muslims form one cluster in the adjacent quarters of El-Harat and Kfarsala. However, the confessional composition is different in these two localities. El-Harat is confessionally mixed. It is inhabited by Shiites, Sunnis and Maronites with almost equal distribution between Muslims and Christians. By contrast, Kfarsala is confessionally homogeneous; populated by Shiites only. Thus, the residential segregation of Shiites is clear in Kfarsala.

Historically, the recent settlement of the Shiites in El-Harat and Kfarsala goes back to the twenties when Shiites started to migrate from the villages surrounding Jbail to El-Harat. They were seeking job opportunities, better standards of living and schooling for their children. With time, prices of land and houses started to rise in El-Harat making life more expensive to Shiites. At this juncture, Maronite landowners in Amchit were offering lower prices of land in Kfarsala in exchange for agricultural services and other businesses. This attracted Shiites from El-Harat as well as from the surrounding villages leading to an inflow of Shiites to Kfarsala. By this, Kfarsala became a pole of attraction to the Shiites which made the Shiite community relatively larger in Kfarsala. This explains the confessionally homogeneous population there.

The Sunni community of El-Harat that settled in Jbail for more than four centuries followed a different direction. After the Sunni community lived in prosperity and owned many of the old historic quarters in Jbail

(2) Informations about Muslims was provided by the five headmen of Jbail: 1- Wadih Abi-Ghosn; 2- Georges Zogheib; 3- Joseph Abi-Chibil; 4- Daniel Salameh; 5- Joseph Al-Kallab, and the three headmen of Amchit: 1- Ghattas Souleiman; 2- Chirbil Zeghendi; 3- Elie Zogheib.

and had business concerns, they migrated to Beirut. Today, the size, power and wealth of the Sunni community in Jbail has declined to an insignificant point. There are approximately 110 Muslim families in El-Harat, and their confessional distribution is: 80 Shiite and 30 Sunni families. In Kfarsala, there are 150 Shiite families.

Research Methodology

Four major steps were followed in this empirical study: (1) preparing the questionnaire (2) sampling technique (3) administering the questionnaire by field workers (4) analyzing data on the computer.

The questionnaire consisted of four major parts with questions about the Christians in Tyre and Muslims in Jbail-Amchit. The first part included questions about socio-economic conditions; the second part included questions about their demographic patterns; the third part was about their confessional relationships with the adjacent confessional majority and the fourth part was about the attitudes towards national integration. To get richer information about the abovementioned points, open-ended questions were given about interconfessional relationships and national integration.

For the sampling, two points were taken into consideration: the size of the sample and its representability. The number of Christian families in Tyre is nearly 300 and Muslim families in Jbail-Amchit around 260. The survey covered half of both families as the total number of Christian and Muslim families reached 560 families. Therefore, the sample consisted of 150 Christian families and 130 Muslim families.

To make this sample adequately representative we followed two steps. First, we asked the headmen to provide us with unofficial lists of residents. This measure was central because the official lists included only those whose origin is in these areas, while the unofficial ones included those who are residents of these areas. Therefore, the sample consisted of the residents of the Christian Quarter in Tyre and Muslim residents in El-Harat (Jbail) and Kfarsala (Amchit). The second step was selecting the respondents from the available lists. A total of 150 Christian families in Tyre and 130 Muslim families in Jbail-Amchit were selected after examining these lists with the headmen of the quarters. The respondents of

the whole sample were selected from different geographical locations, different occupations, different levels of income, and different educational levels.

The questionnaire was administered by the fieldworkers who were students of the third year at the Institute of Social Sciences - II - of the Lebanese University. The students were acquainted with the research methodology as part of a required course in research methodology. Their fieldwork was in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the course. The students were required to work out a problematic, form hypotheses about the study and construct a questionnaire. Students were also given a clear and detailed idea about Christians in Tyre and Muslims in Jbail-Amchit to provide them with some background knowledge and familiarize them with the conditions of these communities in general. They were instructed to record the answers of the respondents precisely and ask respondents for further explanations when needed. They were, also, informed to explain the questions thoroughly to the respondents to avoid misunderstanding. Finally, students were asked not to reveal their confessional affiliation to avoid any possible confessional bias on the part of respondents.

After the students' training was completed they started the fieldwork. To be able to find respondents at home and not at work, Sunday was the day chosen for fieldwork. Every other Sunday was a day of fieldwork for each community. The number of students who conducted the research was 90 students and the fieldwork took 6-7 hours each Sunday. Students visited the already selected families and interviewed the head of the family or any other available adult in the house. Delegates of the headmen accompanied the students all during their visits to facilitate the fieldwork.

Questions were addressed to Christians and Muslims as two confessional minority groups irrespective of sectarian subdivisions within each group. The data obtained from the field work concern two confessional communities, namely, the Christians of Tyre and the Muslims of Jbail-Amchit. During fieldwork, some Christian families were attending church and consequently were not available for the interview. The confessional composition of the sample appears in Table (1):

Table 1: Confessional Composition of the Sample

Confession	City				Total	
	Tyre		Jball - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Maronite	38	34.55	0	0.00	38	15.77
Greek Orthodox	14	12.73	0	0.00	14	5.81
Greek Catholic	57	51.82	0	0.00	57	23.65
Sunni	0	0.00	19	14.50	19	7.88
Shiite	0	0.00	112	85.50	112	46.47
Latin	1	0.91	0	0.00	1	0.41
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

The Christian community consisted of 51.82 percent Greek Catholics, 34.55 per cent Maronites and 12.73 per cent Greek Orthodox. The Muslim community consisted of 85.50 per cent Shiites and 14.50 per cent Sunnites. The overall percentage of Christians was 54.22 per cent and Muslims 54.35 per cent of the sample.

Analysis of data was carried out in the computer center at the Institute of Social Sciences -II- and two types of tables were worked out: simple tables that present descriptive statistics and complex tables that present correlation between selected socio-economic variables and confessional attitudes.

I

SOCIOLOGY OF THE CONFESSIONAL MINORITIES

Understanding the sociology of confessional minorities is crucial to make sense of the factors that influence the confessional identity and inter-confessional relationships. Drawing on the sociology of Christian minority in Tyre and Muslim minority in Jbail-Amchit from an economic, social, demographic, and confessional or ideological perspectives will help understand how these two communities differ as social groupings. These differences were explored in terms of five indicators, and they are:

- 1 - Occupation
- 2 - Income
- 3 - Housing
- 4 - Education
- 5 - Demography

Occupation

In response to different questions about occupation, certain specifications such as the kind of occupation, business partnership, wage labor, secondary occupation, and mother's occupation were studied. Table (2) shows that the occupation of the father varies between liberal professions, formal employment, and informal employment. Christians are more oriented towards informal employment while Muslims are more oriented towards formal employment and liberal professions. If we combine percentages of employees in the formal sector, the overall

percentage reaches more than 41.22 per cent for Muslims compared to about 20.91 per cent for Christians. Similarly, combining percentages of self-employment in the informal sector, the overall percentages of

Table 2: Occupation of the Father

Sector	Occupation	Community				Total	
		Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Liberal profession	Professional	1	0.91	3	2.29	4	1.66
Formal employment in the private sector	Middle-ranking employee	5	4.55	4	3.05	9	3.73
	Low-ranking employee	10	9.09	29	22.14	39	16.18
Formal employment in the public sector	Civil servant	7	6.36	16	12.21	23	9.54
	Military	1	0.91	5	3.82	6	2.49
Informal self-employment	Petty trader	10	9.09	11	8.40	21	8.71
	Petty craftsman	42	38.18	19	14.50	61	25.31
	Petty serviceman	5	4.55	11	8.40	16	6.64
Non-employment	Retired	12	10.91	10	7.63	22	9.13
	Dead	13	11.82	15	11.45	28	11.62
	Unemployed	1	0.91	3	2.29	4	1.66
	Handicapped	3	2.73	5	3.82	8	3.32
Total		110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

Christians reaches about 51.82 per cent compared to nearly 31.30 per cent of Muslims. The differential distribution of occupations in formal employment is abundantly clear: low ranking employment is 22.14 per cent for Muslims and only 9.09 per cent for Christians. Similarly, a portion 12.2 per cent of Muslims work in civil services and only 6.36 per cent of Christians fall in this category. A percentage of 3.82 per cent of Muslims work in the military with almost none of the Christians (0.91%). The percentages in middle ranking employment is 4.55 per cent for Christians compared to 3.05 per cent for Muslims. Even in the sector of liberal professions, Muslims bypassed the Christians in this category: a percentage of 2.29 per cent of Muslims are liberal professionals versus 0.9

per cent of Christians. In the non-employment category, the overall percentage of retired, dead, unemployed or handicapped is slightly higher with Christians than with Muslims. Almost, 26.37 per cent of Christians make up these categories compared to 25.19 per cent of Muslims.

A closer look at Table (2) shows that the occupation in the informal sector heavily depends on craftsmen in the Christian community. About 38.18 per cent of Christians fall in this category compared to only 14.50 per cent of Muslims. It is, also, noted that this higher percentage of Christian craftsmen comprises a significant portion of fishermen, as the sample of the study showed. The fact that Christians heavily depend on the informal sector and Muslims on the formal sector indicates that Christians are socio-economically disfavored compared to Muslim. This is clear because remunerations of the formal sector are higher than those of the informal.⁽¹⁾

Knowing that Christians depend more on informal employment, we investigate the difference in the size of this informal sector in both communities. The size of informal employment was investigated in terms of two indicators namely, business partnership and wage labor. Table (3) shows that business partnership in the informal sector for both communities is not substantial. Most Christians (69.09%) and Muslims (72.51%) in the informal sector have no business partnership. Yet, heads of households who have partners are only 4.55 per cent among Christians

Table 3: Business Partnership of Self-employed Father

Business Partnership	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Father has business partner	5	4.55	3	2.29	8	3.32
Father has no business partner	76	69.09	95	72.51	171	70.95
Father does not work	29	26.36	33	25.19	62	25.72
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

(1) McGee 1977; Portes, Castells and Benton 1989; Portes 1985; Bromley and Gerry 1979; Gilbert and Gugler 1992.

and 2.29 per cent among Muslims. These small-scale enterprises of self-employed fathers in both communities render the recourse to business partnership superfluous.

This was not the case with the other indicator of wage labor. The difference, here, between the two communities was rather sizable. Table (4) shows that 47.32 per cent of Muslims hire wage labor while only 21.82 per cent of Christians do. Conversely, a portion of 51.82 per cent of Christians do not hire wage labor compared to 27.48 per cent of Muslims. These data help us understand that the enterprises of the informal sector

Table 4: Wage Labor of Self-employed Father

Wage Labor	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Father hires wage labor	24	21.82	62	47.32	86	35.68
Father does not hire wage labor	57	51.82	36	27.48	93	38.59
Father does not work	29	26.36	33	25.19	62	25.72
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

in the Christian community are smaller than those of their Muslim counterpart. This entails that enterprises of the Christians have low remunerations and are less profitable than those of the Muslims.

It can be concluded that the prevalence of informal employment in the Christian community and the rather smaller enterprises they run, do not offer adequate and stable resources to depend on to meet their needs and, thus, they do not enjoy enough social security. With such a situation anxieties about coping with day-to-day life tend to be higher for Christians than Muslims. On the other hand, the prevalence of the formal employment in the Muslim community, coupled with the more dynamic informal sector, indicates that they enjoy relatively a better social situation; bearing in mind that many factories and companies are located in Jbail-Amchit.

The differences in the economic practices and the way both communities gain their livelihood take us to investigate whether both

communities seek a secondary occupation beside the primary one. Table (5) reveals that more Christians than Muslims seek a secondary occupation. While 15.45 per cent of Christians seek a secondary

Table 5: Primary Versus Secondary Occupation of the Father

Primary / Secondary Occupation	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Primary occupation	64	58.18	91	69.46	155	64.31
Secondary occupation	17	15.45	7	5.34	24	9.96
Father does not work	29	26.36	33	25.19	62	25.72
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

occupation only 5.34 per cent of Muslims do. In parallel, Muslims who stick to one occupation make up a percentage of 69.46 per cent compared to 58.18 per cent of Christians. Therefore, Christian's work conditions urge them to seek secondary occupation more than the Muslims to make up for the unstable resources of their work conditions.

Whether or not the mother is a productive member in the family, Table (6) shows that most of Christian mothers (71.82%) and Muslim mothers (87.02%) are housewives. However, the mother's occupation becomes significant when we compare the percentages of working mothers in both communities. Interestingly, the overall of combined percentages of Christian working mothers is nearly 20 per cent compared to 7 per cent of Muslim working mothers. Table (6) reveals that 10 per cent of Christian working mothers are middle-ranking employees, versus 2.29 per cent of Muslim mothers. Similarly, 10 per cent of Christian working mothers are low-ranking employees versus 2.29 per cent of Muslim mothers. Thus, the rate of participation of the mother in the labor market is higher in the Christian community than it is in the Muslim one.

Table 6: Occupation of the Mother

Sector	Occupation	Community				Total	
		Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Liberal profession	Professional	0	0.00	1	0.76	1	0.41
Formal employment in the private sector	Middle-ranking employee	11	10.00	3	2.29	14	5.81
	Low-ranking employee	11	10.00	3	2.29	14	5.81
Formal employment in the public sector	Civil servant	1	0.91	1	0.76	2	0.83
Informal self-employment	Petty trader	0	0.00	2	1.53	2	0.83
	Petty craftsman	0	0.00	2	1.53	2	0.83
Non-employment	Retired	2	1.82	0	0.00	2	0.83
	Dead	6	5.45	3	2.29	9	3.73
	No answer	0	0.00	2	1.53	2	0.83
	Housewife	79	71.82	114	87.02	193	80.08
Total		110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

We can infer that the work conditions as indicated by occupation in both communities show that more Christians than Muslims depend on informal employment of small scale enterprises and, consequently, they are urged to seek a second occupation and in need of the mother as a productive member in the family.

Income

For more extensive understanding of the sociological differences between both communities, the income indicator was explored. Table (7) provides a breakdown of the total monthly income of Christian and Muslim families. Curiously, half of each community is centered in the medium-income category. Medium income families make up around 51 per cent of each community. Yet, the difference appears in the high and low income. More Christians (20.91%) earn higher income than Muslims (16,79%), and conversely, less Christians (28.18%) fall in the low income category than Muslims (32.06%).

Table 7: Total Monthly Income of the Family

Total monthly income of the family	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Low-income families (500.000 and below)	31	28.18	42	32.06	73	30.29
Medium-income families (500.000 - 1.500.000)	56	50.91	67	51.15	123	51.04
High-income families (1.500.000 and above)	23	20.91	22	16.79	45	18.67
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

This distribution of families in terms of income shows that Christians in Tyre are slightly better than Muslims in Jbail-Amchit. While occupation as a sociological indicator pointed that Christians do not enjoy satisfying work conditions, these differences in income distributions go in an opposite direction. Can this be related to the nature of occupation or to other contributing elements to total income? To answer this question we examined the distribution of each income level in the different occupational categories. Table (8) presents this distribution.

The table shows that both formal and informal employment in both communities are centered in the medium-income category. A percentage of 48 per cent of Christian fathers in the formal sector and a percentage of 53 per cent of Christian fathers in the informal sector fall in the medium-income category. Likewise, a percentage of 63 per cent of Muslim fathers in the formal sector and a percentage of 44 per cent of Muslim fathers in the informal sector fall in the same income category.

Table 8: Family Income and Father's Occupation in Different Sectors

Sector	Community																Total	
	Christians in Tyre								Muslims in Jbail-Amchit									
	Liberal profession		Formal employment		Informal employment		Non-employment		Liberal profession		Formal employment		Informal employment		Non-employment			
Family income	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Low-income families (500.000 and below)	0	0	4	17	20	35	7	24	0	0	14	26	12	29	16	48	73	30
Medium-income families (500.000 - 1.500.000)	0	0	11	48	30	53	15	52	0	0	34	63	18	44	15	45	123	51
High-income families (1.500.000 and above)	1	100	8	35	7	12	7	24	3	100	6	11	11	27	2	6	45	19
Total	1	100	23	100	57	100	29	100	3	100	54	100	41	100	33	100	241	100

However, the distribution of the father's occupation in the high and low income categories becomes different in both communities. In the Christian community the formal employment ranks higher (35%) than the informal (12%) in the high income category. By contrast, in the Muslim community the informal employment ranks higher (27%) than the formal (11%) in the high income category, too. Conversely, in the Christian community the formal employment ranks lower (17%) than the informal employment (35%) in the low income category. In the Muslim community the informal still ranks higher (29%) than the informal (26%) in the low income category, too.

Comparing the distribution of the father's occupation in the three income categories in both communities, we notice that Christian fathers who earn low income are mostly self-employed and most high income earners are employed. This goes in parallel with the fact that remunerations of the informal sector are lower than the formal one. This implies that the income of the largest category of Christian working fathers, namely, the self-employed, is not a sufficient resource for the

family. This explains - as we have seen - why fathers in the Christian community seek a secondary occupation and have higher rates of working wives. In fact, the dependence on more than one source of income explains why the family income of Christians is slightly higher than Muslims' family income (Table 7).

On the other hand, in the Muslim community we notice that fathers who earn high income are mostly self-employed. This is directly related to the dynamism of the informal sector expressed in the higher percentage of wage labor hired by Muslim self-employed fathers compared to Christian self-employed fathers (Table 4). This does not accord with what we know about the lower remunerations of the informal sector compared to the formal sector.

However, self-employed fathers form a small category of Muslim working fathers since formal employment is more prevalent in the Muslim community. This helps us understand the current levels of income among Muslims. Further, formal employment in the high-income category is under-represented in the Muslim community (11%) compared to its over-representation in the Christian community (35%). Again, this explains the slightly lower levels of family income of Muslims compared to Christians.

For a more in-depth explanation of the income indicator, Table (9) shows the rates of working children and relatives in the family. Christians are more likely to pool resources of the family income if we consider the overall percentage of both children and relatives. Combining the percentages of working children in the Christian community, the overall percentages is about 45.46% per cent compared to an overall percentage of 40.45 per cent of the Muslims. Further, 2,73% of Christian families have two relatives in the labor market versus none in the Muslim community. Hence, the participation rates of children and relatives in the labor market is higher among Christians than it is among Muslims.

Table 9: Participation Rates of Children and Relatives of the Family in the Labor Market

Working members	Number	Community				Total	
		Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Working children	1	29	26.36	30	22.90	59	24.48
	2	13	11.82	13	9.92	26	10.79
	3	4	3.64	6	4.58	10	4.14
	4 and above	4	3.64	4	3.05	8	3.32
	Not working	60	54.55	78	59.54	138	57.26
Total		110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00
Working relatives	1	0	0.00	1	0.76	1	0.41
	2	3	2.73	0	0.00	3	1.24
	Not working	107	97.27	130	99.24	237	98.34
Total		110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

In conclusion, both occupation and income point to the sociological differences between the two communities. However, the slight differences in the total monthly income are not enough to put both communities in different hierarchical social positions. Yet, the difference is more pronounced in the pooling of resources of the family. More Christians than Muslims, depend on more than one resource of income. They seek secondary occupation and mothers, children and relatives participate in the total income. This, in fact, underlines kinship solidarity in the Christian community. This kinship solidarity directly reflects on the confessional solidarity of Christians because kinship is used as an instrument to improve their economic position as a solidary confessional minority.

Housing

Another indicator that reveals the differences that exist between both communities is housing, which was explored in terms of (1) whether they live in old or new houses (2) small or big houses (3) conditions of the house (4) and whether or not they own the house.

The date of constructing the house indicated whether it is old or new.

Table (10) shows that both communities have a high percentage of old houses, built more than 25 years ago with a noticeable low percentage of new houses. A closer look at the differences in percentages in table (10) shows the different situations in both communities. While new houses make up 2,29 per cent in the Muslim community, new houses are non-existent in the Christian community. Conversely, the percentage of ancient houses is higher with Christians (74,55%) than with Muslims (69,47%). Besides, relatively old houses are 25,45 per cent in the Christian community and 28,24 per cent in the Muslim community.

Table 10: Date of House Construction

Date of house construction	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
New houses (less than 4 years)	0	0.00	3	2.29	3	1.24
Old houses (from 5 to 24 years)	28	25.45	37	28.24	65	26.97
Ancient houses (25 years and more)	82	74.55	91	69.47	173	71.78
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

In the same vein, Table (11) reveals the condition of the house in both communities. The data show that house conditions are better with Muslims than with Christians. In both communities houses in average condition rank the highest, with a higher difference in favor of the Muslims (79,39%) versus the Christians (71.82%). By contrast, houses in poor condition are higher with Christians (18,18%) than with Muslims (11,45%).

Table 11: House Condition

House Condition	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good condition	11	10.00	12	9.16	23	9.54
Average condition	79	71.82	104	79.39	183	75.93
Poor condition	20	18.18	15	11.45	35	14.52
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

Moving to the area of the house, Table (12) reveals that Christians are less privileged concerning the size of the house. Although both communities almost meet in percentages of medium houses (40%), they substantially go in separate directions in small and big houses. More Christians live in small houses (31.82%) than Muslims (18.32%). However, more Muslims live in large houses (41.22%) than Christians (28.19%). Thus, both minorities live in different housing situation concerning date of constructing the house, its conditions and its size.

Table 12: Area of the House

Area of the House	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Small house (49m ² - 99 m ²)	35	31.82	24	18.32	59	24.48
Medium house (100 - 149 m ²)	44	40.00	53	40.46	97	40.25
Large house (150m ² and above)	31	28.18	54	41.22	85	35.27
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

We can conclude that date of construction of the house, its conditions and its area have certain implications that point out further differences between both communities. Concerning the date of constructing the house, we note that the absence of new houses in Tyre is explained in terms of the prohibition of building new houses in what is considered the archaeological zone in the old historic Tyre. Besides, the higher percentage of ancient

houses in Tyre can, also, be explained historically that these houses are located in the quarters of this old historic Tyre. Likewise, the higher percentage of houses in poor conditions in Tyre is directly related to the ancient character of the Christian Quarter. Thus, Christians live in the old quarters of historic Tyre where houses are worn away and in poor condition. On the other hand, since Muslims live in more recent and modern quarters, their houses are newer and in better condition.

The quarters in the historic Tyre are very close and bordering each other making a network of narrow alleys along which small houses are built. The small size of these houses reflects the ancient architectural style of historic Tyre. In contrast to the setting in which the Christians live, Muslims live in more modern and spatial houses built along wider avenues in spacious quarters.

Do both communities differ in the way they obtained their houses? Table (13) reveals the various means of earning the house in both communities. The difference is clear in renting and owning the house. More than half of the Christians in Tyre (59.09%) rent the houses they live in compared to 16.79 per cent of the Muslims. A similarly significant portion of Muslims (41.22%) built their own houses, compared to 10 per cent of Christians. This difference becomes even clearer if we combine the percentages of ownership of the house, whether by inheritance or purchase or construction. The overall percentage still runs higher for

Table 13: Means of Obtaining the House

Means of obtaining the house	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Inheritance	10	9.09	37	28.24	47	19.50
Construction	11	10.00	54	41.22	65	26.97
Purchase	11	10.00	17	12.98	28	11.62
Rent	65	59.09	22	16.79	87	36.10
Donation	3	2.73	1	0.76	4	1.66
Confiscation	5	4.55	0	0.00	5	2.07
Temporary occupation	5	4.55	0	0.00	5	2.07
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit (82.44%) than Christians in Tyre (29.09%). Interestingly, settlement in the house without a legal document, whether by donation, confiscation or temporary occupation, is higher with Christians than it is with Muslims. The overall percentage of Christians who live in these houses is nearly 11.83 per cent compared to only 0.76 per cent of Muslims.

Given the trend of renting houses in Tyre poses a question about who owns these rented houses. The four headmen of the Christian quarters in Tyre reported that these ancient houses were built and owned by the old Christian families who migrated from Tyre. Out-migration of the old families was followed by in-migration of new Christian families who moved into the Christian Quarter and rented these houses. These new Christian comers harbored a feeling of insecurity and temporary settlement, and as a result, preferred renting to owning their houses. By contrast, Muslims who have a higher percentage of house ownership highlight a feeling of security enough for a permanent settlement.

In conclusion, different housing arrangements in both minorities entail different life styles and different perspectives that reflect on their confessional identity and solidarity.

Education

In our attempt to study the sociological differences between Muslims and Christians, we look at the educational attainment of fathers and mothers in the families of both communities. Table (14) gives a clear picture of the father's educational attainment in both communities.

Table 14: Education of the Father

Levels	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jball - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Illiterate	20	18.18	24	18.32	44	18.26
Literate	5	4.55	15	11.45	20	8.30
Elementary	31	28.18	30	22.90	61	25.31
Intermediate	24	21.82	21	16.03	45	18.67
Technical Brevet	1	0.91	1	0.76	2	0.83
Baccalaureate	10	9.09	12	9.12	22	9.13
Technical Baccalaureate	1	0.91	3	2.29	4	1.66
University Degrees	7	6.36	10	7.63	17	7.05
Superior Technical Degree or Bachelor of Technical Degree	2	1.82	7	5.34	9	3.73
No answer	9	8.18	8	6.10	17	7.05
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

The educational level of the father in both communities is almost the same in the category of illiterate, Technical Brevet and Baccalaureate level. For example, illiteracy of Christian fathers is 18.18 per cent and of Muslim fathers is 18.32 per cent. Technical Brevet is almost non-existent in both communities: 0.91 per cent of Christians versus 0.76 per cent of Muslims. Similarly, the Baccalaureate level is parallel in both communities, 9.09 per cent of Christians compared to 9.12 per cent of Muslims. Christians fall behind the Muslims in the percentage of (1) literate fathers; 4.55 per cent with Christians compared to 11.45 per cent with Muslims, (2) the percentages of fathers who have Technical Baccalaureate; 0.91 per cent with Christians compared to 2.29 per cent with Muslims, (3) the percentages of fathers who have Superior Technical Degrees or Bachelor of Technical Degrees; 1.82 per cent with Christians compared to 5.34 per cent with Muslims. Christians ranked higher only in two categories; the elementary and intermediate education. The elementary education of Christian fathers is 28.18 per cent compared to 22.90 per cent of Muslim fathers. Intermediate education is 21.82 per

cent with Christians and 16.03 per cent with Muslims. Finally, the university education slightly differs in both communities, 6.36 per cent of Christians have university degrees compared to 7.63 per cent of Muslims.

Hence, the education of the father is emphasized differently in both communities. While formal school education in terms of basic elementary and intermediate is more emphasized with Christians, literacy and technical education is more emphasized with Muslims.

As to the educational attainment of the mother, Table (15) shows that there is no difference between both communities at the elementary level; 19.09 per cent among Christians and 19.08 per cent among Muslims.

The substantial difference appears in the illiteracy and Baccalaureate level. Among Christian mothers 11.82 per cent are illiterate, while among Muslims it is 22.14 per cent. Baccalaureate level is higher among Christian mothers (29.09%) than it is among Muslim mothers (14.50%). Christian mothers, also, rank higher in intermediate and Technical Brevet. A percentage of 20.91 per cent of Christian mothers have reached the intermediate level compared to 17.56% per cent of Muslim mothers. Similarly, Technical Brevet is 1.82% per cent for Christian mothers versus 0.76 per cent of Muslim mothers.

On the other hand, we find that Muslim mothers rank higher in Technical Baccalaureate, university degrees and superior technical studies. A percentage of 1.53% makes up the Technical Baccalaureate among Muslim mothers compared to 0.91 per cent among Christians. Likewise, superior technical studies are 2.29 per cent among Muslim mothers versus none among Christians. A more noticeable difference appears in university education where 9.16 per cent of Muslim mothers have higher degrees compared to 2.73 per cent of Christian mothers.

Hence, the education of the mother is emphasized differently in both communities. The educational attainment in terms of formal school education at the intermediate and secondary level is more emphasized among Christian mothers than Muslim mothers. Yet, Muslim mothers are ahead of Christian mothers at the university and technical level.

Table 15: Education of the Mother

Levels	Community				Total	
	Cristians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Illiterate	13	11.82	29	22.14	42	17.43
Literate	8	7.27	12	9.16	20	8.30
Elementary	21	19.09	25	19.08	46	19.09
Intermediate	23	20.91	23	17.56	46	19.09
Technical Brevet	2	1.82	1	0.76	3	1.24
Baccalaureate	32	29.09	19	14.50	51	21.16
Technical Baccalaureate	1	0.91	2	1.53	3	1.24
University Degrees	3	2.73	12	9.16	15	6.22
Superior Technical Degree or Bachelor of Technical Degree	0	0.00	3	2.29	3	1.24
No answer	7	6.36	5	3.81	12	4.97
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

In conclusion, these differences in educational attainment show that Christians are more concerned with providing education at early stages. This concern is clear in the lower percentage of illiteracy and higher percentages of basic education among Christians. One explanation can be related to their awareness of their status as a minority along with their feeling of insecurity. In their outlook they emphasize education from the very beginning to enhance their status as a solidary group. Basic education - specially in schools that belong to the church - is a fundamental element for their communal advancement. It is one way to make up for their feeling of insecurity as a confessional minority group. Thus, educational attainment becomes their way out for achieving a better and more secure future.

On the other hand, we find that Muslims have different concerns in their educational attainment. Unlike Christians they are less concerned with basic education but more advanced in higher levels of education. This is clear in their higher percentages of university and high technical

education with significant percentages of illiteracy and informal literacy. Besides, data showed that Muslims are distributed cross all levels of education and not centered in one level like the Christians. Their educational attainment seems to be less governed by identity-related drives. Their distribution cross different educational levels is a function of personal endeavor or individual choices and not in terms of solidary group. They are not urged to emphasize basic education of men and women, but tend to have a various and broader focus on educational levels starting with basic education ending up with higher and technical education.

Demography

The demographic patterns of both minorities reveal other sociological differences between Christians and Muslims. The demography of both minorities was examined in terms of family structure and age of parents. Table (16) reveals whether the prevailing family in both communities is nuclear or extended. The majority of families in both communities are nuclear families; 91.82 per cent for Christians and 96.18 per cent for Muslims. The percentage for extended families is 8.18 per cent for Christians and 3.82 per cent for Muslims. It is worthy to note that the higher rate of extended families among Christians reflects one more time the kinship and confessional solidarity among Christians. The feeling of uncertainty among Christians and the pooling of resources in the family - as we have seen - strengthen the kinship solidarity which in turn influences their confessional identity.

Table 16: Structure of the Family

Structure of the family	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Nuclear family	101	91.82	126	96.18	227	94.19
Extended family	9	8.18	5	3.82	14	5.81
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

By contrast, Muslims have a lower rate of extended families which in turn expresses a milder sense of kinship and confessional solidarity.

Unlike Christians, Muslims do not resort to pooling of resources in the family that leads to stronger kinship solidarity. Hence, the components of their confessional identity are different from their Christian counterpart.

The second demographic feature is the age of father and mother. Table (17) and Table (18) present the age groups of fathers and mothers in both minorities. Using these age groups to compute the mean age of each we find the following:

- 1 - the mean age of Christian fathers is 52.48 years;
- 2 - the mean age of Christian mothers is 45.91 years;
- 3 - the mean age of Muslim fathers is 50.67 years;
- 4 - the mean age of Muslim mothers is 47.58 years.

Table 17: Age of the Father

Age group	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
1973 - 1977	1	0.91	0	0.00	1	0.41
1968 - 1972	5	4.55	6	4.58	11	4.56
1963 - 1967	6	5.45	12	9.16	18	7.47
1958 - 1962	11	10.00	23	17.56	34	14.11
1953 - 1957	14	12.73	15	11.45	29	12.03
1948 - 1952	9	8.18	7	5.34	16	6.64
1943 - 1947	14	12.73	12	9.16	26	10.79
1938 - 1942	13	11.82	8	6.11	21	8.71
1937 and below	19	17.27	25	19.08	44	18.26
No answer	18	16.36	23	17.55	41	17.01
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

Table 18: Age of the Mother

Age group	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
1978 - 1982	1	0.91	1	0.76	2	0.83
1973 - 1977	5	4.55	6	4.58	11	4.56
1968 - 1972	11	10.00	11	8.40	22	9.13
1963 - 1967	16	14.55	20	15.27	36	14.94
1958 - 1962	17	15.45	21	16.03	38	15.77
1953 - 1957	15	13.64	8	6.11	23	9.54
1948 - 1952	12	10.91	16	12.21	28	11.62
1943 - 1947	5	4.55	10	7.63	15	6.22
1938 - 1942	3	2.73	14	10.69	17	7.05
1937 and below	16	14.55	18	13.74	34	14.11
No answer	9	8.18	6	4.58	15	6.22
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

The means of age show that Christian fathers are older than Muslim fathers, while Christian mothers are younger than Muslim mothers. Looking at the difference in the means of age between fathers and mothers in both communities, we find it reaches 6.5 years with Christian compared to 3.09 years with Muslim fathers and mothers. These demographic differences point out that they have different marital relationships that necessitate different familial relationships, different familial interaction and different way of life.

In conclusion, the socio-economic and demographic differences between both minorities point out that Christians and Muslims form different social groupings. They have different occupational structures, slightly different income level, different housing arrangements, different educational attitudes, and different demographic patterns. Their different socio-economic and demographic structures are bound-up with different kinship and confessional structures. Christians' socio-economic and demographic conditions enhance their kinship and religious solidarity. Muslims, by contrast, live their socio-economic and demographic conditions in a less pronounced kinship and communal sense of solidarity.

Bearing these differences in mind, we can say that both minorities

form two different status groups rather than two different social classes. Status groups, in the weberian sense, are defined in terms of styles of life and ideas⁽²⁾. Status groups preserve a way of life which at once embodies different values, norms, and different material conditions without necessarily implying different socio-economic positions in the social hierarchy. Social classes, in contrast, are two different economic entities defined in terms of wealth and ranked in different positions in the social hierarchy.

The differences that we have explored between the Christian and Muslim minorities make of each a different status group expressed in different occupational structure, income level, housing conditions, educational attainment and demographic patterns. These differences point to the different ways of life more than different socio-economic ranks. Thus, the material conditions of both minorities are not necessary nor sufficient to define them in terms of social classes ranked differently in the social hierarchy, but rather to identify them only as different status groups. Finally, their different religious and familial values make them two distinct status groups.

(2) Bendix 1966.

II

INTER-CONFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The distinction between Muslim and Christian minorities in their sociological features as two different status groups⁽¹⁾ implies different communal identities. It is natural that members of each community harbor a feeling of solidarity that generates certain commitments towards their community. This triggers confessional consciousness or identity that becomes an orientation or a frame of reference through which each community interacts and perceives others. Consequently, the social distance from other confessional groups will be determined by the nature of the relationships they build and particular attitudes they display towards others. Since inter-confessional relationships reveal major aspects of the social life of Christians and Muslims, it is pertinent to assess the nature of these relationships. This part studies the inter-confessional relationships of each minority vis-à-vis the confessional majority of the adjacent social milieu.

The empirical data collected in this study probe seven features of these inter-confessional relationships, and they are:

- 1 - the nature of confessional relationships with the adjacent social milieu;
- 2 - the impediments to excellent inter-confessional relationships;
- 3 - reasons for settlement in the quarter;
- 4 - relocation to the adjacent quarters;

(1) Part one.

5 - inter-confessional family education;

6 - choice of the school;

7 - economic life.

Nature of Inter-Confessional Relationships

The respondents in each minority described the relationships with the adjacent social milieu as good, formal, reserved or no relationship. Table (19) shows that Christians and Muslims have different perceptions of the nature of these relationships. Muslims seem to hold a more positive perception of their relations with the adjacent social milieu than Christians.

**Table 19: Nature of Confessional Relationship
with the Adjacent Social Milieu**

Nature of relationship	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	63	57.27	110	83.97	173	71.78
Formal	17	15.45	3	2.29	20	8.30
Reserved	28	25.45	16	12.21	44	18.26
No relationship	2	1.82	2	1.53	4	1.66
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

A percentage of 83.96 per cent of Muslims considered it good compared to 57.27 per cent of Christians. Conversely, while 40.90 per cent of Christians considered the relationship formal and reserved, only 14.50 per cent of Muslims considered it as such. Thus, the description reported by Christians signal an implicit inclination of confessionalism compared to Muslims who are more satisfied with these relations.

Impediments to Excellent Relationships with the adjacent social milieu

As to the impediments to have excellent relationships with the adjacent social milieu, respondents were asked to specify the factors that

might obstruct these excellent relationships. Table (20) presents different kinds of impediments reported by both minorities. More Christians related these impediments to differences in traditions and confessions than Muslims. The table shows that 36.36 per cent of Christians related these impediments to traditions compared to 22.14 per cent of Muslims. Difference in confessions was an impediment to 24.55 per cent of Christians compared to 16.79 per cent of Muslims.

**Table 20: Impediments to Excellent Relationship
with the Adjacent Social Milieu**

Kind of impediment	Community				Total	
	Christian in Tyre		Muslims in Jball - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Different standards of living	7	6.36	20	15.27	27	11.20
Different traditions	40	36.36	29	22.14	69	28.63
Different confessions	27	24.55	22	16.79	49	20.33
Rejection by the social milieu	17	15.45	16	12.21	33	13.69
Feeling of superiority	7	6.36	11	8.40	18	7.47
Preoccupation with work	4	3.64	7	5.34	11	4.56
Different political orientation	0	0.00	3	2.29	3	1.24
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	0	0.00	3	2.29	3	1.24
No impediments	6	5.45	19	14.50	25	10.37
No answer	2	1.82	1	0.76	3	1.24
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

It is worth noting that the distinction between «traditions» and «confessions» was not clearly defined to the respondents. As a matter of fact, the term «tradition» implied - as we shall see in part three - confessional traditions rather than cultural traditions in the broad sense

of the term. This entails that confessions coincides with traditions to the respondents. Accordingly, if we combine the percentages of impediments related to confessions and traditions, the overall percentage becomes 60.91 per cent for Christians and 38.93 per cent for Muslims.

By contrast, Muslims were more likely to relate these impediments to social, political and economic factors. Standards of living was an impediment to 15.27 per cent for Muslims compared to 6.36 per cent for Christians. Political factors were an impediment for 2.29 per cent of Muslims versus none of Christians.

Therefore, Christians who tend to have more formal and reserved attitudes and more confessional interpretations for the impediments are more predisposed to have a confessional inclination than Muslims.

Reasons for settlement in the quarter

Settlement in the quarter took place for different reasons specified by the respondents. Most reported reasons stated in Table (21) were not related to confessional factors. The only reason directly related to confessionalism was the «feeling of security among co-religionists». Table (21) shows that this reason was more compelling to Christians than it was to Muslims. A percentage of 10 per cent of Christians specified this reason compared to only 4.58 per cent of Muslims.

On the other hand reasons that are not directly related to confessionalism were more important to Muslims. We find that financial reasons were compelling to 6.87 per cent of Muslims versus 2.73 per cent of Christians. Other non-confessional reasons like availability of the house and convenience of the social environment were not a reason for settlement to Christians but were necessary to 4.58 per cent and 3.82 per cent of Muslims respectively.

Accordingly, given the confessional and non-confessional reasons for settlement specified by Christians and Muslims, it is noticed that Christians were more motivated by confessional reasons to settle in the quarter than Muslims who settled for non-confessional reasons. Thus, the tendency to settle for confession-related factors is stronger with Christians compared to Muslims.

Table 21: Reasons for Settlement in the Quarter

Reasons	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jball · Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Place of birth	42	38.18	50	38.17	92	38.17
Residence of relatives	32	29.09	43	32.82	75	31.12
Feeling of security among co-religionists	11	10.00	6	4.58	17	7.05
Financial	3	2.73	9	6.87	12	4.98
Availability of the house	0	0.00	6	4.58	6	2.49
Coincidence	4	3.64	1	0.76	5	2.07
Convenience of the social environment	0	0.00	5	3.82	5	2.07
War-related reasons	3	2.73	2	1.53	5	2.07
Closeness to school	12	10.91	6	4.58	18	7.47
Marriage	2	1.82	3	2.29	5	2.07
No answer	1	0.91	0	0.00	1	0.41
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

Relocation to the adjacent quarter

Another feature of inter-confessional relationships of both minorities revealed the attitudes of Christians and Muslims towards the adjacent social milieu. Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree to relocate or live in the quarters of the adjacent social milieu. Those who agree were, then, asked to specify their incentives for relocation, and those who have conditional agreement stated their conditions, and finally, those who disagree gave their reasons for that.

The total of 123 respondents who agree to relocate specified their incentives for relocation. Table (22) shows that the only incentive that is confession-related was «willingness to co-exist with other confessions». Muslims are more willing to co-exist with other confessional groups than Christians. A portion of 18.06 per cent of Muslims are ready to co-exist

compared to 13.73 per cent of Christians. Thus, among the different incentives specified by those who agree to relocate, Christians were less

Table 22: Incentives for Accepting to Relocate to the Adjacent Quarter

Incentives to relocate	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Willingness to coexist with other confessions	7	13.73	13	18.06	20	16.26
Better social conditions	16	31.37	12	16.67	28	22.76
Change in life style	2	3.92	5	6.95	7	5.69
Dissatisfaction with current social relationships	2	3.92	1	1.39	3	2.44
No answer	24	47.06	41	56.94	65	52.85
Total	51	100	72	100.00	123	100.00

willing to co-exist with other confessional groups than Muslims. Christians, therefore, are more confessionally oriented in their willingness to relocate to the adjacent quarter of the social milieu compared to Muslims.

Another total of 21 respondents in both communities formed those who conditionally agree to relocate to the adjacent quarters in the social milieu. Table (23) shows that one of the conditions reported by the respondents was overtly related to confessional attitude and it is the «residence of co-religionists». None of the Muslims considered this a necessary condition for relocation while 22.22 per cent of the Christians believed it was necessary. Thus, Christians express a preference to live in a locality that has a majority of people from their own confessional group, while Muslim do not seem to have the same concern.

Table 23: Specifications of Conditions for Accepting to Relocate to the Adjacent Quarter

Conditions to relocate	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Availability of a suitable house	1	11.11	4	33.33	5	23.81
More convenient social environment	0	0.00	2	16.67	2	9.52
Closeness to work	3	33.33	0	0.00	3	14.29
Availability of job opportunities	0	0.00	3	25.00	3	14.29
Residence of co-religionists	2	22.22	0	0.00	2	9.52
No answer	3	33.33	3	25.00	6	28.57
Total	9	100.00	12	100.00	21	100.00

A final total of 97 respondents in both communities who decline or disagree to relocate to the adjacent quarter of the social milieu reported their reasons for that. Table (24) shows that the confession-related reasons are more important to Christians than to Muslims. A percentage of 22 per cent of Christians believe that feeling secure among co-religionists is a reason compared to 14.89 per cent of Muslims. Interestingly, 10 per cent of Christians prefer to live with co-religionists compared to 2.13 per cent of Muslims. Feeling unable to coexist with different confessions was an important reason to 14 per cent of Christians compared to 6.38 per cent of Muslims.

It is, in a way, revealing that concerning attitudes that reflect a confessional inclination, Christians seem to be less willing to coexist and associate with other confessional groups than Muslims who revealed different inclination. Christians, more than Muslims, harbor a feeling of security among their co-religionists and express a preference for living amongst them.

Table 24: Reasons for Declining to Relocate to the Adjacent Quarter

Reasons	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Satisfaction with current social relationships	12	24.00	26	55.32	38	39.18
Satisfaction with the house	7	14.00	7	14.89	14	14.43
Closeness to work	7	14.00	0	0.00	7	7.22
Feeling of security among co-religionists	11	22.00	7	14.89	18	18.56
Preference to live with co-religionists	5	10.00	1	2.13	6	6.19
Inability to coexist with different confessions	7	14.00	3	6.38	10	10.31
No answer	1	2.00	3	6.38	4	4.12
Total	50	100.00	47	100.00	97	100.00

Family Education

Starting from the assumption that confessional attitudes are primarily influenced by family education, respondents were asked to which extent they encourage inter-confessional interaction in raising their children. Table (25) reveals that Christians hold a more persistent reserved attitude in this respect than Muslims. A significant percentage of 83.21 per cent of Muslims encourage inter-confessional interaction, while only 45.45 per cent of Christians do. Conversely, Christians who do not encourage this kind of interaction in raising their children ranked higher (47.27%) than Muslims (10.69%). Therefore, Christians are more confessionally oriented in their family education outlooks, while Muslims welcome more inter-confessional interaction in the socialization of their children.

Table 25: Inter-confessional Family Education

Attitudes	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter-confessional interaction	50	45.45	109	83.21	159	65.98
Does not encourage inter-confessional interaction	52	47.27	14	10.69	66	27.39
Neither	8	7.27	8	6.11	16	6.64
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

Choice of the School

The types of school in Lebanon are private and public. Some private schools are affiliated to certain confessions. In most cases the confessional dimension is a vital determinant of choosing a school for families. Accordingly, the choice of school has become a key indicator of confessional attitudes. It is relevant to investigate the percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of type of school they choose for their children. Table (26) provides a clear picture of the different trends in both minorities.

Table 26: Type of School⁽²⁾

Type	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Public	7	6.14	75	44.91	82	29.18
Non-profitable private	17	14.91	19	11.38	36	12.81
Profitable private	90	78.95	73	43.71	163	58.01
Total	114	100.00	167	100.00	281	100.00

If we compare the percentages of Muslims and Christians who send their children to public schools, we notice a substantial difference between both. Only 6.14 per cent of the Christians prefer public schools while 44.91 per cent of the Muslims do. Private schools, whether

(2) Figures in the table include enrolled children under the age of 18.

profitable or non-profitable, are more favored by Christians than Muslims. These two types of private schools constitute one category of schools because both are owned and managed by confessional groups. Hence, their mission is to transmit the religious and socio-cultural heritage of particular confessional groupings. The overall percentages of these private schools comprises a much wider population of Christians than Muslims. Nearly, an overall percentage of 93.86 per cent of Christians in Tyre send their children to these private schools compared to 55.09 per cent of Muslims. It should, also, be noted that the private schools in the Christian community are owned by Christians and five out of the seven Christian private schools belong to the church⁽³⁾.

If we consider this wider spread of Christians in the private schools, we notice that Christians tend to pool to their own confessional community, identify, and sympathize with their own confessional private schools more than Muslims who opt for public schools. Christians' choice of private schools is at once a reaffirmation of confessional identity and an expression of insecurity of a solidary minority group. Conversely, Muslims' choice of public schools discloses an attenuated concern with confessional identity and solidarity.

To explore more deeply the determinants of choosing a school for their children, it was necessary to probe other reasons, beside the type of school, that make parents decide on the schooling of their children. Table (27) provides these reasons as stated by the respondents to an open-ended question. Interestingly, reasons that are related to confessional, kinship, and communal ties were more important to Christians than to Muslims who emphasized financial and educational reasons in choosing the school. Table (27) shows that religious teaching is a reason for 22.73 per cent of Christians compared to only 2.29 per cent of Muslims. Likewise, an overall percentage of 18.18 per cent of Christians considered relatives, parents or neighbors whether graduate, enrolled or work at school a reason for choosing the school compared to only 3.81 per cent of Muslims.

(3) Interview with the four headmen of the Christian Quarter in Tyre.

Table 27: Reasons for Choice of School

Reasons	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Financial	14	12.73	40	30.53	54	22.41
Closeness to home	19	17.27	21	16.03	40	16.60
Parents and relatives work at school or have connections with the administration	10	9.09	1	0.76	11	4.56
Parents are graduates of the school	7	6.36	3	2.29	10	4.15
Relatives and neighbors are enrolled in school	3	2.73	1	0.76	4	1.66
Religious teaching at school	25	22.73	3	2.29	28	11.62
High-quality education, teaching of foreign languages, discipline and order	29	26.36	50	38.17	79	32.78
Multi-confessional character of the school	0	0.00	10	7.63	10	4.15
No answer	3	2.73	2	1.53	5	2.07
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

On the other hand, the percentage of Muslims who consider financial matters a reason is 30.53 per cent compared to 12.73 per cent of Christians. High quality education is a reason for 38.17 per cent of Muslims compared to 26.36 per cent of Christians. Curiously, 7.63 per cent of Muslims consider the multi-confessional character of the school a reason compared to none in the Christian community.

Therefore, schooling in both communities has demonstrated that factors related to confession, kinship and communal solidarity play a vital role in the choices of Christians more than Muslims, who tend to take into consideration other factors. This clearly shows that Christians display a deeper sense of confessional cohesiveness compared to a looser sense of confessional communality of Muslims.

Economic life

Two variables in the economic life of both communities were selected to examine inter-confessional relationships. These two variables were the location of the workplace of the father and the confessional affiliation of

both business partners and employees.

Respondents were asked whether they work inside or outside the quarter of their community. Table (28) shows that more Christians work inside their quarters compared to Muslims. Conversely, more Muslims work outside their quarters. A portion of 37.27 per cent of Christian fathers work inside the quarter versus only 8.40 per cent of Muslims. A higher percentage of Muslim fathers (66.41%) work outside their quarters compared to Christians (36.36%).

Table 28: Location of the Workplace of the Father

Location	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jball - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Inside the quarter	41	37.27	11	8.40	52	21.58
Outside the quarter	40	36.36	87	66.41	127	52.70
Father does not work	29	26.36	33	25.19	62	25.73
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

It is evident that location of the workplace is associated with the labor market. The prevalence of self-employment in the Christian community - particularly fishing - and the dominance of formal employment in the Muslim community where factories and companies prevail in Jbail-Amchit, explain the difference in the location of the workplace inside or outside the quarter between both communities. As a matter of fact, working inside the quarter confines the social interaction to members of the same confession, hence, nourishes confessional solidarity of the community. By contrast, working outside the quarters allows more interaction with members of different confessions leading to the attenuation of confessional solidarity.

Therefore, the location of workplace inside the quarter in the Christian community imparts a stronger sense of communality compared to Muslims who do not follow the same direction.

The confessional affiliation of business partners indicates the kind of inter-confessional interaction and attitudes. As we have seen, in part one,

business partnership was very low in both communities. Yet, as Table (29) shows, the percentages of those who do have business partnership differ concerning the confessional affiliation. More Christians (4.55 %) than Muslims (1.53 %) deal with business partners who belong to the same confession. While very few Muslims (0.76%) have business partners affiliated to different confession, none of the Christians do. Thus, Christians tend more to accentuate the confessional element in their business partnership than Muslims.

Table 29: Confessional Affiliation of Business Partners of Self-employed Father

Confessional affiliation of business partners	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Business partners are affiliated to the same confession	5	4.55	2	1.53	7	2.90
Business partners are affiliated to different confessions	0	0.00	1	0.76	1	0.41
Father has no business partners	76	69.09	95	72.52	171	70.95
Father does not work	29	26.36	33	25.19	62	25.73
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

The multi-confessional affiliation of wage labor differs in both communities. Table (30) shows that Muslims bypass Christians in hiring wage labor from different confessions. The percentage of multi-confessional affiliation of Muslim wage labor is 45.04 per cent compared to only 17.2 per cent among Christians. Likewise, a higher percentage of wage labor affiliated to the same confession (4.55%) is hired by Christians compared to a lower percentage of 2.29 per cent among Muslims. Hence, Christian's display more confessional attitudes in hiring wage labor compared to Muslims.

**Table 30: Confessional Affiliation
of Wage Labor of Self-employed Father**

Confessional affiliation of wage labor	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Wage labor is affiliated to the same confession	5	4.55	3	2.29	8	3.32
Wage labor is affiliated to different confessions	19	17.27	59	45.04	78	32.37
Father has no wage labor	57	51.82	36	27.48	93	38.59
Father does not work	29	26.36	33	25.19	62	25.73
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

Therefore, following both variables in the economic life of both communities, it is demonstrated that Christians whose workplace is centered inside the quarters are more prone to have business partnership and hire wage labor from the same confession compared to Muslims who are more inclined to work outside their quarters and have business partnership and wage labor from different confessions. This difference in economic life in both communities reveals that Christians display a stronger sense of communality compared to the more tenuous sense of communality of Muslims.

In conclusion, inter-confessional relationships have shown two different confessional orientations of Christians and Muslims. This divergence expressed itself in the way both communities perceive the nature of inter-confessional relationships, in the impediments to excellent relations, the reasons for settlement in the quarter, the willingness to relocate to the adjacent social milieu, family education, schooling and economic life. These indicators of inter-confessional relationships show that Christians tend to have more confessional attitudes and communal solidarity than Muslims who have a milder confessional attitude and a more tenuous sense of communal solidarity.

One useful way to understand these differences in confessional orientation between Christians and Muslims would be the different analysis proposed by the marxist and the weberian school of thought

regarding the determinants of meaningful social action. Marxists⁽⁴⁾ believe that consciousness is determined by the class position in society. In contrast, weberians argue that it is the status, which is defined in terms of styles of life, values and ideas embraced by people, that determines their consciousness⁽⁵⁾. Ideas and values play a role in shaping people's consciousness, attitudes and meaningful social action⁽⁶⁾.

In reference to the marxist and weberian view points, Christians and Muslims form two different status groups rather than two ranking social classes. That was clear through the differences in their sociological aspects, as we have seen in part one. Thus, the sociological differences between Christians and Muslims entail two different styles of life and ideas that in turn lead to different consciousness. Only within these differences can we understand the difference in confessional consciousness and different confessional orientation that both communities display. Thus, the weberian paradigm is the context in which the different confessional attitudes of both minorities should be analyzed and understood.

As two different status groups, both minorities can be put in a wider context of juxtaposition between the minority versus the majority statuses. Christians are not only a minority in Tyre, they form a minority in Lebanon and in the whole Middle East. Minorities in all societies live with a feeling of insecurity that contributes to a high sense of solidarity and accentuates the group communal identity. Besides, these minorities are urged to work harder for more social achievement; economically, socially and culturally. Therefore, within this wider context it can be argued that the differences between Christians and Muslims refer to their difference as a minority versus majority status groups. Christians experience their status as a minority both in Lebanon and in the Middle East while Muslims experience their status as a majority status group in Lebanon and the Middle East. Christians, then, as a minority group, form

(4) Harris (1968), Taylor (1979), Friedman (1974), Rey (1971), Godelier (1973), Terray (1975).

(5) Weber (1930), Bendix (1966).

(6) Eisenstadt (1968, 1973), Bellah (1965), Inkelas and Smith (1974), McClelland (1961), Walzer (1965), Berger and Hsiao (1988), Robertson and Lechner (1990), Robertson (1997).

a solidary group more conscious of their communal identity. Conversely, Muslims as a majority group are more secure in their social milieu and, hence, exhibit an attenuated sense of confessional solidarity and identity. Moreover, much of the literature about Christians in Lebanon and their economic, political and cultural endeavor and urge to achieve⁽⁷⁾ reflect their sense of confessional insecurity and anxiety in a milieu of Muslim majority.

Furthermore, looking closely at the Lebanese context to examine the situation of Christians and Muslims, we find that the political mapping of post-Ta'if Lebanon witnessed a change in hegemonic positions of communal groupings. Christian's hegemony in the country declined while Muslims, particularly Shiites, moved to a position of hegemony⁽⁸⁾. The increased feeling of insecurity among Lebanese Christians is to some extent a reflex mechanism to perceiving themselves as menaced minority group with declining political power. By contrast, Muslims, and particularly Shiites, feel more confident and more assured of their future in the country as a confessional community. Their tenuous and loose sense of communality compared to Christians is a reflection of their rise to a position of hegemony in the Lebanese society.

Finally, shifts in hegemonic positions were also accompanied by demographic changes. The demographic growth of Muslims, particularly Shiites, increased compared to Christians. Evidently, the demographic change has a sociological impact on Christians and Muslims. It reinforces the insecurity of Christians as a minority status group while it strengthens the self-confidence of Muslims as a majority status group. Therefore, the vivid sense of communality of Christians compared to the loose communal sentiment of Muslims is the expression of different demographic patterns of the two communities.

Needless to say, Christians' decline explains their political disorganization and their relative political marginalization as well as the decline of their employment in the state bureaucracy. It, also, reflects the

(7) Touma (1971), Harik (1966, 1968), Hitti (1965), Chevallier (1971), Daher (1981), Fawaz (1983).

(8) Nasr (1978, 1985), Norton (1987), El-Khazen (2000), Ajami (1986), Cobban (1985), Salamé (1994), Salem (1997).

contraction of their communal territorial base in the country. Conversely, the rise of Muslims, particularly Shiites, explains the development of their organized political parties and the growth of their schools and various charitable organizations. It, also, explains their increased hegemony in key positions in the apparatus of the state and their increased geographic dispersion in the country.

The political and demographic changes affecting Christians and Muslims in Lebanon condition the attitudes of Christians in Tyre and Muslims in Jbail-Amchit. In fact, the contrast between Christians' confessional insecurity and malaise with the social milieu coupled with a strong sense of communality on one hand and Muslims' confessional security and ease with the social milieu coupled with a loose sense of communality, on the other hand, are local manifestations of the political and demographic changes affecting the confessions at the national level.

Another major consequence of the different confessional orientations of both communities is the out-migration of Christians from Tyre and the in-migration of Shiites to Jbail-Amchit. As we have mentioned before, some of the old Christian families migrated from Tyre and new Christian settlers moved in and resettled in the Christian Quarter. Currently, the new settlers are moving out from the quarters in search for a better life. So, the Christian population is decreasing in size, though we have to point out that this out-migration is less accentuated in comparison to rural migration in the country at large.

Muslims on the other hand, and Shiites in particular, started to migrate from the villages surrounding Jbail-Amchit in 1930's, and settled in the Christian-dominated agglomerations of Jbail and Amchit. Currently, this in-migration is still in progress and, as a result, the Shiite population is growing in size. It seems that the Shiites look forward to a better future in their newly established quarters.

III

NATIONAL INTEGRATION

National integration involves the integration of different confessional communities into supra-confessional entities at the local and national level. At the local level the supra-confessional entities entail the integration of Christians and Muslims as two confessional minorities into their adjacent social milieu inhabited by another confessional majority. At the national level the supra-confessional entities entail the integration of Christians and Muslims as confessional minorities into the nation-state.

National integration was measured in terms of five indicators and they are:

- 1 - cooperation in local development policies;
- 2 - participation in traditional religious feasts and ceremonies;
- 3 - authorities and their respective function in inter-confessional relationships;
- 4 - scope of inter-confessional relationships;
- 5 - promotion of inter-confessional co-existence.

These indicators of national integration imply voluntary actions taken with a freedom of choice. Respondents are free to choose to cooperate or not, to participate or not, in the religious feasts and ceremonies. Similarly, respondents are free to choose the authorities they refer to in their inter-confessional relationships, the scope of these inter-confessional relationships, and the means of promoting inter-confessional co-

existence. Other actions that are not voluntary, such as settlement in quarters and location of workplaces, are not considered indicator because they are determined by societal forces.

In addition, the indicators of national integration were selected according to inter-confessional relationships that result in permanent new supra-confessional entities. An example of these indicators is the cooperation between the two communities in local development policies. Such kind of cooperation produces supra-confessional structures capable of pursuing policies and implementing projects. Participation in religious feasts is another example that produces permanent supra-confessional customary traditions. Other indicators like authorities referred to in inter-confessional relationships, various social ties, and the nation-state produce permanent supra-confessional structures. Some inter-confessional relationships that reflect attitudes rather than supra-confessional structures are not considered accurate indicators of national integration.

As a matter of fact national integration and inter-confessional relationships are two different social process but interdependent and closely intertwined. Better inter-confessional relationships lead to stronger national integration, and worse inter-confessional relationships lead to weaker national integration. Although, inter-confessional relationships are considered central to national integration, yet national integration is not reduced to this kind of relationships. In fact, other contributing factors, along with inter-confessional relationships, play a role in ensuring national integration. National integration depends on national traditions, voluntary associations of the civil society and other supra-confessional structures. In addition, the reactivation and efficacy of these supra-confessional structures basically depend on the prevailing economic, social and political conditions of the society at large. These societal forces necessarily influence the rise and decline of the supra-confessional structures. Thus, national integration is a complex whole that requires more than one of its parts to be attained. Inter-confessional relationships become a necessary part but not sufficient in achieving national integration.

Therefore, for an in-depth understanding of national integration aside from the dialectics between inter-confessional relationships and national integration, the five indicators were examined.

Cooperation in Local Development

Respondents were asked whether or not they cooperate with other confessions in local development policies. Table (31) shows that Muslims more than Christians cooperate with other confessions. The percentage of Muslims who cooperate is 48.85 per cent compared to 38.18 per cent of Christians. Conversely, Muslims who do not cooperate make up a percentage of 51.14 per cent compared to a higher percentage of 61.81 per cent of Christians. These percentages signify that Christians are more reserved concerning inter-confessional relationships compared to Muslims who are more open to inter-confessional relations.

Table 31: Inter-confessional Cooperation in Local Development Policies

Inter-confessional Cooperation	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Cooperate	42	38.18	64	48.85	106	43.98
Do not cooperate	68	61.81	67	51.14	135	56.01
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

It is important to note that inspite the differences between both, yet more than half of the respondents in both communities reported that cooperation does not exist. The percentage of Muslims who reported that there is no cooperation is 51.14 per cent and Christians 61.81 per cent. What does this signify? It shows that both communities are interested in their immediate and narrow confessional concerns rather than in the local community as supra-confessional community. They focus on their own confessional groupings more than on permanent supra-confessional structures that carry out development policies. This, also, indicates a sense of alienation from the larger social entities that transcend restricted confessional affairs.

Evidently, this lack of cooperation does not strengthen national integration. Building a nation requires integrating people into a hierarchy of structures that carry out policies ensuring the welfare of the local non-confessional community as a whole. People should integrate into these hierarchical structures starting from the local community as a regional entity reaching up the state. Only by the active participation of people

across all levels of these hierarchical structures can integration take place. Such integration creates a feeling of integration into development policies at the local, regional and national level. It, also, inculcates a sense of national identity by linking the local with the national. This can be realized through genuine and smooth cooperation of people from different confessional backgrounds.

Traditions

Traditions were examined in terms of the respondents' view of their own traditions. In response to an open-ended question, respondents specified their own traditions as a confessional community. Table (32) presents these traditions. Considering what the respondents described as traditions, we notice that both Christians and Muslims demonstrate a religious trait in their description of their traditions. Traditions, to them, are an echo of their confessions. Traditions and confessions coalesce in what we may call «confessional traditions».

Table (32) also shows that Muslims are more likely to share and participate in the Christians feasts and ceremonies than Christians, who tend to abstain from sharing these feasts and ceremonies with Muslims. A percentage of 9.80 per cent of the Muslims reported that they celebrate religious feasts of other confessional communities compared to a significantly lower percentage of 0.98 per cent of the Christians. Other traditions that entail sharing feasts and ceremonies with others were also higher with Muslims than with Christians. For example, sharing moments of joy and sorrow was 29.41 per cent for Muslims compared to only 13.73 per cent for Christians. Similarly, 10.78 per cent of the Muslims celebrate Christian feasts like Halloween, Cross Feast, Saydat Al-Bihar, Carnival Week, Palm Sunday, Virgin Mary Month while non of the Christians celebrate Muslim feasts like Lesser and Greater Bairam, Ramadan, Ashoura, Prophet's Birthday and visiting shrines. This reveals that Christians have more reserved confessional attitude than Muslims who have a more moderate confessional attitude and more open to inter-confessional relationships.

Table 32: Traditions of the Confessional Communities

Traditions	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Sharing moments of joy and sorrow	14	13.73	30	29.41	44	21.57
Joining feast reunions	9	8.82	16	15.69	25	12.25
Celebrating holidays like Christmas, Easter, New Year, Assumption, Epiphany	17	16.67	0	0.00	17	8.33
Celebrating Lesser and Greater Bairam, Al-Hijriya New Year, Imam-Ali Birthday	0	0.00	27	26.47	27	13.24
Roaming and Catering for special festivities like Halloween, Cross Feast, Saydat Al-Bihar, Palm Sunday, the Virgin Mary Month, Carnival Week	91	89.22	11	10.78	102	50.00
Fastbreaking, gathering and celebrating Ramadan's nights	0	0.00	20	19.61	20	9.80
Dressing in black and holding ceremonies in the commemoration of Ashoura	0	0.00	18	17.65	18	8.82
Celebrating Prophet's Birthday	0	0.00	10	9.80	10	4.90
Visiting shrines and sanctuaries during feasts	0	0.00	14	13.73	14	6.86
Conformity to the confession in manners and styles of dressing and choice of spouse in marriage and chastity of girls	5	4.90	6	5.88	11	5.39
Celebrating religious feasts of other confessional communities	1	0.98	10	9.80	11	5.39
Charity giving during feasts	3	2.94	10	9.80	13	6.37
Slaying sheep on Greater Bairam	0	0.00	4	3.92	4	1.96
Exposing the trousseau and participating in the festivities after the wedding	2	1.96	4	3.92	6	2.94
Total	102	100.00	102	100.00	204	100.00

However, addressing these differences in attitude between Christians and Muslims from the perspective of national integration, we find that inspite these differences, both Christians and Muslims have perceptions that express national disunity. Both of them disregard common national

and cultural traditions. They both perceive «traditions» as a synonym to their own «confession» rather than to shared national traditions. Besides, not only do both communities disregard the common national traditions but also avoid the religious ceremonies that are strictly specific to the other confession. All Christians and most Muslims abstain from the celebration of confession-specific ceremonies. The only social event that both communities exchange is sharing moments of joy and sorrow. This exchange, though important, is not the central and the highly cherished tradition of both communities.

In both cases Muslims and Christians reflect a traditional rupture between them as two communities. This does not help in building customary and national traditions that unify both communities. Hence, both communities do not move in the direction that build up a strong national integration.

Authorities involved in Inter-confessional Relationships

Since a plurality of authorities plays a role in either promoting or hindering inter-confessional relationships and national integration, it becomes pertinent to identify these authorities and their functions in the dynamics of inter-confessional relationships. To identify these authorities respondents were given a list of different authorities to specify according to their role in resolving inter-confessional conflicts. Respondents were also given the choice to add other authorities if needed.

Religious authorities are assumed to represent the whole confessional community rather than factions of the community. Religious authorities, too, do not represent supra-confessional groupings. Similarly, high status individuals who, most of the time, are affiliated to the same confessional group and are self-appointed and imposed on the confessional community, represent members of the confessional community more than non-confessional entities. Conversely, elected political authorities, voluntary associations, and other supra-confessional organizations represent factions of the confessional community and supra-confessional groupings, i.e., authorities rooted in local or national non-confessional bodies. Therefore, the stronger the confessional solidarity is the more central the role of religious authorities and high status individuals becomes to the confessional community. This, in turn, leads to weaker

sense of national integration. Conversely, the sense of national integration becomes stronger when members of a community have a moderate confessional solidarity and refer less to religious authorities and high status individuals.

On the other hand, conferring functions to elected political authorities and voluntary associations in inter-confessional relationships, is a resultant of a weaker confessional stance and a stronger sense of national integration. However, when confessional attitudes are strong and the sense of national integration is weak, the role of elected political authorities and voluntary associations becomes less significant.

The role of authorities in the resolution of inter-confessional conflicts as reported by both communities is presented in table (33). Both communities have the highest percentage in the internal security category. The percentage of Christians is 48.18 per cent and the percentage of Muslims is 59.54 per cent. However, the lowest percentage in both communities goes to elected political leaders; 5.45 per cent of Christians and 3.05 per cent of Muslims.

Interestingly, these percentages rise higher concerning high status individuals and religious authorities. A percentage of 11.82 per cent of Christians refer to high status individuals compared to a percentage of 13.74 per cent of Muslims. Likewise, a percentage of 20.9% of Christians

Table 33: Authorities Referred to in the Resolution of Inter-Confessional Conflicts

Authorities	Community				Total	
	Christian in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
High status individuals	13	11.82	18	13.74	31	12.86
Religious authorities	23	20.9	8	6.11	31	12.86
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	6	5.45	4	3.05	10	4.14
Internal Security Forces	53	48.18	78	59.54	131	54.36
Judicial authorities	10	9.09	15	11.45	25	10.37
Conflicts resolved personally	3	2.73	5	3.82	8	3.32
No conflicts	2	1.82	3	2.29	5	2.07
Total	110	100.00	131	100.00	241	100.00

confer to religious authorities compared to 6.11 per cent of Muslims. High status individuals and religious authorities represent confessional groupings, and the high overall percentage of Christians (32.72%) and Muslims (19.85%) who refer to these authorities in resolving their conflicts express - despite the difference between both - a confessionally-oriented attitude, and, hence, a weak sense of national integration. In contrast, elected political leader, who are presumably elected by people from different confession, are symbols of national authorities. The low percentages of Christians and Muslims who refer to these authorities reflect a state of fragmentation and disunity of the society.

Therefore, both communities are more confessionally oriented in the authorities they refer to. They tend to trust the symbols of confessions rather than the symbols of national authorities. This confessional predisposition of Christians and Muslims, by no means, support or contribute to a strong sense of national integration.

Promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication also involves the role of certain authorities. To identify these authorities respondents were given a list of different authorities to specify according to their role in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication. Respondents were also given the choice to add other authorities if needed. Table (34) shows the role of authorities in the promotion of inter-confessional interaction and communication. The table shows that more Christians confer an important role to religious authorities in inter-confessional interactions and communication than Muslims. A significant percentage of 49.09 per cent of Christian believe in the role of the religious authorities compared to only 16.03 per cent of Muslims. This difference between Christians and Muslims goes in parallel with the Christians stronger sense of communality. Besides, the presence of the Catholic, Maronite and Greek Orthodox Archbishopric in the Christian Quarter of Tyre points to the role and influence of the religious authorities in the Christian community. High status individuals enjoy a similar position to that of religious authorities in both communities. A percentage of 22.73 per cent of Christians confer to high status individuals compared to 32.82 per cent of Muslims.

**Table 34: Authorities Involved in Promoting
Inter-confessional Interaction and Communication**

Authorities	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
High status individuals	25	22,73	43	32,82	68	28,22
Religious authorities	54	49,09	21	16,03	75	31,12
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	4	3,64	1	0,76	5	2,07
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	6	5,45	24	18,32	30	12,45
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	19	17,27	34	25,95	53	21,99
Multi-confessional schools	1	0,91	1	0,76	2	0,83
Exchange of common interests	1	0,91	0	0,00	1	0,41
No answer	0	0,00	7	5,34	7	2,90
Total	110	100,00	131	100,00	241	100,00

Interestingly, as we have seen, elected political leaders are not a top priority in resolving conflicts (see Table 33). Both communities, too, perceive a very narrow role of these political authorities in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication. The percentage of Christian who recognize the role of these authorities is only 3.64 per cent compared to a lower percentage of 0.76 per cent of Muslims. The low percentages of Christians and Muslims who refer to elected political authorities, concomitant with the high percentages of both communities who refer to high status individuals and religious authorities, indicate that Christians and Muslims are predisposed in their perceptions of authorities to be weakly integrated at the national level and reflect a state of national disunity.

In the same vein, we can note that religious authorities who represent confessional groupings rather than nation-wide entities, are a form of top-bottom integration provided by religious leaders rather than a form of bottom-top integration realized by people of the society. The same applies to high status individuals who are, also, a form of top-bottom integration controlled by influential figures rather

than a form of bottom-up integration attained by people. Here, again, both communities reflect a weak sense of national integration.

Voluntary associations are no exception with Muslims and Christians. Table (34) shows that a low percentage of Christians and Muslims observe the role of these associations in inter-confessional interaction. The percentage of Muslim is 18.32 per cent compared to only 5.45 per cent of Christians. These low percentages reflect a state of social fragmentation and, hence, a weak sense of national integration. This is evident because only an active civil society and strong voluntary associations are the instruments of effective national integration worked out from below by the people and for the people. The trivialization of civil society by both communities, and the concomitant emphasis on integration from above realized by religious authorities and high status individuals, are salient indicators of a weak sense of national integration.

Not only do both communities capitalize on the role of religious authorities and high status individuals and give less importance to the role of voluntary associations and elected political leaders, they, also, under-evaluate the vital role of multi-confessional schools and exchange of common interests in inter-confessional interaction. Almost none of the Christians (0.91%) and the Muslims (0.76%) referred to the role of multi-confessional school. Similarly, none of the Muslims and only 0.91 per cent of the Christians referred to the role of exchange of common interests.

In fact, both multi-confessional school and exchange of common interest are necessary for national integration. Multi-confessional schools play a role in inculcating national values and in creating social bonds among children of different confessions. Also, exchange of common interests is central to interaction because in a market economy interest-oriented actions entail communication and interaction among people of different socio-economic, confessional, and cultural backgrounds. Needless to say that the more intense the interest-oriented interactions and communications are, the more solid the ground of national integration becomes.

Scope of Inter-Confessional Relationships

To explore the importance of a particular scope of inter-confessional relationship to another, respondents were asked to rate different specified scopes on a 7-point scale ranging from the most important (1) to the least important (7), and to indicate if there is no relationship. Table (35.1) and Table (35.2) show the scopes and their importance in inter-confessional relationships. Most of the scopes stated in these tables entail, by one way or another, one form of inter-confessional interaction that builds up for national integration. People from different confessions are unified in political celebrations, national ceremonies, common interests and more profoundly in friendship and marriage. Curiously, none of the above was of a first degree importance to both communities. More than half of the Muslims and the Christians gave top priority to social obligations of sharing moments of joy and sorrow; and their percentages are: 52.73 per cent of the Christians and 54.20 per cent of the Muslims. As it can be expected the percentages of those who give joy and sorrow the least importance are low percentages. Tables (35.1) and Table (35.2) reveal that 0.91 per cent of the Christians and 0.76 per cent of the Muslims consider it as such. These high percentages of Christians and Muslims concerning the importance of sharing moments of joy and sorrow demonstrate that both communities are more concerned with relations based on formalism and ritualism of social duties and obligations more than their concern with relations based on central public issues needed for national integration.

The scopes of political and national ceremonies accentuate more clearly the stance of both communities. First, political celebration is not even a scope of inter-confessional relationships to 30 per cent of the Christians and to 32.06 per cent of the Muslims. In addition to those who have no relations in the political scope, the percentages of Christians and Muslims at the bottom points of the ranking scale are the highest. The percentages of Christians are 18.18 per cent and 13.64 per cent respectively. Likewise, the percentages of Muslims are 17.56 per cent and 26.72 per cent respectively. Second, national ceremonies are not even a scope of inter-confessional relationships to 20 per cent of the Christians and 22.14 per cent of the Muslims. Added to that, the percentages of Christians and Muslims at the bottom points of the rating

scale are the highest. The percentages of Christians are 24.55 per cent and 21.82 per cent respectively. Likewise, the percentages of Muslims are 13.74 per cent and 27.48 per cent respectively.

Table 35.1: Scope of Inter-Confessional Relationships

Scope	Rate	Community																	
		Christians in Tyre																	
		No Relationship		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Political celebration		33	30.00	7	6.36	5	4.55	10	9.09	8	7.27	12	10.91	20	18.18	15	13.64	110	100.00
National and official ceremonies		22	20.00	7	6.36	7	6.36	9	8.18	11	10.00	27	24.55	24	21.82	3	2.73	110	100.00
Joy and sorrow		4	3.64	58	52.73	21	19.09	9	8.18	11	10.00	2	1.82	4	3.64	1	0.91	110	100.00
Work and common interests		16	14.55	16	14.55	21	19.09	19	17.27	18	16.36	12	10.91	6	5.45	2	1.82	110	100.00
Friendship		7	6.36	24	21.82	24	21.82	16	14.55	23	20.91	8	7.27	6	5.45	2	1.82	110	100.00
Marriage		50	45.45	5	4.55	2	1.82	4	3.64	5	4.55	10	9.09	9	8.18	25	22.73	110	100.00

Table 35.2: Scope of Inter-Confessional Relationships

Scope	Rate	Community																	
		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit																	
		No Relationship		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Political celebration		42	32.06	5	3.82	5	3.82	8	6.11	5	3.82	8	6.11	23	17.56	35	26.72	131	100.00
National and official ceremonies		29	22.14	10	7.63	9	6.87	12	9.16	8	6.11	18	13.74	36	27.48	9	6.87	131	100.00
Joy and sorrow		1	0.76	71	54.20	34	25.95	9	6.87	8	6.11	6	4.58	1	0.76	1	0.76	131	100.00
Work and common interests		13	9.92	14	10.69	22	16.79	21	16.03	31	23.66	20	15.27	9	6.87	1	0.76	131	100.00
Friendship		4	3.05	44	33.59	25	19.08	27	20.61	18	13.74	8	6.11	5	3.82	0	0.00	131	100.00
Marriage		27	20.61	13	9.92	10	7.63	17	12.98	14	10.69	22	16.79	6	4.58	22	16.79	131	100.00

The importance both communities give to social obligations versus political and national ceremonies demonstrate that both communities are disinterested in sharing political symbols and national values that are needed for a nationally integrated society. Needless to say that nation-building involves mobilization of people around certain political values and symbols rather than confining to mere formalism and ritualism of social obligations. By this, Christian's and Muslim's disinterest in the political dimension signifies their weak sense of national integration.

Third, from the scope of political and national ceremonies we move to more profound scopes of inter-confessional relationships, namely friendship and marriage. Table (35.1) and Table (35.2) reveal a continuous trend in both communities. In comparison to the scope of social obligation of joy and sorrow, marriage and friendship are of second-degree importance as a scope. This trend takes a sharper direction in the scope of marriage compared to friendship. A high percentage of Christians and Muslims reported that the scope of marriage is non-existent; with a significantly higher percentage of the Christians. The percentage of Christians who have no inter-confessional marriages is 45.45 per cent compared to 20.61 per cent of the Muslims. Similarly, the percentages of Christians and Muslims at the lowest points of the rating scale are the highest. The percentage of Christians is 22.73 per cent and Muslims 16.79 per cent. It is noted that the substantial difference between Christians and Muslims in the absence of inter-confessional marriage shows that Muslims are more receptive and tolerant with this kind of marriage than Christians. This signifies a more confessional attitude on the part of Christians.

Obviously, inter-confessional marriage is the most fertile soil for attaining a deconfessionalized society. Marriage is the most intimate and private social relationship. It diffuses confessionalism and paves the way for national integration and nation-building. This vital social unit needed for national integration is devalued by both communities compared to the importance both gave to social obligations of joy and sorrow.

Friendship, too, is less valued by both communities than social obligations; but more emphasized than marriage. A small percentage of Christians (6.36%) and Muslims (3.05%) have no friendship relationships. And, both communities have a high percentage of the top points of

the rating scale; 21.82 per cent of Christians and 33.59 per cent of Muslims. Besides, almost none of the Christians or the Muslims consider it the least important, the percentage of Christians is 1.82 per cent versus none among Muslims. Although both communities consider friendship more important than marriage, yet both consider it less important than political and national ceremonies. However, both communities still see sharing moments of joy and sorrow of higher importance than political, national, marital and friendly relationships. Knowing the role of friendship and marriage in melting members of a society in the same pot, the devaluation of both Christians and Muslims of the role of these social ties shows more deeply their weak sense of national integration.

Fourth, both communities under-emphasize work and common interest as a scope of inter-confessional relationship. This scope is less important than the scope of sharing joy and sorrow. Christians who have no relations of common interests is 14.55 per cent compared to 9.92 per cent of the Muslims. Only 14.55 per cent of the Christians consider this scope the most important compared to 10.69 per cent of the Muslims who gave it the same rank. Evidently, economic transactions and interactions are central in a market economy. These transactions and interactions increase with a more developed economy. Thus, this kind of economic interactions necessarily promotes national integration. Therefore, the under-emphasis of economic life serves as an indicator of the weak national integration of both communities.

Inter-confessional Co-existence

To explore how Christians and Muslims perceive the measures required for promoting national integration of the different confessional groupings in the Lebanese sovereign nation-state, respondents were given an open-ended question in which they stated their views without interference on the part of the field workers. Table (36) presents the views of both communities. The divergence in the views of both communities was clear. However, these views echoed rhetorically the traditional political discourse prevailing among Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. Christians' views reflect a pluralistic model of Lebanon in which the confessional minorities form the elementary structures of society.

**Table 36: Promotion of Confessional Coexistence
in the Lebanese Nation-State⁽¹⁾**

Measures	Community				Total	
	Christians in Tyre		Muslims in Jbail - Amchit			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Abolishment of political confessionalism	10	9.71	17	13.82	27	11.95
Enhancing non-confessional family education, teaching civics and making all schools multi-confessional	14	13.59	31	25.20	45	19.91
Creating multi-confessional clubs that work on fostering a sense of national awareness	15	14.56	22	17.89	37	16.37
Secularization, civil marriage, open-mindedness, freedom	29	28.16	18	14.63	47	20.80
Tolerance, accepting and communicating with each other, sincere and consensus relationships	45	43.69	50	40.65	95	42.04
Working for common national goals	7	6.80	5	4.07	12	5.31
Dialogue, national unity, even development, entente between political and religious leaders	14	13.59	10	8.13	24	10.62
Recognition of the worries of minorities, balanced power-sharing and effective political representation of confessions	21	20.39	18	14.63	39	17.26
Non-interference of religious leaders	5	4.85	19	15.45	24	10.62
Non-interference of political leaders	7	6.80	13	10.57	20	8.85
Abolishment of extremist political parties	2	1.94	7	5.69	9	3.98
Liberation of the national territory and non-interference of foreigners in national affairs	4	3.88	7	5.69	11	4.87
Fostering economic growth and development	4	3.88	5	4.07	9	3.98
National integration of confessional communities	3	2.91	1	0.81	4	1.77
Promotion of the national good	4	3.88	0	0.00	4	1.77
Abolishment of confessionalism in the collective mind	9	8.74	9	7.32	18	7.96
Total	103	100.00	123	100.00	226	100.00

Nation-building, according to their model, requires both a secular system and effective political representation of confessional communities implemented in the context of inter-confessional dialogue, entente, balanced power-sharing between different confessions, freedom, and open-mindedness. On the other hand, Muslims' views reflect an

(1) 7 interviewees in Tyre and 8 in Jbail-Amchit gave no response.

assimilative model of Lebanon built on enhancing non-confessionalism in national life. Nation-building, according to their model, necessitates the abolishment of political confessionalism, promotion of non-confessional socialization, termination of interference of religious and political leader as well as extremist political parties.

Looking at the percentages in Table (36), we find that a significant percentage of both communities reported that promoting confessional co-existence requires tolerance and communicating with each other. The percentage of Christians is 43.69 per cent and Muslims 40.65 per cent. In fact, this view does not suggest any practical implications by both communities.

However, the divergence in the views of both communities becomes clear in the statements that reflect the model of each community. The pluralistic model of Christians is understood in terms of the percentages of Christians that ranked higher than Muslims. An overall percentage of 23.30 per cent makes up Christians who call for (1) recognition of the worries of minorities, balanced power sharing and effective political representation of confessions, (2) national integration of confessional communities, compared to an overall percentage of 15.44 per cent of the Muslims. The percentage of Christians who call for dialogue and entente between political and religious leaders is 13.59 per cent compared to a percentage of 8.13 per cent of the Muslims. The percentage of Christians who call for secularization, civil marriage, open-mindedness and freedom is 28.16 per cent, compared to a percentage of 14.63 per cent of the Muslims.

On the other hand, the assimilative model of Muslims is understood in terms of the percentages of Muslim that ranked higher than Christians. The percentage of Muslims who call for the abolishment of political confessionalism is 13.82 per cent compared to 9.71 per cent of the Christians. The overall percentage of Muslims who call for (1) enhancing non-confessional family education, teaching civics and multiconfessional school, (2) creating multiconfessional clubs to foster national awareness, is 43.09 per cent compared to 28.15 per cent of the Christians. Similarly, an overall percentage of 31.71 per cent of Muslims call for (1) non-interference of religious leaders, (2) non-interference of political leaders, (3) termination of extremist political parties, compared to an overall

percentage of 13.59 per cent of the Christians.

The pluralistic model of the Christians is a reflection of confessional solidarity as it assumes that communal minorities constitute the building blocks of society along with confessional power sharing, entente, and political representation. On the other hand, the assimilative model of the Muslims corresponds to a weaker confessional solidarity as it assumes non-confessionalism in politics, family, education and clubs.

Considering the views of both communities on one hand, and national integration on the other hand, we notice the following: First, both communities were focusing on their existence as different confessional groupings in a multi-confessional society. Most of what both communities reported finds its roots in the prevailing traditional political discourse in the country. The reflection of this prevailing political discourse shows the preoccupation of both communities with their conditions as different communities and not with the mechanisms needed for a comprehensive nationally integrated society. This, again, shows the thin sense of national integration among Christians and Muslims. This preoccupation with confessional concerns is clear in the respective terms of confessionalism, minorities, non-confessionalism, abolishment of confessionalism, etc. Ideas, mechanism and structures that transcend confessional groupings and contribute to national integration are not traced in what they reported. Second, neither community referred to the dynamic role of the various voluntary associations of civil society in the process of national integration. Such associations are either absent or disregarded by both communities. In either case, this signifies a weak sense of national integration. Third, both communities bypassed the role of political reform as a vital institutional mechanism for integrating individuals into the nation-state, especially the consensus and/or liberal models of democracy, role of political parties in nation building, and constitutional amendments. Likewise, both communities did not hint to the function of clientelist politics in integrating individuals to primordial structures. By so doing confessionalism is nurtured at the expense of national integration. Fourth, both communities did not allude to socio-economic disparity and its relation to the reproduction of confessional identity. Only with socio-economic reforms can national integration be attained. Fifth, both communities did not refer to the distinction between a culturally heterogeneous and homogeneous society. In a heterogeneous society

the institutionalization of personal federalism in the domains of education, administration and culture is a prerequisite for the good management of pluralism. In a homogeneous society such personal federalism does not exist. This cultural issue, in either sense, was not clear enough to both communities although it is crucial in the Lebanese society.

As we have seen, both communities fall behind the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strong sense of national integration. The national integration of Christians and Muslims as two different confessional minorities lacks the components that lead to their integration at the national level. Most Christians and Muslims do not cooperate to carry out policies ensuring the welfare of the local community as one supra-confessional whole. There is a clear rupture in traditions between them rather than common unifying customary and national traditions. They are confessionally oriented in the authorities they refer to and in their perception of the authorities that are capable of resolving conflict and promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication. They, too, tend to weigh social obligations as a scope of inter-confessional relationships more than vital scopes that build up to national integration. Besides, in their views of what promotes confessional coexistence, they proved to be preoccupied with their own conditions, as two distinct communities, rather than with the mechanisms needed for a comprehensive nationally integrated societies. The weak sense of national integration of Christians and Muslims seems to support the viewpoint that confessionalism reproduces a fragmented, backward, and failed social order in the country.

Addressing the problematic of national integration brings us back to the primordial and the structural approaches introduced in the preface. Both approaches consider confessionalism a central issue in national integration, though the assumptions and conclusions of primordialists and structuralists diverge in their assesment of the confessional and national issues. Primordialists argue that confessionalism is a fundamental given of the Lebanese social existence. In their view, national integration requires the provision of institutional mechanisms such as consensus democracy and personal or non-territorial federalism in matters of education and culture. Such mechanisms are capable of efficient management of a pluralistic society composed of different

confessional groups, i.e., different status groups. On the other hand, structuralists believe that confessional consciousness is reproduced by the differential access to the economic, social, political, educational, and cultural resources of the Lebanese society. Therefore, national integration, as structuralists argue, requires both redressing the imbalances among the various confessions and implementing structural reforms.

It is clear that primordialists tend to situate the problem of national integration at the level of the confessions. Their focus is centered on attaining the well being of the confessional groupings, which in turn, achieves the well being of the society at large. Evidently, in this perspective, the abolishment of confessionalism is not posed because the social existence of Lebanon is defined in terms of confessionalism. Further, confessional coexistence in Lebanon is considered an exemplary model that could be instituted in all pluralistic societies. Therefore, national integration in this view point requires, first, the recognition of the worries, differences, and aspirations of the confessions and, second, the translation of confession-related characteristics into viable institutional frameworks at the national level. Structuralists, on the other hand, tend to locate the problem of national integration at the level of society at large. Most structuralists acknowledge the confessional composition of the Lebanese society, but believe that reforms and redressing of socio-economic and political imbalances limit confessionalism in social life to a great extent. Confession-related problems are relegated to secondary concerns to the advantage of the primary concern of structural reforms. Some structuralists even demand the complete abolishment of confessionalism as a prerequisite for reform.

Despite this difference in outlook regarding confessionalism, both primordialists and structuralists concord in posing the problem of national integration at the national level. This concordance is based on the assumption that confessionalism and national integration are at the same time different and closely related concepts. As we have argued before, confessionalism is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient of national integration. In fact, national integration involves the juxtaposition of confessional groupings as different parts in supra-confessional structures as one whole. Wholes, needless to say, cannot be reduced to their elementary parts. Hence, confessionalism and national integration are different but dialectically related.

We, also, have argued that confessions are different status groups and confessionalism is part of their social existence. Our argument, therefore, endorses the viewpoint that confessionalism is a given fact of Lebanese society and, hence, cannot be abolished from social life. However, the problem of national integration transcends confessionalism and is situated at the level of society at large: Firstly, the institutional mechanisms of consensus democracy and non-territorial federalism of the primordial approach pose national integration at the level of society at large. This is evident since the institution of these structures is supra-confessional and ultimately depends on decision-making at the national level. In other terms, the political, social and cultural structures of society at large determine the efficacy of the management of pluralism. Good management reduces confessional tensions, conflicts, and fragmentation, and, hence, generates a momentum towards unity and national integration. Conversely, bad management exacerbates confessional identities, conflicts, and, hence, generates fragmentation and disunity. Secondly, the redressement of economic, social and political imbalances among confessions and the focus on reforms, advocated by structuralists, also, situates national integration at the level of society at large. Needless to say, addressing imbalances and implementing reforms are national policies determined by the state of society at large. National reform policies attenuate confessional identities and tensions and promote national unity. Conversely, the persistence of imbalances among the confessions and the opposition to reforms exacerbates confessional identities and tensions ending up with disunity and fragmentation that hinders national integration.

Briefly put, the problem of national integration is posed at the national level, rather than at the level of the confessional givens of Lebanese society, and the propositions suggested by primordialists and structuralists are prerequisites for attaining national integration. Firstly, the givenness of confessionalism in Lebanese social life requires its institutionalization at the national level in consensus democracy and personal federalism and, secondly, the smooth and efficient management of political pluralism requires structural reforms along the lines advocated by structuralists.

Therefore, the weak sense of national integration of Christians and Muslims is a national problem contingent on reforming the Lebanese

system along the lines advocated by primordialists and structuralists. It is reasonable to argue that the failure to implement reforms at the national level reproduces the evils of confessionalism in social life. These evils manifest themselves in fragmentation, fanaticism, and violence as well as in the marginalization of civil society and the trivialization of democracy.

Since Independence, the Lebanese social order has reproduced confessional identities and extremism and failed to establish a nationally integrated and stable society. According to primordialists, the Lebanese social order failed to institute a consensus model of democracy. It recognized the plural structure of society but failed to translate pluralism into non-territorial federalism in the Swiss or Belgium sense of the term. Thus, confessionalism remains a burning issue awaiting appeasement and national integration is still on the agenda. In the structuralists viewpoint the Lebanese social order failed, too, to institute a viable and liberal democracy operating in an active civil society where people strive to promote the national good through supra-confessional voluntary associations. This is clear in the marginalized civil society in Lebanon and the trivialized liberal democracy. Besides, the growth of a national identity required for a solid national unity and integration, is hindered by confessional identities and tensions. Such situation is produced by (1) confessional political clientelist system, (2) educational system, (3) confessional personal status codes, (4) different confessional voluntary associations, (5) socio-economic imbalances among confessions. Therefore, neither confessional appeasement nor national integration was attained.

The data in this chapter reveal that Christians and Muslims display a weak sense of national integration which testifies to the failure of the Lebanese social order in accomplishing nation-building and national integration.

Today, the Syrian satellization of post-Ta'if Lebanon accentuates the crisis of the system; it exacerbated confessionalism and weakened national unity. The Syrian-dominated regime lost its independence and its sovereignty, and as a result, the regime proved incapable of addressing the major issues of the country including confessionalism and national integration: First, the regime has distorted political representation and created political imbalances among confessions. This led to the

dysfunctioning of the confessional democratic system. Second, ruling elites, freed from the obligations of representativity and accountability, pursued already defined policies. Third, the regime marginalized civil society and clientelized the voluntary associations. Concomittantly, confessional associations and institutions were encouraged. We are currently witnessing a marked growth of a multitude of confessionally-based organizations. Fourth, the Syrian satellization is accompanied by an acute socio-economic crisis that renders people apathetic to public issues and force them to turn to the security of the family and confession. Evidently, the burning issue of confessionalism and national integration cannot be addressed in a context of non-accountability, marginalized civil society, heightened confessionalism, social fragmentation, and acute crisis.

IV

CORRELATION BETWEEN SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND CONFESSIONALISM

Considering the findings on the sociology of Christians and Muslims as two different minorities, their inter-confessional relationships and their national integration, we attempt to examine the correlation between certain selected socio-economic variables and different indicators of confessional attitudes in both minorities.

We selected the socio-economic variable that are directly related to work, income and education. These selected variables are:

- 1 - location of the workplace of the father;
- 2 - employment of the mother;
- 3 - family income;
- 4 - education of the father and mother;
- 5 - schooling of children.

These five socio-economic variables are believed to contribute by one way or another to different confessional attitudes of both communities. For example, fathers who work outside the communal quarters are more likely to build relations with people from other confessions. Mothers, as well, who are employed are more prone to interact with people other than the immediate family and relatives of housewives. High-income families are more likely to exhibit moderate confessional attitudes compared to low-income families. Level of education and type of school play a role in transmitting religious values and beliefs. Thus, all these

variables are expected to lead to different confessional attitudes.

To which extent these variables influence confessional attitude will be examined in terms of four indicators. Some correlation is expected to exist between each of the five selected socio-economic variables and four indicators of confessional attitudes, and they are:

- 1 - nature of relationship with the adjacent social milieu: whether the relationship is good, formal, reserved, or no relation will express the influence of each of the five socio-economic variables;
- 2 - impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu: the five selected socio-economic variable are expected to correlate with the way Christians and Muslims explain these impediments whether in terms of confession-related or non-confession-related interpretations;
- 3 - inter-confessional family education: the five selected socio-economic variables are assumed to correlate with family education that encourages or does not encourage inter-confessional interaction;
- 4 - function of authorities in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication: the five selected socio-economic variables are assumed to correlate with the kind of authorities referred to whether religious figures, high status individuals, elected authorities, and voluntary associations.

Each of the following tables presents the relationship between each of the five selected socio-economic variable with the four indicators of confessional attitudes. A chi-square test was conducted for each of the five socio-economic variables with each of the four indicators of confessional attitudes. The tables present the frequencies and percentages of responses of Christians and Muslims as well as the chi-square test results.

Location of the Workplace of the Father

Starting from the assumption that multi-confessional labor markets entail some kind of economic integration, the workplace can indicate a difference in confessional attitudes. Fathers working outside the communal quarter have more chance to interact and develop social ties and common material interests with individuals affiliated to different

confessions. Social ties developed in multi-confessional labor markets supersede confessional affiliation and, hence, reduce confessionalism. By contrast, fathers working in the immediate communal quarters are less likely to develop multi-confessional social ties and, hence, preserve the primacy of their confessional ties and affiliation. Thus, it is expected that the work of the father, whether inside or outside the communal quarter, is correlated with an increased or decreased confessional attitudes. This difference in confessional attitude is studied in terms of four indicators: (1) nature of confessional relationship with the adjacent social milieu, (2) impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu, (3) inter-confessional family education, (4) authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication. Accordingly, we forward our hypothesis that there is correlation between workplace and each of these four indicators.

Table (37) presents the frequencies of Christians and Muslims in terms of the workplace of the father and the first indicator, i.e., the nature of inter-confessional relationship.

Table 37: Location of the Workplace of the Father and the Nature of Confessional Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu⁽¹⁾

Location of the Workplace	Community											
	Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jbail - Amchit					
	Inside the quarter		Outside the quarter		Total		Inside the quarter		Outside the quarter		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	19	46.34	23	56.10	42	51.22	10	90.91	70	80.46	80	81.63
Reserved	11	26.83	12	29.27	23	28.05	1	9.09	12	13.79	13	13.27
Formal	10	24.39	6	14.63	16	19.51	0	0.00	3	3.45	3	3.06
No relationship	1	2.44	0	0.00	1	1.22	0	0.00	2	2.30	2	2.04
Total	41	100.00	40	100.00	81	100.00	11	100.00	87	100.00	98	100.00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 2.42$; $P = .48$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = .92$; $P = .81$

The chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant

(1) Figures in the table include only working fathers in Tyre and Jbail-Amchit (See table 2)

correlation for Christian fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 2.42$, $P = .48$), nor for Muslim fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = .92$, $P = .81$).

Table (38) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between location of the workplace and the second indicator, i.e., the impediments to excellent relationships with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 38: Location of the Workplace of the Father and Impediments to Excellent Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Kind of Impediments	Location of the Workplace		Community										Total	
			Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jbail - Amchit					
	Inside the quarter		Outside the quarter		Total		Inside the quarter		Outside the quarter					
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Different standards of living	4	9.76	2	5.00	6	7,41	1	9.09	15	17.24	16	16,33		
Different traditions	18	43.90	11	27.50	29	35,80	4	36.36	20	22.99	24	24,49		
Different confessions	6	14.63	13	32.50	19	23,46	4	36.36	10	11.49	14	14,29		
Rejection by the social milieu	8	19.51	6	15.00	14	17,28	0	0.00	10	11.49	10	10,20		
Feeling of superiority	2	4.88	4	10.00	6	7,41	1	9.09	7	8.05	8	8,16		
Preoccupation with work	1	2.44	2	5.00	3	3,70	0	0.00	7	8.05	7	7,14		
Different political orientation	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	0	0.00	3	3.45	3	3,06		
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	0	0.00	2	2.30	2	2,04		
No impediments	1	2.44	1	2.50	2	2,47	1	9.09	13	14.94	14	14,29		
No answer	1	2.44	1	2.50	2	2,47	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00		
Total	41	100.00	40	100.00	81	100,00	11	100.00	87	100.00	98	100,00		

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 6.84$; $P = .44$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 8.36$; $P = .39$

The chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant correlation for Christian fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 6.84$, $P = .44$), nor

for Muslim fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 8.36$, $P = .39$).

Table (39) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between location of the workplace and the third indicator, i.e., inter-confessional family education.

Table 39: Location of the Workplace of the Father and Inter-Confessional Family Education

Location of the workplace	Community											
	Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jbail - Amchit					
	Inside the quarter		Outside the quarter		Total		Inside the quarter		Outside the quarter		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter-confessional interaction	13	31.71	20	50.00	33	40,74	10	90.91	70	80.46	80	81,63
Does not encourage inter-confessional interaction	26	63.41	16	40.00	42	51,85	1	9.09	9	10.34	10	10,20
Neither	2	4.88	4	10.00	6	7,41	0	0.00	8	9.20	8	8,16
Total	41	100.00	40	100.00	81	100,00	11	100.00	87	100.00	98	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 4.93$; $P = .08$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 1.15$; $P = .56$

The chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant correlation for Christian fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 4.93$, $P = .08$), nor for Muslim fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 1.15$, $P = .56$).

Table (40) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relation between location of the workplace and authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication.

Table 40: Location of the Workplace of the Father and Authorities Involved in Promoting Inter-confessional Interaction and Communication

Location of the Workplace Authorities	Community											
	Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jbail - Amchit					
	Inside the quarter		Outside the quarter		Total		Inside the quarter		Outside the quarter		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
High status individuals	10	24.39	8	20.00	18	22,22	3	27.27	28	32.18	31	31,63
Religious authorities	20	48.78	21	52.50	41	50,62	1	9.09	15	17.24	16	16,33
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	2	4.88	1	2.50	3	3,70	0	0.00	1	1.15	1	1,02
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	3	7.32	2	5.00	5	6,17	1	9.09	17	19.54	18	18,37
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	5	12.20	8	20.00	13	16,05	5	45.45	21	24.14	26	26,53
Multi-confessional schools	1	2.44	0	0.00	1	1,23	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00
Exchange of common interests	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	0	0.00	1	1.15	1	1,02
No answer	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	1	9.09	4	4.60	5	5,10
Total	41	100.00	40	100.00	81	100,00	11	100.00	87	100.00	98	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 6.08$; $P = .41$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 4.92$; $P = .67$

The chi-square test did not indicate a statistically significant correlation for Christian fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 6.08$, $P = .41$), nor for Muslim fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 4.92$, $P = .67$).

Therefore, the hypothesis was null; the location of the workplace whether outside or inside the communal quarters does not correlate with increased or decreased confessional attitude.

Employment of the Mother

Working mothers are more exposed to social interaction with people beyond the circle of the family and relatives. At workplace the mother is more likely to interact with people affiliated to different confessions and more probably to have multi-confessional social ties. Conversely, unemployed housewives, often interact with family, relatives and neighbors who are most of the time affiliated to the same confession. Thus, the position of the mother whether employed or a housewife is expected to be correlated with a mild or strong confessional attitude. This difference is traced in the four indicators: (1) nature of confessional relationship with the adjacent social milieu, (2) impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu, (3) inter-confessional family education, (4) authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication. Accordingly, we forward our hypothesis that there is correlation between employment of the mother and each of the four indicators.

Table (41) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in term of the relationship between the employment of the mother and the first indicator, i.e., the nature of confessional relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 41: Employment of the Mother and the Nature of Confessional Relationship With the Adjacent Social Milieu

Employment of the Mother	Community																	
	Christians in Tyre								Muslims in Jbail - Amchit									
	Employee		Housewife		Dead		Total		Employee		Housewife		Dead		No answer		Total	
Nature of Relationship	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	14	60.87	45	55.56	4	66.67	63	57,27	11	91.67	95	83.33	3	100.0	1	50.00	110	83,97
Reserved	4	17.39	22	27.16	2	33.33	28	25.45	1	8.33	15	13.16	0	0.00	0	0.00	16	12.21
Formal	4	17.39	13	16.04	0	0.00	17	15.45	0	0.00	2	1.75	0	0.00	1	50.00	3	2.29
No relationship	1	4.35	1	1.23	0	0.00	2	1,82	0	0.00	2	1.75	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1,53
Total	23	100.0	81	100.0	6	100.0	110	100,00	12	100.0	114	100.0	3	100.0	2	100.0	131	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 3.08$; $P = .79$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 21.96$; $P = .009$

The chi-square test for Christian mothers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 3.08$, $P = .79$). The chi-square test for Muslim mothers indicated a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 21.96$, $P = .009$).

Table (42) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between the employment of the mother and the second indicator, i.e., impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 42: Employment of the Mother and Impediments to Excellent Relationship With the Social Milieu

Employment of the Mother	Community																Total	
	Christians in Tyre								Muslims in Jbail - Amchit									
	Employee		Housewife		Dead		Total		Employee		Housewife		Dead		No answer			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Kind of Impediments																		
Different standards of living	0	0.00	6	7.41	1	16.67	7	6,36	0	0.00	19	16.67	1	33.33	0	0.00	20	15,27
Different traditions	9	39.13	27	33.33	4	66.67	40	36,36	5	41.67	24	21.05	0	0.00	0	0.00	29	22,14
Different confessions	5	21.74	22	27.16	0	0.00	27	24,55	0	0.00	22	19.30	0	0.00	0	0.00	22	16,79
Rejection by the social milieu	5	21.74	12	14.81	0	0.00	17	15,45	1	8.33	14	12.28	1	33.33	0	0.00	16	12,21
Feeling of superiority	0	0.00	7	8.64	0	0.00	7	6,36	2	16.67	9	7.89	0	0.00	0	0.00	11	8,40
Preoccupation with work	3	13.04	1	1.23	0	0.00	4	3,64	1	8.33	5	4.39	0	0.00	1	50.00	7	5,34
Different political orientation	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	1	8.33	2	1.75	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	2,29
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	1	8.33	2	1.75	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	2,29
No impediments	0	0.00	5	6.17	1	16.67	6	5,45	1	8.33	16	14.04	1	33.33	1	50.00	19	14,50
No answer	1	4.35	1	1.23	0	0.00	2	1,82	0	0.00	1	0.88	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0,76
Total	23	100.0	81	100.0	6	100.0	110	100,0	12	100.0	114	100.0	3	100.0	2	100.0	131	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 21.07$; $P = .10$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 27.67$; $P = .42$

The chi-square test for Christian mothers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 21.07$, $P = .10$), nor for Muslim mothers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 27.67$, $P = .42$).

Table (43) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between the employment of the mother and the third indicator, i.e., inter-confessional family education.

Table 43: Employment of the Mother and Inter-Confessional Family Education

Employment of the Mother	Community																Total	
	Christians in Tyre								Muslims in Jbail - Amchit									
	Employee		Housewife		Dead		Total		Employee		Housewife		Dead		No answer			
	N	%	N	%	N	%			N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter- confessional interaction	9	39.13	37	45.68	4	66.67	50	45,45	10	83.33	95	83.33	3	100.00	1	50.00	109	83,21
Does not encourage inter- confessional interaction	13	56.52	37	45.68	2	33.33	52	47,27	1	8.33	12	10.53	0	0.00	1	50.00	14	10,69
Neither	1	4.35	8	9.88	0	0.00	9	8,18	1	8.33	7	6.14	0	0.00	0	0.00	8	6,11
Total	23	100.00	81	100.00	6	100.00	110	100,00	12	100.00	114	100.00	3	100.00	2	100.0	131	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 2.41$; $P = .65$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 4.04$; $P = .67$

The chi-square test for Christian mothers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 2.41$, $P = .65$), nor for Muslim mothers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 4.04$, $P = .67$).

Table (44) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between the employment of the mother and the fourth indicator, i.e., authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication.

Table 44: Employment of the Mother and Authorities Involved in Promoting Inter-Confessional Interaction and Communication

Employment of the Mother	Community															
	Christians in Tyre								Muslims in Jbail - Amchit							
	Employee		Housewife		Dead		Total		Employee		Housewife		Dead		No answer	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Authorities																
High status individuals	4	17.39	20	24.69	1	16.67	25	22,73	7	58.33	34	29.82	1	33.33	1	50,00
Religious authorities	14	60.87	37	45.68	3	50.00	54	49,09	3	25.00	18	15.79	0	0.00	0	0.00
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	0	0.00	4	4.94	0	0.00	4	3,64	0	0.00	1	0.88	0	0.00	0	0.00
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	0	0.00	6	7.41	0	0.00	6	5,45	1	8.33	27	23.68	2	66.67	0	0.00
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	5	21.74	13	16.05	1	16.67	19	17,27	1	8.33	33	28.95	0	0.00	0	0.00
Multi-confessional schools	0	0.00	1	1.23	1	16.67	2	1,82	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Exchange of common interests	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	0	0.00	1	0.88	0	0.00	0	0.00
No answer	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	0	0.00	6	5.26	0	0.00	1	50.00
Total	23	100.0	81	100.0	6	100.0	110	100,00	12	100.0	114	100.0	3	100.0	2	100.0

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 29.56$; $P = .009$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 22.18$; $P = .38$

The chi-square test for Christian mothers indicated a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 29.56$, $P = .009$). The chi-square test for Muslim mothers did not indicate a statistically significant

correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 22.18$, $P = .38$).

Therefore, the hypothesis in null except for 2 chi-square tests out of 8 that indicated a significant correlation between employment of the mother and the indicators of confessional attitudes.

Family Income

We assumed that level of income correlates with confessional attitudes. High-income families have higher expectations and more connections, and hence are more mobile and open-minded. Their outlook is less focused on confessional issues than low-income families. Based on this assumption, high and low income levels are expected to correlate with different confessional attitudes. This difference is traced in the four indicators of confessional attitudes studied before. Therefore, we forward a hypothesis that there is correlation between total monthly income of the family and the four indicators of confessionalism.

Table (45) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim families in terms of the relation between total monthly income and the first indicator of the nature of confessional relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 45: Total Monthly Income of the Family and the Nature of Confessional Relationship With the Adjacent Social Milieu

Total monthly Income	Community															
	Christians in Tyre								Muslims in Jbail - Amchit							
	500.000 L.L. and below		500.000 - 1.500.000		1.500.000 and above		Total		500.000 L.L. and below		500.000 - 1.500.000		1.500.000 and above		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	19	61.29	30	53.57	14	60.86	63	57,27	39	92.85	53	79.10	18	81.81	110	83,96
Reserved	8	25.80	14	25.00	6	26.08	28	25.45	3	7.14	10	14.92	3	13.63	16	12.21
Formal	4	12.90	10	17.85	3	13.04	17	15.45	0	0.00	3	4.47	0	0.00	3	2.29
No relationship	0	0.00	2	3.57	0	0.00	2	1,81	0	0.00	1	1.49	1	4.54	2	1,52
Total	31	100.00	56	100.00	23	100.00	110	100.00	42	100.00	67	100.00	22	100.00	131	100.00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 2.63$; $P = .85$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 6.74$; $P = .34$

The chi-square test for Christian families did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 2.63$, $P = .85$), nor for Muslim families at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 6.74$, $P = .34$).

Table (46) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim families in terms of the relation between total monthly income and the second indicator of impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 46: Total Monthly Income of the Family and Impediments to Excellent Relationship With the Adjacent Social Milieu

Kind of Impediments	Total Monthly income		Community												Total	
			Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jbail - Amchit							
	500.000 L.L. and below		500.000 - 1.500.000		1.500.000 and above		Total		500.000 L.L. and below		500.000 - 1.500.000		1.500.000 and above			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Different standards of living	1	3.23	4	7.14	2	8.70	7	6,36	7	16.67	12	17.91	1	4.55	20	15,27
Different traditions	13	41.94	22	39.29	5	21.74	40	36,36	10	23.81	12	17.91	7	31.82	29	22,14
Different confessions	2	6.45	18	32.14	7	30.43	27	24,55	7	16.67	12	17.91	3	13.64	22	16,79
Rejection by the social milieu	8	25.81	7	12.50	2	8.70	17	15,45	3	7.14	10	14.93	3	13.64	16	12,21
Feeling of superiority	4	12.90	1	1.79	2	8.70	7	6,36	4	9.52	5	7.46	2	9.09	11	8,40
Preoccupation with work	1	3.23	1	1.79	2	8.70	4	3,64	1	2.38	5	7.46	1	4.55	7	5,34
Different political orientation	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	0	0.00	2	2.99	1	4.55	3	2,29
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	1	2.38	1	1.49	1	4.55	3	2,29
No impediments	1	3.23	2	3.57	3	13.04	6	5,45	9	21.43	7	10.45	3	13.64	19	14,50
No answer	1	3.23	1	1.79	0	0.00	2	1,82	0	0.00	1	1.49	0	0.00	1	0,76
Total	31	100.0	56	100.0	23	100.0	110	100,00	42	100.0	67	100.0	22	100.00	131	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 21.51$; $P = .08$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 11.85$; $P = .85$

The chi-square test for Christian families did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 21.51$, $P = .08$), nor for Muslim families at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 11.85$, $P = .85$).

Table (47) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim families in terms of the relation between total monthly income and inter-confessional family education.

Table 47: Total Monthly Income of the Family and Inter-Confessional Family Education

Total monthly income	Community															
	Christians in Tyre								Muslims in Jbail - Amchit							
	500.000 L.L. and below		500.000 - 1.500.000		1.500.000 and above		Total		500.000 L.L. and below		500.000 - 1.500.000		1.500.000 and above		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter-confessional interaction	15	48.39	23	41.07	12	52.17	50	45.45	36	85.71	55	82.09	18	81.82	109	83.21
Does not encourage inter-confessional interaction	14	45.16	28	50.00	10	43.48	52	47.27	5	11.90	8	11.94	1	4.55	14	10.69
Neither	2	6.45	5	8.93	1	4.35	8	7.27	1	2.38	4	5.97	3	13.64	8	6.11
Total	31	100.0	56	100.0	23	100.0	110	100.00	42	100.00	67	100.0	22	100.0	131	100.00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 1.22$; $P = .87$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 3.97$; $P = .40$

The chi-square test for Christian families did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 1.22$, $P = .87$), nor for Muslim families at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 3.97$, $P = .40$).

Table (48) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim families in terms of the relationship between total monthly income of the family and authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication.

Table 48: Total Monthly Income of the Family and Authorities Involved in Promoting Inter-Confessional Interaction and Communication

Total monthly income	Community															
	Christians in Tyre								Muslims in Jbail - Amchit							
	500.000 L.L. and below		500.000 - 1.500.000		1.500.000 and above		Total		500.000 L.L. and below		500.000 - 1.500.000		1.500.000 and above		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
High status individuals	8	25.81	11	19.64	6	26.09	25	22,73	15	35.71	21	31.34	7	31.82	43	32,82
Religious authorities	13	41.94	29	51.79	12	52.17	54	49,09	4	9.52	12	17.91	5	22.73	21	16,03
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	2	6.45	1	1.79	1	4.35	4	3,64	0	0.00	1	1.49	0	0.00	1	0,76
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	3	9.68	3	5.36	4	17.39	10	9,09	6	14.29	13	19.40	5	22.73	24	18,32
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	4	12.90	11	19.64	0	0.00	15	13,64	16	38.10	13	19.40	5	22.73	34	25,95
Multi-confessional schools	1	3.23	1	1.79	0	0.00	2	1,82	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00
Exchange of common interests	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	0	0.00	1	1.49	0	0.00	1	0,76
No answer	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0,00	1	2.38	6	8.96	0	0.00	7	5,34
Total	31	100.00	56	100.00	23	100.00	110	100,00	42	100.00	67	100.00	22	100.0	131	100,0

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 15.61$; $P = .33$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 13.23$; $P = .50$

The chi-square test for Christian families did not indicate a

statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 15.61$, $P = .33$), nor for Muslim families at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 13.23$, $P = .50$).

Therefore, the hypothesis is null; there is no correlation between different income levels and changes in confessional attitudes.

Education of the Father and Mother⁽²⁾

Educational attainment is consigned to the category of achieved personal choices while religion is consigned to the category of the ascribed traditions and customs. Higher level of education offers wider range of interests, outlooks, and expectations. Individuals with higher level of education are more prone to have broadened horizons and increased life opportunities, hence, ascribed religious outlooks become superfluous in their life. By contrast, religious concerns become more common with lower educational levels as a result of limited life opportunities. Thus, we assume that high and low level of education correlate with different confessional attitudes. This difference is expected to be expressed in the four selected indicators of confessionalism. Therefore, we forward a hypothesis that there is correlation between level of education of the father and the mother and each of the four indicators of confessionalism.

Starting with the fathers' level of education, Table (49.1) and Table (49.2) present the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim fathers in terms of the relationship between level of education and the first indicator of the nature of relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

(2) We have regrouped educational levels in five categories.

Table 49.1: Education of the Father and the Nature of Confessional Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Nature of Relationship	Community													
	Christians in Tyre													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	14	70.00	30	50.00	2	50.00	6	60.00	5	71.43	6	66.67	63	57.27
Reserved	3	15.00	19	31.67	0	0.00	2	20.00	1	14.28	3	33.33	28	25.45
Formal	2	10.00	10	16.67	2	50.00	2	20.00	1	14.28	0	0.00	17	15.45
No relationship	1	5.00	1	1.67	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.82
Total	20	100.00	60	100.00	4	100.00	10	100.00	7	100.00	9	100.00	110	100.00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 18.23$; $P = .44$

Table 49.2: Education of the Father and the Nature of Confessional Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Nature of Relationship	Community													
	Muslims in Jbail - Amchit													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	21	87.50	53	80.30	8	72.73	11	91.67	9	90.00	8	100.00	110	83.97
Reserved	2	8.33	11	16.66	1	9.09	1	8.33	1	10.00	0	0.00	16	12.21
Formal	0	0.00	2	3.03	1	9.09	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	2.29
No relationship	1	4.17	0	0.00	1	9.09	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.53
Total	24	100.00	66	100.00	11	100.00	12	100.00	10	100.00	8	100.00	131	100.00

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 13.60$; $P = .75$

The chi-square test for Christian fathers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 18.23$, $P = .44$), nor for Muslim fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 13.60$, $P = .75$).

Table (50.1) and Table (50.2) present the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim fathers in terms of the relationship between level of education and the second indicator of impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 50.1: Education of the Father and Impediments to Excellent Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Kind of impediments	Community													
	Christians in Tyre													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Different standards of living	1	5.00	5	8.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	11.11	7	6.36
Different traditions	6	30.00	23	38.33	2	50.00	4	40.00	2	28.57	3	33.33	40	36.36
Different confessions	4	20.00	15	25.00	1	25.00	3	30.00	3	42.86	1	11.11	27	24.55
Rejection by the social milieu	4	20.00	10	16.67	0	0.00	1	10.00	0	0.00	2	22.22	17	15.45
Feeling of superiority	2	10.00	2	3.33	1	25.00	0	0.00	1	14.29	1	11.11	7	6.36
Preoccupation with work	0	0.00	2	3.33	0	0.00	2	20.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	3.64
Different political orientation	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
No impediments	2	10.00	2	3.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	14.29	1	11.11	6	5.45
No answer	1	5.00	1	1.67	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.82
Total	20	100.00	60	100.00	4	100.00	10	100.00	7	100.00	9	100.00	110	100.00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 34.63$; $P = .78$

Table 50.2: Education of the Father and Impediments to Excellent Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Kind of impediments	Community													
	Muslims in Jbail - Amchit													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Different standards of living	3	12.50	14	21.21	2	18.18	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	12.50	20	15.27
Different traditions	4	16.67	15	22.73	1	9.09	3	25.00	2	20.00	4	50.00	29	22.14
Different confessions	6	25.00	7	10.61	1	9.09	4	33.33	2	20.00	2	25.00	22	16.79
Rejection by the social milieu	2	8.33	9	13.64	2	18.18	0	0.00	2	20.00	1	12.50	16	12.21
Feeling of superiority	1	4.17	6	9.09	0	0.00	1	8.33	3	30.00	0	0.00	11	8.40
Preoccupation with work	0	0.00	3	4.55	3	27.27	1	8.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	7	5.34
Different political orientation	0	0.00	2	3.03	0	0.00	1	8.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	2.29
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	0	0.00	1	1.52	1	9.09	1	8.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	2.29
No impediments	7	29.17	9	13.64	1	9.09	1	8.33	1	10.00	0	0.00	19	14.50
No answer	1	4.17	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.76
Total	24	100.00	66	100.00	11	100.00	12	100.00	10	100.00	8	100.00	131	100.00

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 60.99$; $P = .23$

The chi-square test for Christian fathers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 34.63$, $P = .78$), nor for Muslim fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 60.99$, $P = .23$).

Table (51.1) and Table (51.2) present the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim fathers in terms of the relationship between level of education and the third indicator of inter-confessional family education.

Table 51.1: Education of the Father and Inter-confessional Family Education

Levels Attitudes	Community													
	Christians in Tyre													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter-confessional interaction	10	50.00	24	40.00	3	75.00	4	40.00	4	57.14	5	55.56	50	45.45
Does not encourage inter-confessional interaction	8	40.00	31	51.67	1	25.00	6	60.00	3	42.86	3	33.33	52	47.27
Neither	2	10.00	5	8.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	11.11	8	7.27
Total	20	100.00	60	100.00	4	100.00	10	100.00	7	100.00	9	100.00	110	100.00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 12.61$; $P = .39$

Table 51.2: Education of the Father and Inter-confessional Family Education

Levels Attitudes	Community													
	Muslims in Jbail - Amchit													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter-confessional interaction	20	83.33	56	84.85	7	63.64	11	91.67	7	70.00	8	100.00	109	83.21
Does not encourage inter-confessional interaction	2	8.33	7	10.61	3	27.27	1	8.33	1	10.00	0	0.00	14	10.69
Neither	2	8.33	3	4.55	1	9.09	0	0.00	2	20.00	0	0.00	8	6.11
Total	24	100.00	66	100.00	11	100.00	12	100.00	10	100.00	8	100.00	131	100.00

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 9.99$; $P = .61$

The chi-square test for Christian fathers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 12.61$, $P = .39$), nor for Muslim fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 9.99$, $P = .61$).

Table (52.1) and Table (52.2) present the frequencies and percen-

tages of Christian and Muslim fathers in terms of the relationship between level of education and the fourth indicator of authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication.

Table 52.1: Education of the Father and Authorities Involved in Promoting Inter-confessional Interaction and Communication

Authorities	Levels		Community													
	Christians in Tyre															
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
High status individuals	6	30,00	14	23,33	0	0,00	1	10,00	2	28,57	2	22,22	25	22,73		
Religious authorities	8	40,00	29	48,33	3	75,00	7	70,00	3	42,86	4	44,44	54	49,09		
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	0	0,00	3	5,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	14,29	0	0,00	4	3,64		
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	1	5,00	2	3,33	0	0,00	1	10,00	0	0,00	2	22,22	6	5,45		
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	4	20,00	12	20,00	1	25,00	1	10,00	1	14,29	0	0,00	19	17,27		
Multi-confessional schools	1	5,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	0,91		
Exchange of common interests	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	11,11	1	0,91		
No answer	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00		
Total	20	100,00	60	100,00	4	100,00	10	100,00	7	100,00	9	100,00	110	100,00		

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 42.79$; $P = .43$

Table 52.2: Education of the Father and Authorities Involved in Promoting Inter-confessional Interaction and Communication

Authorities	Levels		Community													
	Muslims in Jbail - Amchit															
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
High status individuals	9	37,50	24	36,36	3	27,27	3	25,00	1	10,00	3	37,50	43	32,82		
Religious authorities	3	12,50	11	16,67	3	27,27	1	8,33	2	20,00	1	12,50	21	16,03		
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	1	4,17	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	0,76		
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	3	12,50	11	16,67	2	18,18	2	16,67	4	40,00	2	25,00	24	18,32		
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	7	29,17	17	25,76	3	27,27	5	41,67	0	0,00	1	12,50	33	25,19		
Multi-confessional schools	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	8,33	0	0,00	1	12,50	2	1,53		
Exchange of common interests	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00		
No answer	1	4,17	3	4,55	0	0,00	0	0,00	3	30,00	0	0,00	7	5,34		
Total	24	100,00	66	100,00	11	100,00	12	100,00	10	100,00	8	100,00	131	100,0		

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 55.92$; $P = .07$

The chi-square test for Christian fathers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 42.79$, $P = .43$), nor for Muslim fathers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 55.92$, $P = .07$).

Therefore, the hypothesis is null; there is no correlation between level of education of the father and changes in confessional attitudes.

From the fathers' level of education, we consider the level of education of the mother. Table (53.1) and Table (53.2) present the

frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim mothers in terms of the relationship between level of education and the first indicator of the nature of confessional relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 53.1: Education of the Mother and the Nature of Confessional Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Nature of Relationship	Community													
	Christians in Tyre													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	8	61,54	27	51,92	1	33,33	20	62,50	2	66,67	5	71,43	63	57,27
Reserved	4	30.76	10	19.23	1	33.33	11	34.37	0	0.00	2	28.57	28	25.45
Formal	1	7.69	13	25.00	1	33.33	1	3.12	1	33.33	0	0.00	17	15.45
No relationship	0	0,00	2	3,85	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	2	1,82
Total	13	100,00	52	100,00	3	100,00	32	100,00	3	100,00	7	100,00	110	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 15.84$; $P = .60$

Table 53.2: Education of the Mother and the Nature of Confessional Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Nature of Relationship	Community													
	Muslims in Jbail - Amchit													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	28	96,55	48	80,00	5	83,33	17	89,47	9	75,00	3	60,00	110	83,97
Reserved	1	3,45	12	20,00	1	16,67	0	0.00	2	16.66	0	0,00	16	12.21
Formal	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	5,26	1	8.33	1	20,00	3	2.29
No relationship	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	5,26	0	0,00	1	20,00	2	1,53
Total	29	100,00	60	100,00	6	100,00	19	100,00	12	100,00	5	100,00	131	100,00

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 90.54$; $P = .00$

The chi-square test for Christian mothers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 15.84$, $P = .60$). The chi-square test for Muslim mothers indicated a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 90.54$, $P = .00$).

Table (54.1) and Table (54.2) present the frequencies and percentages

of Christian and Muslim mothers in terms of the relationship between level of education and the second indicator of impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 54.1: Education of the Mother and Impediments to Excellent Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Levels Kind of Impediments	Community													
	Christians in Tyre													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Different standards of living	0	0,00	5	9,62	0	0,00	1	3,13	0	0,00	1	14,29	7	6,36
Different traditions	5	38,46	20	38,46	1	33,33	9	28,13	1	33,33	4	57,14	40	36,36
Different confessions	2	15,38	11	21,15	0	0,00	13	40,63	1	33,33	0	0,00	27	24,55
Rejection by the social milieu	2	15,38	9	17,31	0	0,00	5	15,63	0	0,00	1	14,29	17	15,45
Feeling of superiority	1	7,69	4	7,69	0	0,00	2	6,25	0	0,00	0	0,00	7	6,36
Preoccupation with work	0	0,00	1	1,92	2	66,67	1	3,13	0	0,00	0	0,00	4	3,64
Different political orientation	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00
No impediments	2	15,38	1	1,92	0	0,00	1	3,13	1	33,33	1	14,29	6	5,45
No answer	1	7,69	1	1,92	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	2	1,82
Total	13	100,00	52	100,00	3	100,00	32	100,00	3	100,00	7	100,00	110	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 63.84$; $P = .01$

Table 54.2: Education of the Mother and Impediments to Excellent Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Levels Kind of impediments	Community													
	Muslims in Jbail - Amchit													
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Different standards of living	3	10,34	12	20,00	0	0,00	2	10,53	0	0,00	3	60,00	20	15,27
Different traditions	4	13,79	17	28,33	0	0,00	6	31,58	2	16,67	0	0,00	29	22,14
Different confessions	6	20,69	11	18,33	3	50,00	1	5,26	1	8,33	0	0,00	22	16,79
Rejection by the social milieu	3	10,34	7	11,67	0	0,00	4	21,05	1	8,33	1	20,00	16	12,21
Feeling of superiority	3	10,34	4	6,67	0	0,00	2	10,53	2	16,67	0	0,00	11	8,40
Preoccupation with work	0	0,00	2	3,33	1	16,67	1	5,26	2	16,67	1	20,00	7	5,34
Different political orientation	0	0,00	1	1,67	1	16,67	0	0,00	1	8,33	0	0,00	3	2,29
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	1	3,45	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	5,26	1	8,33	0	0,00	3	2,29
No impediments	8	27,59	6	10,00	1	16,67	2	10,53	2	16,67	0	0,00	19	14,50
No answer	1	3,45	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	0,76
Total	29	100,00	60	100,00	6	100,00	19	100,00	12	100,00	5	100,00	131	100,00

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 61.01$; $P = .23$

The chi-square test for Christian mothers indicated a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 63.84$, $P = .01$). The chi-square test for Muslim mothers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 61.01$, $P = .23$).

Table (55.1) and Table (55.2) present the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim mothers in terms of the relationship between level of education and the third indicator of inter-confessional family education.

Table 55.1: Education of the Mother and Inter-confessional Family Education

Attitudes	Levels		Community													
			Christians in Tyre													
			Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter-confessional interaction	9	69,23	18	34,62	2	66,67	15	46,88	1	33,33	5	71,43	50	45,45		
Does not encourage inter-confessional interaction	3	23,08	30	57,69	1	33,33	15	46,88	2	66,67	1	14,29	52	47,27		
Neither	1	7,69	4	7,69	0	0,00	2	6,25	0	0,00	1	14,29	8	7,27		
Total	13	100,00	52	100,00	3	100,00	32	100,00	3	100,00	7	100,00	110	100,00		

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 15.47$; $P = .21$

Table 55.2: Education of the Mother and Inter-confessional Family Education

Attitudes	Levels		Community													
			Muslims in Jbail - Amchit													
			Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter-confessional interaction	26	89,66	52	86,67	5	83,33	13	68,42	9	75,00	4	80,00	109	83,21		
Does not encourage inter-confessional interaction	1	3,45	6	10,00	1	16,67	4	21,05	2	16,67	0	0,00	14	10,69		
Neither	2	6,90	2	3,33	0	0,00	2	10,53	1	8,33	1	20,00	8	6,11		
Total	29	100,00	60	100,00	6	100,00	19	100,00	12	100,00	5	100,00	131	100,00		

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 22.82$; $P = .02$

The chi-square test for Christian mothers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 15.47$, $P = .21$). The chi-square test for Muslim mothers indicated a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 22.82$, $P = .02$).

Table (56.1) and Table (56.2) present the frequencies and percentages of Christian and Muslim mothers in terms of the relationship between level of education and the fourth indicator of authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication.

Table 56.1: Education of the Mother and Authorities Involved in Promoting Inter-confessional Interaction and Communication

Authorities	Levels	Community													
	Christians in Tyre														
	Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total		
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
High status individuals	4	30,77	13	25,00	0	0,00	6	18,75	1	33,33	1	14,29	25	22,73	
Religious authorities	6	46,15	23	44,23	3	100,00	16	50,00	1	33,33	5	71,43	54	49,09	
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	1	7,69	1	1,92	0	0,00	1	3,13	1	33,33	0	0,00	4	3,64	
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	0	0,00	4	7,69	0	0,00	2	6,25	0	0,00	0	0,00	6	5,45	
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	2	15,38	10	19,23	0	0,00	7	21,88	0	0,00	0	0,00	19	17,27	
Multi-confessional schools	0	0,00	1	1,92	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	0,91	
Exchange of common interests	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	0,91	
No answer	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	14,29	0	0,00	
Total	13	100,00	52	100,00	3	100,00	32	100,00	3	100,00	7	100,00	110	100,00	

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 41.69$; $P = .48$

Table 56.2: Education of the Mother and Authorities Involved in Promoting Inter-confessional Interaction and Communication

Authorities	Levels		Community													
			Muslims in Jbail - Amchit													
			Illiterate		Basic education		Technical degrees		Baccalaureate		University degrees		No answer		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
High status individuals	9	31,03	18	30,00	1	16,67	9	47,37	3	25,00	3	60,00	43	32,82		
Religious authorities	5	17,24	10	16,67	1	16,67	3	15,79	2	16,67	0	0,00	21	16,03		
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	1	3,45	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	0,76		
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	7	24,14	8	13,33	0	0,00	4	21,05	3	25,00	2	40,00	24	18,32		
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	6	20,69	21	35,00	2	33,33	3	15,79	2	16,67	0	0,00	34	25,95		
Multi-confessional schools	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	16,67	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	0,76		
Exchange of common interests	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00		
No answer	1	3,45	3	5,00	1	16,67	0	0,00	2	16,67	0	0,00	7	5,34		
Total	29	100,00	60	100,00	6	100,00	19	100,00	12	100,00	5	100,00	131	100,00		

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 48.34$; $P = .23$

The chi-square test for Christian mothers did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 41.69$, $P = .48$), nor for Muslim mothers at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 48.34$, $P = .23$).

Therefore, the hypothesis is null except for 3 chi-square tests out of 8 that indicated a significant correlation between educational level of the mother and indicators of confessional attitudes.

Type of schooling for children

Public schools in Lebanon exclude religious teaching from their curriculum to the benefit of supra-confessional subjects. Some private schools, particularly those owned and managed by confessional groups, transmit the socio-cultural heritage, specially the religious heritage, of the confessional community. We assume that public schooling correlates with weak confessional attitudes and private schooling with strong confessional attitudes. Thus, we forwarded a hypothesis that there is correlation between type of school and the four indicators of confessional attitudes.

We considered profitable and non-profitable private school as one category of schools managed by confessional groups, and in this capacity both transmit the religious and socio-cultural heritage of particular confessional groupings. We assume that the type of school whether private or public correlates with different confessional attitudes. Thus, we forward a hypothesis that there is correlation between the type of school and each of the four indicators of confessionalism.

Table (57) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between type of school and the first indicator of the nature of confessional relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 57: Type of School and the Nature of Confessional Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu⁽³⁾

Type of School Nature of relationship	Community											
	Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jbail - Amchit					
	Public		Private		Total		Public		Private		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Good	5	71,43	56	52,34	61	53,51	57	76,00	81	88,04	138	82,63
Reserved	0	0,00	28	26,16	28	24,56	14	18,66	11	11,95	21	12,57
Formal	2	28,57	23	21,49	25	21,92	0	0,00	0	0,00	4	2,40
No relationship	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	4	5,33	0	0,00	4	2,40
Total	7	100,00	107	100,00	114	100,00	75	100,00	92	100,00	167	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 1.46$; $P = .48$;

(3) Figures in the table include enrolled children under the age of 18.

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 3.11$; $P = .37$

The chi-square test for Christians did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 1.46$, $P = .48$), nor for Muslims at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 3.11$, $P = .37$).

Table (58) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between type of school and the second indicator of impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu.

Table 58: Type of School and Impediments to Excellent Relationship with the Adjacent Social Milieu

Type of School Kind of Impediments	Community											
	Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jbail - Amchit					
	Public		Private		Total		Public		Private		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Different standards of living	0	0,00	8	7,48	8	7,02	14	18,67	18	19,57	32	19,16
Different traditions	3	42,86	30	28,04	33	28,95	15	20,00	16	17,39	31	18,56
Different confessions	1	14,29	31	28,97	32	28,07	7	9,33	20	21,74	27	16,17
Rejection by the social milieu	0	0,00	19	17,76	19	16,67	9	12,00	18	19,57	27	16,17
Feeling of superiority	0	0,00	5	4,67	5	4,39	7	9,33	3	3,26	10	5,99
Preoccupation with work	3	42,86	3	2,80	6	5,26	7	9,33	7	7,61	14	8,38
Different political orientation	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	2	2,67	3	3,26	5	2,99
Interference of political authorities (Lebanese and non-Lebanese)	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	3	3,26	3	1,80
No impediments	0	0,00	7	6,54	7	6,14	14	18,67	4	4,35	18	10,78
No answer	0	0,00	4	3,74	4	3,51	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00
Total	7	100,00	107	100,00	114	100,00	75	100,00	92	100,00	167	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 7.88$; $P = .34$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 11.77$; $P = .16$

The chi-square test for Christians did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 7.88$, $P = .34$), nor for Muslims at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 11.77$, $P = .16$).

Table (59) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between type of school and the third indicator of inter-confessional family education.

Table 59: Type of School and Inter-Confessional Family Education

Type of School Attitudes	Community											
	Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jbail - Amchit					
	Public		Private		Total		Public		Private		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Encourages inter-confessional interaction	4	57,14	45	42,06	49	42,98	64	85,33	71	77,17	135	80,84
Does not encourage inter-confessional interaction	3	42,86	58	54,21	61	53,51	6	8,00	15	16,30	21	12,57
Neither	0	0,00	4	3,74	4	3,51	5	6,67	6	6,52	11	6,59
Total	7	100,00	107	100,00	114	100,00	75	100,00	92	100,0	167	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = .26$; $P = .87$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = .25$; $P = .88$

The chi-square test for Christians did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = .26$, $P = .87$), nor for Muslims at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = .25$, $P = .88$).

Table (60) presents the frequencies and percentages of Christians and Muslims in terms of the relationship between type of school and the fourth indicator of authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication.

Table 60: Type of School and Authorities Involved in Promoting Inter-confessional Interaction and Communication

Type of School Authorities	Community										Total	
	Christians in Tyre						Muslims in Jball - Amchit					
	Public		Private		Total		Public		Private			
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
High status individuals	0	0,00	25	23,36	25	21,93	26	34,67	26	28,26	52	31,14
Religious authorities	1	14,29	54	50,47	55	48,25	11	14,67	16	17,39	27	16,17
Elected political leaders (mayor, headman, deputy)	0	0,00	7	6,54	7	6,14	1	1,33	0	0,00	1	0,60
Voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations)	0	0,00	5	4,67	5	4,39	21	28,00	17	18,48	38	22,75
Authorities are not needed because relationships are good	6	85,71	15	14,02	21	18,42	15	20,00	24	26,09	39	23,35
Multi-confessional schools	0	0,00	1	0,93	1	0,88	0	0,00	1	1,09	1	0,60
Exchange of common interests	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	1	1,33	1	1,09	2	1,20
No answer	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	0	0,00	7	7,61	7	4,19
Total	7	100,00	107	100,00	114	100,00	75	100,00	92	100,00	167	100,00

Christians in Tyre: $\chi^2 = 9.46$; $P = .14$;

Muslims in Jbail-Amchit: $\chi^2 = 5.74$; $P = .57$

The chi-square test for Christians did not indicate a statistically significant correlation at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 9.46$, $P = .14$), nor for Muslims at the $P > .05$ ($\chi^2 = 5.74$, $P = .57$).

Therefore, the hypothesis is null. There is no correlation between type of school and the indicators of confessional attitudes.

As we have seen, there is no correlation between the five selected

socio-economic variables of (1) location of the workplace of the father, (2) employment of the mother, (3) family income, (4) level of education of the father and mother, (5) schooling of the children and each of the four indicators of confessional attitudes, namely, (1) nature of confessional relationship, (2) impediments to excellent relationship with the adjacent social milieu, (3) inter-confessional family education, (4) authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication.

We conclude that socio-economic conditions do not shape confessional attitudes. Empirically, confessionalism is not a dependent variable of socio-economic conditions.

Considering these findings within the framework of the primordialists, these findings support the primordial approach that insists on the givenness and the pervasiveness of confessionalism in the Lebanese society and its role in the relations of production and distribution. In the same vein, these findings illustrate the weberian view of status groups. Christians and Muslims constitute - as we have seen in part one - two different status group defined in terms of different ideas and styles of life and not in terms of social classes defined and determined by material conditions. In addition, these findings accord with weberians⁽⁴⁾ and certain neo-marxists⁽⁵⁾ who assume that ideology is an important determinant of meaningful social action. These findings also go along with post-modernists who take the weberian stand a step further and stipulate that regimes of power / knowledge⁽⁶⁾, and politics of discourse⁽⁷⁾, or signs, codes, and images⁽⁸⁾ and cultural capital⁽⁹⁾ dominate every day life of individuals and groups and, hence, the society at large.

(4) Weber (1930), Bendix (1966), Eisenstadt (1968, 1973), Bellah (1965), Berger and Hsiao (1988), Inkelas and Smith (1974), McClelland (1961), Robertson and Lechner (1990), Robertson (1997), Walzer (1965).

(5) Gramsci (1971, Laclau and Mouffe (1987), Lash and Urry (1987), Thompson (1963) Best and Kellner (1991), Harvey (1990), Jameson (1984), Touraine (1995), Castells (1989), and the theorists of the Frankfurt School [Jay (1973), Blackburn (1973), Ben (1992)] .

(6) Foucault (1995).

(7) Lyotard (1971, 1988).

(8) Baudillard (1975, 1983), Appadurai (1990), Luke (1995).

(9) Bourdieu (1984).

CONCLUSION

Polemics over confessionalism in Lebanon entail two broad viewpoints: the primordial and the structural. Some see the virtues and some see the evils in confessionalism. Those who see the virtues consider confessionalism a given fact in the Lebanese society and relate it to Lebanon's success story of economic liberalism and plural democracy. However, those who see the evils consider that confessionalism leads to fragmentation of society, fanaticism, violence, marginalization of civil society, trivialization of democracy as well as to a failed political clientelist system, and they see the solution in abolishing confessionalism.

Concerning the relation between confessionalism and national integration some writers see national integration in terms of institutional mechanism capable of the management of confessional pluralism. Other writers see national integration in terms of structural reforms that ultimately limit confessionalism. The failure to implement structural reforms reproduces confessionalism which in turn produces strife and turbulences in social life.

Our attempt was to provide some answers to whether confessionalism is a given fact in the Lebanese society or simply a superstructure reproduced by the Lebanese system; if confessionalism explains the success story of Lebanon or its precarious and archaic foundation; if confessionalism promotes or hinders national integration; and if national integration is contingent only on the confessional issue. But the big question remains: If confessionalism is an obstacle and leads to fragmentation, shall we abolish confessionalism to attain national integration? To answer this question, we have to discern the problem in its social context. Is it in the failed system that enhances confessionalism allowing extremism and violence to take the lead? If

the answer affirms this statements, reforms are imperative. Or, is the problem located in confessionalism? Again, if the answer is affirmative, deconfessionalization imposes itself on the Lebanese society.

This study drew on the premise that confessionalism is a given fact of the Lebanese society. It, also, has an ineffable and overpowering coerciveness in and of itself. The different sociological aspects of both Christians and Muslims showed that both are status groups in the weberian terms. They are defined in terms of styles of life, ideas and values rather than in terms of material conditions of social class. It was established that Christians in Tyre and Muslims in Jbail-Amchit are two different status groups who have different styles of life and outlooks expressed in different occupational structures, different housing arrangements, different educational attitudes and different demographic patterns ending up with different levels of communal cohesiveness of kinship and religious solidarity. We noted how Christians and Muslims experience their socio-economic and demographic conditions in two different ways: Christians are predisposed to display a more pronounced sense of communality in matters of kinship and religion, whereas Muslims tend to exhibit a more loose sense of communality in kinship and religion. In this context both communities do not form two different social classes because the differences in their material conditions do not rank them in different socio-economic positions in the social hierarchy. Their differences are in their different life styles and outlooks. Hence, the differences in communal solidarity between Christians and Muslims are explained in terms of status rather than in terms of social class. This supports the primordial viewpoint.

Another dimension of Christians and Muslims as two different status groups is the minority status of the Christians versus the majority status of the Muslims. Minority status groups live with a feeling of insecurity that contributes to a high sense of solidarity and accentuated communal identity. Conversely, majority status groups are more secure in their social milieu and, hence, exhibit an attenuated sense of confessional solidarity and identity. Accordingly, Christians form a solidary minority group more conscious of their communal identity compared to the more tenuous sense of solidarity and identity of the Muslim's majority status group. This divergence between Christians and Muslims was clear in the nature of their inter-confessional relationships, their explanation of the impedi-

ments to excellent inter-confessional relationships, their reasons for settlement in the quarter, their willingness to relocate to the adjacent social milieu, their family education, schooling and economic life. Here, again, this divergence between Christians and Muslims embrace the primordial perspective.

Considering the givenness of confessionalism, the primordial ties of confessionalism were examined in terms of the correlations between selected socio-economic variables and confessional attitudes. The selected variables were communal versus non-communal workplaces of fathers, employment versus non-employment of mothers, different educational attainment of parents, and different types of schools as socio-economic variables. The confessional variables were measured in terms of the respondents' attitude regarding their inter-confessional relationships and family education as well as the authorities they refer to in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication.

Importantly, no statistically significant correlation was detected between these variables. This showed that confessional attitudes are not shaped by socio-economic conditions. Confessionalism is not a dependent variable of material conditions and this supports the primordial approach that sees pervasiveness of confessionalism in the Lebanese society and the role it plays in the relations of production and distribution. This, too, converges with the weberians and certain neo-marxists who give an important role to ideas in human societies. Post-modernists, as well, confer more autonomy to culture-related notions of signs, codes and images, discourses and figures, and regimes of power / knowledge.

Confessionalism can promote or hinder national integration. So, is national integration contingent only on the confessional issue? Is the problem in confessionalism or in the Lebanese system? The Christian and Muslim community as two different status groups revealed a weak sense of national integration. The analysis of data showed that most Christians and Muslims do not cooperate in pursuing local development policies that ensure the welfare of the local community. They tend to disregard unifying national traditions and emphasize their own confessional traditions. They refer to confessionally-oriented authorities rather than to voluntary associations of civil society to resolve inter-confessional

conflicts and promote inter-confessional interaction and communication. Social obligation are more valued as a scope of inter-confessional relationship than vital scopes of politics, common interests, friendship and marriage needed for building up national integration. Their views of what promotes confessional coexistence reflect rhetorically the traditional political discourse prevailing in the country, and they disregard the role of civil society, cultural pluralism and structural reforms.

This weak sense of national integration of Christians and Muslims seem to support the viewpoint that confessionalism reproduces a fragmented, backward, and failed social order in Lebanon. However, confessionalism and national integration are different but dialectically related. National integration embodies and transcends confessionalism. Hence, confessionalism is part of a whole that can not be reduced to its elementary parts. Then, the problem of national integration should be posed at the national level rather than at the givenness of confessions. The problem of Lebanon, therefore, is not in the existence of confessions and the primordialism of confessionalism; but rather in the failure of the prevailing national order to promote the efficient integration of the confessions into a modern, plural, and democratic nation-state.

We suggested that national integration should concern the society at large and the propositions advanced by primordialists and structuralists are prerequisites for attaining national integration. First, the worries, differences, and aspirations of the confessions should be recognized. More importantly, these confessional communities should be institutionalized at the national level in consensus democracy and personal federalism. Definitely, this entails bringing to an end the discourse on the abolishment of confessionalism. Second, good management of political pluralism requires structural reforms in the economic, political, social, and cultural domains along the lines proposed by structuralists. The failure to implement reforms in the Lebanese system reproduces the evils of confessionalism in social life. These evils manifest themselves in fragmentation, fanaticism, violence as well as in the marginalisation of civil society and trivialization of democracy.

We have indicated that the Lebanese social order has failed to establish a nationally integrated, viable, and stable society along the lines proposed by primordialists and structuralists. Consequently, confession-

alism has remained a burning issue awaiting appeasement and national integration is still on the agenda. Not until this system finds the required formula using the elements of primordialists and structuralists, will national integration and social stability be attained. Without a nationally integrated society, the country will always be at risk of witnessing more confessionalism that history and experience proved it to be a fertile soil for extremism and violence.

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE ADDRESSED TO THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY

Item of the questionnaire included the following:

- Family Name:
- First Name:
- Place of Residence:
- Confession:
- Occupation of the head of the family:
- Secondary occupation of the head of the family:
- Workplace of the head of the family:
 - ☐ inside the quarter
 - ☐ outside the quarter
- Confessional affiliation of business partnership of the head of the family:
- Confessional affiliation of wage labor of the head of the family:
- Occupation of the mother:
- Total monthly income of the family:
 - ☐ 500.000 and below
 - ☐ 500.000 1.500.000
 - ☐ 1.500.000 and above.

- Number of working children and relatives in the family:
- Contribution of working children and relatives to the family income:
- Date of construction of the house:
 - ☐ less than 4 years
 - ☐ from 5 to 24 years
 - ☐ 25 years and more
- Condition of the house:
 - ☐ good
 - ☐ average
 - ☐ poor
- Area of the house:
 - ☐ 49 m2 - 99 m2
 - ☐ 100 m2 - 149 m2
 - ☐ 150 m2 and above
- Means of obtaining the house:
 - ☐ inheritance
 - ☐ construction
 - ☐ purchase
 - ☐ rent
 - ☐ other, specify:
- Educational qualification of the head of the family:
- Educational qualification of the mother:
- Schooling of the children:
 - Type of school:
 - ☐ public
 - ☐ profitable private
 - ☐ non-profitable private
- Reasons for choice of school:

-
- Reasons for non-enrollment in school:
 - Level of education of children:
 - Size of the family:
 - Structure of the family:
 - ☐ nuclear
 - ☐ extended
 - ☐ kinship relationship of relatives with members of the family
 - Age of the father:
 - Age of the mother:
 - Age of the children:
 - Nature of confessional relationship with the adjacent social milieu:
 - ☐ good
 - ☐ reserved
 - ☐ formal
 - ☐ no relationship
 - Impediments to excellent relationship with the social milieu:
 - ☐ different standards of living
 - ☐ different traditions
 - ☐ different confessions
 - ☐ rejection by the social milieu
 - ☐ other, specify:
 - Reasons for settlement in the quarter:
 - ☐ place of birth
 - ☐ residence of relatives
 - ☐ feeling of security among co-religionists
 - ☐ other, specify:
 - Attitudes vis-à-vis relocation to the adjacent social milieu:
 - ☐ accept to relocate

- ☐ accept to relocate with conditions
- ☐ decline to relocate
- Incentives for accepting to relocate to the adjacent social milieu:
 - ☐ willingness to coexist with other confessions
 - ☐ better social conditions
 - ☐ change in life style
 - ☐ dissatisfaction with current social relationship
- Specifications of conditions for accepting to relocate to the adjacent social milieu:
 - ☐ availability of a suitable house
 - ☐ more convenient social environment
 - ☐ closeness to work
 - ☐ availability of job opportunities
 - ☐ residence of co-religionists
- Reasons for declining to relocate to the adjacent social milieu:
 - ☐ satisfaction with current social relationship
 - ☐ satisfaction with the house
 - ☐ closeness to work
 - ☐ feeling of security among co-religionists
 - ☐ preference to live with co-religionists
 - ☐ inability to coexist with different confessions
- Inter-confessional family education:
 - ☐ encourages inter-confessional interaction
 - ☐ does not encourage inter-confessional interaction
 - ☐ neither
- Inter-confessional cooperation in local development policies;
 - ☐ cooperate
 - ☐ do not cooperate
- What are the traditions of the confessional communities?

-
- Authorities referred to in the resolution of inter-confessional conflicts:
 - ☐ high status individuals
 - ☐ religious authorities
 - ☐ elected political authorities (mayor, headman, deputy)
 - ☐ internal security forces
 - ☐ judicial authorities
 - ☐ other, specify:
 - Authorities involved in promoting inter-confessional interaction and communication:
 - ☐ high status individuals
 - ☐ religious authorities
 - ☐ elected political authorities (mayor, headman, deputy)
 - ☐ voluntary associations (political parties, trade unions, professional associations, charitable organizations).
 - ☐ other, specify:
 - Scope of inter-confessional relationships (rate the following on a 7-point scale from the most important (1) to the least important (7). Zero means no relationship).
 - ☐ participation in political celebration
 - ☐ participation in national and official ceremonies
 - ☐ sharing moments of joy and sorrow
 - ☐ relationships based on work and common interests
 - ☐ friendship relationships
 - ☐ marriage relationships
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CLASSIFICATION OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE FATHER

We have regrouped the Occupation of the Fathers into the following 4 categories:

1 - Professionals

Professionals are members of the liberal professions. In our sample professionals comprise the following:

- physician
- engineer
- lawyer
- pharmacist

2 - Formal Employees of the Private Sector

Formal employees are wage earners in Formal enterprises. Formal enterprises are capital-intensive and large scale bureaucratic organizations in the service and industrial sectors. These enterprises hire skilled wage labor who have benefits, regular hours of work, regular and relatively high salaries. Relations are impersonal both within the enterprises and between the enterprises and their clients. We have subdivided employees into two groups: middle-ranking and low-ranking employees. The former have higher incomes than the latter.

i - Middle-Ranking Employees

In our sample this category of employees comprises the following:

- pharmacist assistant

- school teachers
- maintenance workers and technicians
- sales-clerks in stores and boutiques
- topographer
- employee in the Casino of Lebanon

ii- Low-Ranking Employees

This category of employees comprises the following:

- workers in factories
- employees in shops, supermarkets, stores and boutiques
- daily workers in numerous enterprises
- builders
- agricultural laborers
- bodyguards
- janitors
- cooks
- chefs
- confectioners
- van and bus drivers
- bulldozer drivers
- distributors of various goods
- employees in Coca Cola

3 - Formal Employees of the Public Sector

Formal employees are the salaried personnel of the state. This category includes civil servants and the military.

i- Civil Servants

Civil servants are low-ranking employees of ministries and other state

institutions (electricity of Lebanon, office of social security, Litani Project, the Water Company).

ii- Military

Military are the low-ranking personnel of the army, the Internal Security Forces, and the Public Security.

4 - Informal Self-employed

These are the owners of the informal enterprises. Informal enterprises are labor-intensive and small-scale enterprises owned by families. These enterprises hire unskilled and low-income wage labor who enjoy no benefits and whose work hours are irregular. Relations are personal both within the enterprises and between the enterprises and their clients.

In our sample we regrouped owners of self-employed informal enterprises and employees of these enterprises in one category of self-employed fathers. The small scale nature of the enterprises and the overlapping of ownership and employment (some employees are co-owners and some owners run a one-man business concern) required this regroupment. For example, of the 26 fishermen of our sample, 2 are fishing boats manufacturers, 4 own fishing boats, and 8 own fishing nets, and the others are propertyless fishermen. The same principle applies to carpenters, head builders, confectioners and others. This principle allowed the classification of the self-employed into 3 groups: self-employed owners of major means of production or shops or means of transportation; employed owners of minor means of production or means of services, and property less employees who sell their labor power.

Approximately, the self-employed are composed of equal percentages of major owners, minor owner employees and propertyless employees. We regrouped the self-employed into 3 major sub-divisions: The petty traders, the petty craftsmen, and the petty servicemen.

Petty traders comprise the following:

- owners of grocery shops
- owners of supermarkets
- owners of boutiques

- owners of shoe stores
- owners of jewelry stores
- owners of butcheries
- owners of confectionery shops
- Retail sellers of vegetables, building material, home appliances, and car spare parts.
- owners of beverage stores.
- Petty craftsmen possess the know-how of particular crafts. In our sample craftsmen comprise the following:
 - fishermen and fishing boats manufacturers
 - construction entrepreneurs
 - head builders
 - white washers
 - painters
 - paviors
 - sawyers
 - carpenters
 - blacksmith
 - tailors
 - restaurateurs
 - coffee shop owners
 - food and sweet confectioners and sellers

Petty servicemen neither produce nor sell goods; they only provide services. In our sample servicemen comprise the following:

- commissioners
- real estate agents
- insurance agents

- taxi drivers
- bus owners and drivers
- van owners and drivers
- pick-up owners and drivers
- secretaries
- motorcar repairers
- motorcar polishers
- electricians
- repairers of computers, radios, TVs, etc.
- mechanics and maintenance workers.

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